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Abstract 
 
Michel Foucault’s later work contains the foundations of an ‘ethic of power.’ This 
ethic, I suggest, provides an alternative approach to the question of what it means to 
‘resist’ power.  
‘Relations of power’ for Foucault describes an inalienable feature of social 
interaction. This account continues to cause debate among scholars with diverging 
views about its critical and political implications. In addressing these concerns I make 
the point that many of Foucault’s critics assume certain interpretations of terms such 
as ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ that locate these criticisms in the very traditions Foucault 
was attempting to overcome. Consequently, their evaluation of Foucault’s critical and 
political contributions are made from within these same traditions. 
Re-reading these concepts in light of his later work on ‘government’ and on 
ancient ethics requires a renewed approach to understanding a Foucaultian concept of 
politics. In turn, this requires a re-thinking of the relationship of ethics to politics and 
the nature of the political field itself. In disassociating political power from the state, 
Foucault disrupts the usual alignment between the public and political spheres. By 
arguing that power relations extend throughout society, Foucault posits the political 
field as co-extensive with networks of power relations. The subject thus emerges as a 
constitutive element of the political field. In this way, Foucault posits aesthetic 
practices of self-stylisation firmly in the domain of politics. In this way, the 
constitution of the subject takes its place as an integral part of Foucault’s idea of 
politics.  
In light of these points, I argue that in understanding what Foucault means by 
‘resistance’ we should look to his account of the ‘critical attitude’—the right to 
qualified refusal of forms of government. This is not to say that resistance to power is 
limited to this refusal, but that the latter founds resistance to power. As such, an ethic 
of power would not describe how to exercise power, nor would it determine some 
exercises of power as ‘good’ and others as ‘bad.’ Rather, it would be an ethic that 
governs how we constitute ourselves as ethical subjects, in relation to ourselves and in 
relation to others, following the recognition that we are each subjects of, and subject 
to, power.  
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I outline the conceptual foundations of an ‘ethic of power,’ focusing on 
how key ideas from Michel Foucault’s late investigations into ancient ethics 
demonstrate an ongoing concern with political and interpersonal exercises of power. 
This ethic provides an alternative approach to the question of what it means to ‘resist’ 
power. It is not an ethic that describes how to exercise power, nor, strictly speaking, 
does it determine some exercises of power as acceptable and others as not. It is an 
ethic that governs how we constitute ourselves as ethical subjects, in relation to 
ourselves and in relation to others, following the recognition that we are each subjects 
of and subject to power. This ethic arises as part of a renewed approach to Foucault’s 
idea of politics, the relationship between ethics and politics, and the nature of the 
political field itself.  
A re-thinking of Foucaultian politics is required by re-reading the concepts of 
‘power’ and ‘freedom’ in light of his later work on ‘government’ and ancient ethics. 
Foucault posits such governmental concepts as ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’ as 
historically and socially contingent phenomena. By arguing that power relations 
extend throughout society, he posits the political field as co-extensive with networks 
of power relations. As such, Foucault disrupts the usual alignment between the public 
and political spheres. In conceiving of the subject as arising within networks of power 
relations, moreover, the subject emerges as a constitutive element of the political field. 
In positing aesthetic practices of self-stylisation firmly in the domain of politics, the 
constitution of the subject takes its place as an integral part of Foucault’s idea of 
politics. In conclusion, I argue that ‘resistance’ should primarily be understood as 
referring to the capacity for refusal engendered by the critical attitude. 
Foucault’s idea that ‘relations of power’ form an inalienable part of social 
interaction continues to cause debate among scholars with diverging views about its 
critical and political implications. His critics have tended to read the ubiquity of power 
as precluding any possibility of resisting power. This is particularly because Foucault 
appears to fail to offer a strong normative framework that would render concepts such 
as ‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ meaningful. Yet, as these same scholars point out, 
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Foucault continues to employ such terms in articulating his broader project. Along 
these lines, Foucault’s later work has often been read as addressing these apparent 
critical shortfalls by re-introducing the ideas of ethics and subjectivity into his 
philosophical vocabulary.  
One of the aims of this thesis, then, is to present a coherent defence of 
Foucault’s project that avoids the well-known problems that arise from Foucault’s 
often inconsistent and sometimes problematic presentation of his views. Particularly, it 
attempts to demonstrate how the concepts of ‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ are consistent 
with Foucault’s broader project, by pointing out the different ways that Foucault seeks 
to use these ideas. In doing so, I make the point that many of Foucault’s critics assume 
a certain interpretation of terms such as ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ that locate these 
criticisms in the very traditions Foucault was attempting to overcome. As such, there 
are inherent problems in attempting to evaluate the contributions of Foucault’s project 
from within these traditions, or by assuming such interpretations. In drawing out an 
‘ethic of power,’ then, I present an account of Foucault’s later project that 
demonstrates the consistency of the ideas of ethics and subjectivity with the work on 
power. 
The discussion straddles the supposed divide between the ‘middle’ and ‘late’ 
periods of Foucault’s oeuvre. I use these categories loosely. While there are certainly 
conceptual developments and re-orientations in Foucault’s thinking between these 
‘stages,’ this does not constitute a radical break. Thus one of the secondary aims of the 
discussion (but which I do not discuss explicitly) is to draw out some of the thematic 
consistencies between these two stages. Neither is the discussion intended as a 
comprehensive analysis of either of these stages: as such, it proposes a framework, or 
groundwork, within which further detailed analysis of Foucault’s final years of 
lectures at the Collège de France might be carried out.  
The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One outlines three broad critical 
perspectives on Foucault’s work on power and ethics, providing a critical framework 
within which the arguments of this thesis rest. It is divided into three parts.  
The first part outlines the view that Foucault’s account of power fails on ethical 
and political grounds because it precludes the possibility of a strong normative 
foundation according to which exercises of power could be assessed as positive or 
negative, acceptable or unacceptable, legitimate or illegitimate. Although Foucault 
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refers to the possibility of ‘resistance’ in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison and The Will to Knowledge, the first volume of The History of Sexuality, which 
gives the impression that Foucault does think that some forms of power are 
unacceptable, his insistence that this possibility arises internal to networks of power 
renders the term devoid of critical force.  
The second part takes up this point in terms of the account of the body implied 
by Foucault’s description of disciplinary power. This is important because for many 
critics this account is not only central to the possibility of resisting power, but to the 
possibility of articulating the political possibilities of Foucault’s work more broadly. 
For the most part this turns on the extent to which bodies are ‘produced’ or 
‘fabricated’ by disciplinary techniques. One of the central issues is whether, in this 
account, bodies can be described as having ‘depth’ or ‘interiority.’ This is important 
for several reasons. First, this issue arises in a more general discussion concerning the 
apparent absence of strong normativity in Foucault’s accounts of power and ethics. It 
is suggested that should the body be accounted for ‘in itself,’ then it might serve as a 
foundation for normative concepts that could be used for a transcendent critique of 
power. Second, because the possibility of resistance tends to be equated with either the 
extent to which the body can be said to pre-exist or stand ‘outside’ power, or the 
extent to which it is not constituted by power. A ‘depth’ that could ‘escape’ power 
could thus found the potential for resistance to power. The corollary argument is that 
resistance is a normative concept that depends on the body as a bearer of values. 
The third part considers three ideas that feature strongly in Foucault’s later 
work, which he adopts from Antiquity; namely, the reflexive relationship with self 
[rapport à soi], the care of the self, and the ‘arts’ or ‘aesthetics’ of existence. This part 
takes two broad critical perspectives. First, it outlines the position that Foucault’s 
insistence on the precedence that care for oneself should take over care for others has 
negative implications for the spirit of Foucault’s ethics. Particularly that this 
precedence undermines the ethical authority of ‘the Other’ that should be at the heart 
of ethics. Second, I briefly outline several issues concerning the ethical and political 
implications of the place that Foucault gives to aesthetics within his broader 
conception of ethics. Particularly, that the subsequent emphasis on self-creation and 
self-stylization renders ethics egoistic and narcissistic: irresponsive and insensible to 
the needs of others.  
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Chapter Two provides a broad overview of Foucault’s concept of ‘relations of 
power’ and ‘freedom,’ paying particular attention to the conceptual facets according to 
which an ethic of power would be grounded. It is divided into two parts. 
Part One examines two theoretical aspects of Foucault’s project, which ground 
the critical framework through which I examine the concepts of power, freedom and 
resistance. It has two sections. The first section considers briefly Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical approaches, focusing less on their methodological 
aspects than on their underlying critical commitments. It picks up the threads of 
Foucault’s self-proclaimed hostility to ‘the Subject,’ foregrounding the argument 
elaborated in Chapter Three that the Subject he rejects in his earlier works is very 
different from the ethical self-constituting subject he describes later. The second 
section takes up Foucault’s analysis and idea of ‘critique,’ which evolves from the 
archaeo-genealogical approach and genealogy of the modern subject, and culminates 
in the idea of the ‘critical attitude.’ This critical attitude is, briefly, a certain way of 
thinking and behaving in relation to oneself, to others, and to the world that represents 
a permanently questioning, challenging stance. For Foucault, it forms the foundation 
of the capacity to challenge the relationship between authority and truth, whereby the 
subject can call into question particular modes and formations of government. 
Part Two provides an overview of the central themes in Foucault’s account of 
power. It has six sections. The first section outlines his analysis of the ‘juridico-
discursive’ model of power, which captures the prevailing assumptions about power 
many modern analyses implicitly assume.1 Most obviously, but most significantly, this 
model turns on the view that power is necessarily negative and repressive. In light of 
this, I argue that the critical positions outlined in the first part of Chapter One are 
bound within the very conceptions of power that Foucault was trying to move beyond. 
As such, Foucault’s theoretical and political contributions are undermined. In the next 
section I provide a brief overview of the idea of ‘governmentality,’ focussing on how 
this idea entails the disassociation of political power from the state. This is because 
Foucault views power as a concrete feature of social interaction, not the corollary 
product of what are essentially discursive institutions. That is, particular arrangements 
of power relations given form and meaning through particular discourses and 
discursive practices. Read in conjunction with Foucault’s concept of relations of 
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power, this requires a renewed approach to understanding the nature of the political 
field. The third section outlines Foucault’s alternative account of power – focussing 
primarily on the ‘analytics’ of The Will to Knowledge and “The Subject and Power” – 
within the context of the critical claims outlined in the first part of Chapter One. 
Namely, whether Foucault’s distinctions between power relations, ‘domination’ and 
‘violence’ form an adequate basis upon which to evaluate power. In providing a 
preliminary analysis of Foucault’s idea that opportunities for resistance should be 
sought within networks of power relations, I foreground the argument that rapport à 
soi (the reflexive relationship with oneself) introduces a ‘permanent limit’ to exercises 
of power.  
The fourth section examines Foucault’s concept of ‘freedom’ within the context 
of his account of power relations. In providing an initial account of freedom as a 
structural condition of power, I question whether it is able to offer either a meaningful 
foundation for the notion of resistance, or the basis for a critical evaluation of power. 
In the next section, however, I draw out his rejection of the ideas of freedom tied to 
the liberal tradition, which go some way in explaining why Foucault thinks that using 
freedom to evaluate power is so problematic. Particularly, the characterisation of 
power as encroaching upon an area of freedom inalienable from the individual 
misrepresents both the relationship between power and freedom and their respective 
natures. Moreover, Foucault thinks that such an account of freedom is itself 
strategically deployed as a governmental technology. I defend Foucault’s account by 
demonstrating how the criticisms outlined in parts one and two of Chapter One tend to 
lean on conceptions of power and freedom bound within liberalism and the juridico-
discursive model of power. This is why Foucault needs to re-formulate the 
relationship between power and freedom: to limit its use as a technology of 
government. Finally, I argue that Foucault’s own idea of freedom is better understood 
relationally. That is, freedom denotes a relation between people, and as such can be 
considered as another facet of Foucault’s idea of power relations. 
Chapter Three is concerned with Foucault’s account of ‘the subject.’ In 
response to criticisms outlined in Chapter One, I argue that the conclusion that 
Foucault cannot speak about resistance in a genuine way – because his account does 
not admit the body as either a bearer of a priori values or as endowed with a minimum 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, vol. 1 of The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley 
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strength or agency – relies on the correlation between the body as inextricably 
located within networks of power and the body as necessarily and entirely determined. 
The chapter is divided into two parts.  
In the first section of part one, I provide a preliminary analysis of ‘the Subject’ 
of Foucault’s archaeo-genealogical work, in comparison to the idea of subjectivity he 
adopts later. In doing so, I demonstrate that Foucault’s philosophical commitments 
regarding the subject remain consistent. In section two, I consider Foucault’s account 
of the subject in the context of his critical appraisal of humanism. In doing so, I 
suggest that Foucault turned to ancient ethics in order to aid in his project of restoring 
power – understood as the capacity for self-constitution – to the subject. In the third 
section of part one, I argue that Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power presupposes 
an active body-subject that has capacities and skills that arise internal to the 
disciplinary mechanism. In the fourth section, building on the work of Elizabeth Grosz 
and Paul Patton, I argue that the operation of disciplinary power presupposes 
subjective experience of disciplinary techniques. This enables an alternative account 
of the docile body, understood as the body-subject. 
In the first section of part two, I turn to Foucault’s idea of the reflexive 
relationship to self (rapport à soi) that forms the foundation of his account of ethical 
subjects. For Foucault, the four-fold structure of rapport à soi describes the modes by 
which individuals constitute themselves as subjects. In demonstrating the 
interdependence of these modes of self-constitution with broader social practices, I 
foreground the argument (developed in Chapters Five and Six) that subjects emerge 
contemporaneously with the political field. In the final section, I draw on work by 
Gilles Deleuze and Judith Butler to show how the social relations in which we live are 
incorporated into the very constitution of the subject. This has important implications 
not only for the self-reflective and interpretative dimensions of rapport à soi, but for 
addressing certain criticisms of Foucault’s account of ethics. Moreover, Deleuze and 
Butler’s respective readings of rapport à soi support the argument that the body-
subject has capacities and skills that arise internal to networks of power, yet which are 
not entirely determined. As such, this contributes to a meaningful understanding of 
resistance.  
                                                                                                                                            
(London: Penguin Books, 1998), especially 81-91. 
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Chapter Four outlines four perspectives on Foucault’s broader account of 
ethics (as referring to rapport à soi and the care of the self). The first and second 
sections examine the ethical implications of Foucault’s idea of rapport à soi read in 
conjunction with the theme of the care for the self. Particularly, I examine the ethical 
implications of Foucault’s argument that care for oneself must precede care for others. 
In doing so, I address the Levinas-inspired criticisms (introduced in part three of 
Chapter One) that see this argument as indicating a serious lack of ethical regard for 
others. I argue that rather than bearing upon the spirit of Foucault’s account of ethics, 
his idea that care for oneself must precede care for others is founded on the structural 
primacy of rapport à soi. As such, Foucault’s emphasis on the precedence of care for 
oneself over care for others does not indicate a disregard for the ethical status of 
others, but rather a practical approach to the ethics of self-constitution that recognizes 
that the capacity to care for others follows from proper care for oneself.  
The third section continues this line of enquiry, in which I consider whether the 
apparent absence of ethical universalism necessarily precludes a serious ethical 
orientation towards others. Building on Christopher Cordner’s idea of a ‘universalism 
of outlook,’ I suggest that rapport à soi can in fact form the foundation of such an 
outlook. Specifically, that the recognition of other people as subjects of, and as subject 
to, power forms the foundation of an ethic of power. Finally, I turn in the fourth 
section to the question of whether rapport à soi and the associated notion of ‘subject-
positions’ can found a situationally-specific account of social norms. Drawing on 
Judith Butler’s analysis in Giving an Account of Oneself, and building on the analysis 
of rapport à soi in Chapter Three, I suggest that contrary to the apparent centrality of 
the self in an ethics founded on rapport à soi, Foucault’s account of the latter is 
founded, partly, on social norms, which save it from claims of egoism.  
Chapter Five examines the ethical and aesthetic aspects of the alternative 
account of politics entailed by Foucault’s philosophical commitments regarding 
‘power.’ It is divided into five sections. In the first section, I outline the context of this 
account in terms of Foucault’s return to Antiquity and the search for a renewed ethic 
of the self. In Foucault’s view modernity and Antiquity share a common problem: the 
practice of liberty. It is in approaching this problem that Foucault thinks that ancient 
ethics might be useful; that in the decline of traditional moral foundations Antiquity 
could offer a means of grounding this liberty in an ethics of the self.  
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In the second section I consider Foucault’s comments about his own role as an 
intellectual and philosopher, suggesting that these reflect – and indeed offer an insight 
into – certain ideas that Foucault thought we could adopt from the ancient world. On 
one hand, he ties his own philosophical practice or ‘work’ to the aesthetic themes he 
finds in Antiquity, namely, the transformative and creative aspects of exercises of the 
self. On the other hand, Foucault sees that work as bearing a certain function and 
responsibility in broader society. Of particular significance is the role that Foucault 
ascribes to philosophers and intellectuals in relationship to politics. As I point out, this 
role is tied to Foucault’s idea of the critical attitude. 
In the third section, I argue that rather than diminishing the ethical importance 
of others, Foucault’s adoption of an aesthetic model provides further depth and 
meaning to his account of ethics. By examining the problems with the artistic analogy, 
I further defend Foucault against claims of narcissism and egoism. Finally, I examine 
the aesthetic model with an explicitly political focus. One of the critiques of 
Foucault’s position in this regard is that aesthetic practices are not politically 
meaningful because they are essentially private activities. Building on Chapter Two, 
however, I complicate this reading by demonstrating how Foucault thinks that 
aesthetic activities are indeed carried out within the political field. This further 
disrupts the usual alignment of the political with the public domain. This is further 
supported once we understand Foucault’s idea of subjects as discursive phenomena 
that emerge as part of the political field. As such, self-forming practices are an integral 
part of a Foucaultian conception of politics. 
In the final section of Chapter Five, I consider the extent to which such aesthetic 
activities, and techniques of the self more broadly, form an adequate basis from which 
to adopt the critical attitude. In doing so, I turn to the particular significance that 
Foucault’s account has had for feminist scholars. While Foucault’s description of 
‘docile bodies’ has on the whole been criticised by feminist scholars, his later work on 
techniques of the self tend to be viewed more favourably. This is because, as I point 
out, Foucault’s later work pursues avenues for transforming individuals’ relations to 
power, and undermining discipline and normalisation. I examine Foucault’s account of 
ancient dietetic practices, focusing on the contribution that such analyses make toward 
Foucault’s goal of giving form and content to a modern ethic of the self. What is 
particularly significant, I argue, is that Foucault’s analyses lead to the idea that 
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practices that might otherwise be cast as disciplinary and normalising can be 
practiced in a critical way, thereby undermining their disciplinary and normalising 
effects.  
In the final chapter I offer a framework within which the possibility of a 
Foucaultian ethic of power can be thought. I describe a relational account of politics, 
according to which the concepts of freedom, ‘right’ and ‘resistance’ are meaningful by 
virtue of their place within Foucault’s idea of relations of power. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section outlines what a relational politics might 
mean. It observes that following Foucault’s de-coupling of political power from the 
state, and read in conjunction with his emphasis on relations of power, the political 
field should be re-conceived as extending throughout social organisations in line with 
relations of power. In doing so, I demonstrate how a certain conception of relationally 
defined ‘rights’ is consistent with Foucault’s broader philosophical and political 
commitments. In addition, I point to the significance of the discursive field as the 
primary site of political contestation. This is because the discursive field is the site of 
interplay between the epistemic frames and structures of power that govern subject’s 
self-understanding. 
This foregrounds the idea that parrēsia – frank or truthful discourse – can be 
understood in part as the actualisation of the critical attitude. That is, truthful discourse 
manifests the right to question authority on its relation to truth. In the third section of 
the chapter, I examine in further detail the idea of the critical attitude and its 
relationship with aesthetic practices. It is only by understanding the relationship 
between aesthetic self-formation and the critical attitude that the latter can be saved 
from an otherwise incontrovertible problem identified by Judith Butler. That is, that in 
questioning the epistemological and authoritarian foundations of supposed ‘true 
discourses,’ parrēsia requires the subject to suspend precisely that critical relation. 
The significance of this point lies in its consequences for the political implications and 
contribution of Foucault’s broader project. 
Finally, I conclude the chapter by returning to the idea of ‘resistance.’ In 
understanding what Foucault means by resistance we should look to his account of the 
‘critical attitude’—the right to qualified refusal of forms of government. In doing so, I 
argue that Foucault shares with Albert Camus a commitment to an idea of ‘refusal’ 
that forms the foundation of a certain solidarity with other human beings. As such, 
while it may still fail to meet certain normative criteria as presented in Chapter One, 
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the idea of refusal as the founding form of resistance allows a meaningful conception 
of the latter that remains coherent with Foucault’s broader project. 
In conclusion, I observe that for Foucault the subject is a discursive 
phenomenon that emerges contemporaneously with the relational fields of power and 
freedom. In disrupting the usual alignment between the public and political spheres, 
and by conceiving of power relations as extending throughout society, Foucault posits 
the political field as co-extensive with networks of power relations. The subject thus 
emerges as a constitutive element of the political field. As such, the aesthetic practices 
of self-stylisation that Foucault adopts from Antiquity play a key role in how he 
conceives of the modern relationship between ethics and politics. In this way, the 
constitution of the subject takes its place as an integral part of Foucault’s idea of 
politics. In light of these points, I argue that in understanding ‘resistance,’ we should 
look to the ‘critical attitude’—the right to qualified refusal of given forms of 
government. This is expressed as a continual refusal, founded in critical practices of 
the self. Finally, I point to the possibility of an ethic of power founded in the 
recognition of other people as subjects of, and subject to, power.   
  11 
Chapter One: Critical perspectives 
Introduction 
Different threads in recent Foucault scholarship tend to be characterized by their 
respective approaches to the relationship between the different ‘periods’ of his work. 
These in turn bear upon the reception of key concepts and themes and therefore upon 
their critical and political force. There are two broad approaches I am interested in 
here. 
The first approach takes the view that there is a significant, if not radical, break 
between the work on power (generally taken to represent the ‘middle’ period) and the 
work on ethics (generally taken to represent the ‘late’ period). It is Foucault’s apparent 
‘turn’ to subjectivity in this late work that is especially emblematic of this break. That 
is, that Foucault moves from an account of individuals as products of power regimes 
to an account of the actively self-constituting ethical subject.  
Regardless of whether such a break is assumed, however, Foucault’s readers 
tend to agree on the possibility of renewed political opportunities arising from the later 
work. This approach takes the themes and concepts of the late work to present an 
opportunity for re-reading and re-interpreting earlier ideas. Through a deeper 
understanding of Foucault’s later philosophical projects, earlier ideas might be re-
thought and take on new meaning.2 The predominance of ethical and subjective 
themes – for example, Foucault’s claim that he had always been interested in ‘the 
subject’ – has led readers to retrospectively draw out the threads of Foucault’s earlier 
thought on the subject and reconsider its apparent antagonism. His increased emphasis 
on self-constitution, additionally, has prompted scholars to reconsider whether the 
bodies featured in Discipline and Punish are as docile as previously thought. The 
publication of Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in particular presents a 
unique opportunity for conducting such a re-reading.3 Indeed, the availability of these 
                                                     
2 See, for example, Edward F. McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis: An Introduction to the 
Philosophical Life (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007).  
3 Eric Paras, for example, thinks that the publication of these lectures actually requires a 
general overhaul of interpretation of Foucault’s oeuvre. See Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond 
Power and Knowledge (New York: Other, 2006). 
  
 
12 
lectures coincides with a renewed interest in the work on power, of which a fresh 
consideration has been posited as a political imperative.4 Familiar notions of 
‘domination,’ ‘discipline,’ and ‘normalization’ might be re-interpreted to offer new 
insights. 
The second approach focuses more on the ethical and aesthetic themes of the 
later work, which, while accepting the possibility that these offer new avenues of re-
interpretation, tend not to assume a radical break. This approach has adopted – both as 
a question and a possible organizing principle – the idea of philosophy or 
philosophical work as a guide to and a way of living. This theme, which greatly 
interested Foucault both philosophically and personally, is discussed not only as an 
object or idea for investigation, but a possible mode of thinking through Foucault’s 
own work.5 
This speaks also to its political possibilities. In some feminist Foucault 
scholarship, for example, there has been a shift away from criticizing Foucault for the 
apparent absence of language in which to articulate the possibilities for resisting 
power, to viewing the late Foucault as a useful source of strategies or ways of thinking 
about ‘transforming,’ ‘creating,’ or going beyond what we are, or are told we are. 
Indeed, some readers and scholars have found reading (and writing about) Foucault’s 
work to be personally transformative.6 
This thesis falls within the context of these themes. I focus mainly on 
Foucault’s work on power and investigations into ethics, taking the view that while 
there is certainly conceptual development and re-orientation between these ‘stages,’ 
the late ethical and aesthetic themes are predominantly extensions of the interests 
already present in the former. In offering the groundwork of an ethic of power, I align 
                                                     
4 See, for example, Jeffrey T. Nealon, who re-examines ‘power’ and argues that “we have too 
hastily abandoned or thought ourselves to have profitably moved beyond Foucault’s midcareer 
work on power.” In Nealon’s view, recent world events, such as those of 11 September 2001, 
justify, if not require, renewed examinations of disciplinary power and panoptic surveillance in 
relation to ethics and subjectivity. Foucault Beyond Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 3. 
5 McGushin, for example, suggests that we “read Foucault’s work as a sort of manual to the art 
of living philosophically.” Foucault’s Askēsis, xi.  
6 Ladelle McWhorter, for example, describes how her discovery of Foucault enabled the 
rejection of an identity ascribed to her by society as essentially, and only, queer. She describes 
her book as more than a critical analysis; in her words it is: “a local political study, a study of 
the impact of Foucault’s texts at a site of political oppression, at a site that serves as an anchor 
point for power and that constitutes itself as a locus of resistance and transformation.” Bodies 
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the thesis both with those readers who see the political possibilities of a re-
interpretation of ‘power’ and with those who seek out the possibilities for personal 
transformation and ways of living, which is itself both an ethical and political project. 
As such, I attempt to bridge any gaps between these approaches, most notably by 
addressing certain critiques that try to undermine the political possibilities both of the 
work on power (by claiming that the absence of strong normativity precludes any 
theoretical or practical opportunities), and by defending Foucault against certain 
interpretations of his ethics as essentially egoistic (by claiming that his emphasis on 
care of the self over care for others renders others as secondary ethical concerns).  
This chapter outlines three critical perspectives on Foucault’s later work on 
ethics, and his work on power as it pertains to the former. It is by no means a 
comprehensive survey or analysis of late-Foucault scholarship; rather, it provides a 
critical framework in which this thesis rests and against which the central arguments 
of this thesis are positioned.  
The first section outlines the position that Foucault fails to provide a basis on 
which to distinguish between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ forms or exercises of 
power. This position presupposes that some forms of power, if not all, are negative 
and ought to be rejected. The failure is partly a result of Foucault’s methodological 
approach, which describes how power has been exercised in specific historical 
contexts, abstracting from this an ‘account’ of power in general, without assessing 
whether such instances are acceptable or legitimate, or not. Yet, Foucault’s invocation 
of the notion of ‘resistance’ seems to imply that some forms or exercises of power are 
objectionable, in order to make a call to resistance meaningful. This call, however, is 
incoherent without a strong normative foundation upon which to distinguish legitimate 
from illegitimate exercises of power.  
The second section outlines similar critiques of the account of the body implied 
by Discipline and Punish. This focuses on Foucault’s idea of the ‘docile body,’ 
arguing that the body as it appears here is unable to provide a basis for the sort of 
strong normativity required by the position outlined above. This position holds that the 
body could only serve as such a foundation if it can be accounted for independently of 
networks of power; that is, if it is not entirely constituted by them. Thus, the question 
                                                                                                                                            
and Pleasures: Foucault and the politics of sexual normalization (Indiana University Press: 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1999), xviii. 
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becomes whether, for Foucault, bodies are entirely constituted. This is important 
because it provides partial context to the arguments presented in chapters two and 
three: namely, that while the bodies that Foucault describes cannot be a source of 
normative values – because there is no body in itself external to or independent of 
networks of power – Foucault’s account of the body-subject goes part of the way in 
providing a source of meaning for the notion of resistance, even if it does not meet 
stringent normative criteria.  
The third section examines critiques that focus on either the spirit of Foucault’s 
descriptions of ethics and the care of the self – that is, what makes the accounts 
meaningful from an ethical or moral perspective – or on certain structural or 
methodological elements of these accounts. In the former case, these critiques tend to 
focus on the implications of an ethics that appears to over-emphasize the ethical 
importance of the ‘self.’ Methodological criticisms – of the late work at least – tend to 
focus on Foucault’s use and interpretation of ancient philosophy. These particular 
criticisms are not examined in detail in this thesis, because the arguments presented 
here assume that the objectives and relative success, or not, of Foucault’s project do 
not turn on the historical or philosophical accuracy of his interpretations.  
Forms of power: normative foundations 
Foucault’s methodological approach (which can be described as ‘archaeo-
genealogical,’ as I discuss briefly in Chapter Two) to analyzing power forms the basis 
of the criticism that he is unable to articulate a meaningful notion of resistance to 
power, which gives way to a more general claim about the lack of potential for 
transcendent critique and political engagement. Jürgen Habermas, for example, 
suggests that underlying Foucault’s genealogical and historiographical method is an 
attempt to provide a purely descriptive account of power, and thus to circumvent any 
evaluative or prescriptive elements. This method, according to Habermas, “brackets 
normative validity claims as well as claims to propositional truth and abstains from the 
question of whether some discourse and power formations could be more legitimate 
than others.”7 Foucault certainly appears to avoid making any political or moral 
judgements about specific instances of power (at least in his published works). 
Foucault thinks that the a priori norms and values that such judgements would require 
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are themselves the products or effects of specific historical mechanisms of power that 
posit such concepts as universal and absolute, while effectively masking their 
contingency upon the arrangements of power that produced them. As such, the use of 
polarities such as ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ exercises of power are part of a 
humanist critique that has already fallen prey to normalising and disciplinary power 
regimes. In Habermas’ reading of Foucault, “Humanist critique…is in danger…of 
merely strengthening a humanism that has been brought down from heaven to earth 
and has become a normalizing form of violence.”8 In Foucault’s view, the deployment 
of normalised concepts such as ‘man’ and ‘agency,’ far from safeguarding our 
aspirations and possibilities for human flourishing, quash those possibilities by 
limiting us to a certain conception or ‘truth’ of ourselves that is far from necessary.  
The pervasive and all-encompassing nature of power described in Discipline 
and Punish and The Will to Knowledge appears to preclude any characterization of 
counter-power as resistance or confrontation, or any characterization with a normative 
pull. Habermas asks “But if it is just a matter of mobilizing counter-power, of strategic 
battles and wily confrontations, why should we muster any resistance at all against this 
all-pervasive power circulating in the bloodstream of the body of modern society, 
instead of just adapting ourselves to it?”9 ‘Resistance’ connotes a normative sense that 
is not captured in the idea of different exercises of power or force relations coming up 
against each other: of countering power through just another exercise of power. 
Habermas’ point is that a call for resistance makes no sense outside of such a 
normative framework; that the very notion of resistance indicates that some forms of 
power ought to be resisted, and are therefore illegitimate. Charles Taylor, similarly, 
argues that the terms ‘power’ and ‘domination’ only make sense if juxtaposed against 
some concept of human agency as constrained or limited: “Nevertheless, the notion of 
power or domination requires some notion of constraint imposed on someone by a 
process in some way related to human agency. Otherwise the term loses all 
meaning.”10 The very possibility of a transcendent critique of power seems impossible 
under this reading.  
                                                                                                                                            
7 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. 
Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987), 282. 
8 Ibid., 283. 
9 Ibid., 283-284. 
10 Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David 
Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 90. 
  
 
16 
Yet Habermas points out that in reading Foucault we cannot help but 
encounter elements of the normative language games that he rejected, which 
demonstrate that “(t)he asymmetric relationship between powerholders and those 
subject to power, as well as the reifying effect of technologies of power, which violate 
the moral and bodily integrity of subjects capable of speech and action, are 
objectionable for Foucault, too.”11 Like Habermas, Nancy Fraser criticizes Foucault 
for continuing to utilise the same ‘humanist rhetoric’ that he is attempting to 
undermine.12 Both Habermas and Fraser think that Foucault does question whether 
some power formations could be more legitimate or preferable than others. Fraser 
draws on Foucault’s later distinctions between ‘power,’ ‘violence’ and ‘domination’ to 
demonstrate this point: 
Foucault calls in no uncertain terms for resistance to domination. But 
why? Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought 
domination to be resisted? Only with the introduction of some 
normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such 
questions. Only with the introduction of normative notions could he 
begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge 
regime and why we ought to oppose it.13 
Although Fraser takes these distinctions as evidence that Foucault does find the 
question of whether some forms of power should be resisted meaningful, for Fraser 
these distinctions are in themselves insufficient to provide the sort of normative basis 
that would make the notion of resistance meaningful. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 
Two, in late interviews and texts Foucault delimits relations of power (or 
‘government’) from what he calls ‘states of domination,’ with a corollary definition of 
violence. These delineations, however, are imprecise and turn on a non-normative 
conception of ‘freedom.’ This does little to meet the requirement for normatively 
categorized forms of power, which for Fraser must prefigure any meaningful notion of 
                                                     
11 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 284. 
12 Fraser cites the following statement by Foucault: “When today one wants to object in some 
way to the disciplines and all the effects of power and knowledge that are linked to them, what 
is it that one does, concretely, in real life […] if not precisely appeal to this canon of right, this 
famous, formal right, that is said to be bourgeois, and which in reality is the right of 
sovereignty?” in “Two Lectures” in Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon 
et al. (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 108. 
13 Nancy Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions,” 
in Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 29. 
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resistance. That is, there must be either criteria on which to evaluate an exercise of 
power and determine its legitimacy or illegitimacy – such as the notion of ‘consent’ 
that features in other theories of power – or categories or types of power that are 
identified a priori as legitimate or illegitimate prior to any actual exercise.  
Critics in the humanist vein presuppose the legitimacy of humanist ideals and 
normative values as the basis for their critiques of Foucault. But Foucault rejects such 
ideals precisely because they are dangerously prone to deployment, sometimes 
inadvertently, to normalizing and disciplining ends. Of course, for Foucault discipline 
and normalization are not always bad. The real problem and insidiousness in the 
operation of the humanist ideal is that it does not always appear as such: it masks itself 
in the guise of a liberating conception of humanity. Fraser acknowledges this point 
when she argues that just as there is no human nature to appeal to in Foucault, neither 
can one have recourse to the ‘subject’ as a measure for the evaluation power: 
For Foucault, the subject is merely a derivative product of a certain 
contingent, historically specific set of linguistically infused social 
practices that inscribe power relations upon bodies. Thus, there is no 
foundation, in Foucault’s view, for critique oriented around the 
notions of autonomy, reciprocity, mutual recognition, dignity, and 
human rights. Indeed, Foucault rejects these humanist ideals as 
instruments of domination deployed within the current ‘disciplinary 
power/knowledge regime.’14 
Fraser argues that a critique of power cannot be founded on such notions as autonomy 
because Foucault’s very account of subjects precludes them from having such inherent 
qualities. For Fraser, the qualities or attributes associated with a humanist reading of 
the body or subject could only be a viable normative foundation if these pre-exist or 
are positioned as external to networks of power, or at the very least ‘escape’ 
investment by power. She seems to be suggesting that Foucault’s wholesale rejection 
                                                     
14 Nancy Fraser, “Foucault’s Body Language,” in Unruly Practices, 56. Sandra-Lee Bartky 
makes a similar point: “[If] individuals were wholly constituted by the power/knowledge 
regime Foucault describes, it would make no sense to speak of resistance to discipline at all. 
Foucault seems sometimes on the verge of depriving us of a vocabulary in which to 
conceptualise the nature and meaning of those periodic refusals of control which, just as much 
as the imposition of control, mark the course of human history.” “Foucault, Femininity, and the 
Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the 
Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990), 81. 
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of humanist ideals is necessarily and unavoidably tied to a conception of power that 
leaves no room for critique or challenge from within that framework. This implies a 
more general position that any basis for the evaluation of power would have to be 
found external to the networks and functions of power; that is in a transcendent 
critique. Thus for Fraser neither the body nor subject could form an alternative source 
of evaluation, since for Foucault bodies and subjects are produced by power too. 
However, while it is true that Foucault would reject ‘humanist ideals’ both as 
techniques and effects of disciplinary power, his later work on ethics complicates this 
implied reading of both the ‘body’ and ‘subject’. 
If qualities like those listed above can only be associated with a body or subject 
that is not entirely derived from specific historical and disciplinary mechanisms, this 
leaves open the question of whether an alternative reading of body-subjects as not 
entirely contingent might be an acceptable basis upon which to evaluate forms of 
power. Although the normative critique might allow the attributes listed above to be 
ascribed to a Foucaultian body-subject if this was shown to be the case, Foucault 
would still reject the use of these qualities if they were defined and ascribed a priori. 
(I return to this question in the next section.)  
By linking Foucault’s rejection of these ideals with this reading of the 
contingent subject, Fraser leaves open the question of whether his later account of 
self-constituting subjects allows normative notions such as autonomy to resurface. 
This view presupposes that body-subjects can only be a source of resistance if not 
entirely constituted by social practices and power relations. For Fraser and Habermas, 
the critical question is whether a proposed source of evaluating power qualifies as a 
strong a priori normative foundation or not. The issue is that within Foucault’s 
account there is evidence that some exercises or forms of power are to be rejected, yet 
at the same time Foucault fails to establish any normative foundation on which to 
identify those forms that ought to be rejected from those that ought not. 
To return to the central problem as posed by Habermas and Fraser, it is the case 
that in Foucault’s later work many exercises of power appear to be far from 
objectionable, and that some may even be described as desirable. I argue this point, 
suggesting that Foucault’s descriptions of ethics as rapport à soi and the care of the 
self presuppose that exercises of power are not restricted to repression and coercion as 
the positions outlined in this section assume. Indeed, Foucault’s move to using the 
language of ‘government’ rather than power is evidence of this view. His invocation 
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of ‘liberty,’ furthermore, provides weight to the distinction between relations of 
power and states of domination and clearly illustrates Foucault’s commitment to 
demonstrating that some exercises of power are reasonable, while others are not. As 
John Ransom points out, Foucault does not think that exercises of power are a priori 
objectionable and therefore inadmissible on normative grounds,15 so the task is to 
identify the grounds on which Foucault would claim that an exercise or instance of 
power is objectionable. The distinctions noted above provide the starting point for this 
task and there is some scholarship already directed to this aim. As Barry Hindess 
points out, for example, it is the distinction between power and domination in 
particular that allows Foucault to denounce some power arrangements as states of 
domination and therefore as unacceptable.16  
As Ransom’s comment makes clear, however, the position held by Fraser and 
Habermas require a priori universal normative standards, by which to reject a priori 
certain forms or exercises of power. This thesis does not attempt to argue that there is 
an a priori or universal basis for evaluating power. Instead, it argues that the absence 
of a priori grounds does not mean that there is no basis upon which to evaluate 
instances and exercises of power. Even if, as Charles Taylor asserts, “there is no order 
of human life, or way we are, or human nature, that one can appeal to in order to judge 
or evaluate between ways of life,”17 it does not follow that all is permitted, or that 
there is no way to distinguish between forms of life or exercises of power. In Chapter 
Two I argue that in addition to the broad distinctions already noted above, it is the 
body-subject – rather than the body simpliciter or ‘the subject’ per se – that provides 
further weight to the argument that Foucault’s account does provide a basis to evaluate 
power.  
Resisting bodies 
Continuing along similar lines to those of the previous section, here I outline three 
particular critical perspectives on the characterization of the body as implied by 
Foucault’s account of disciplinary power. The stakes of these perspectives are much 
the same as outlined in the first section: namely, the extent to which both the 
                                                     
15 John S. Ransom, Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1997), 107. 
16 Barry Hindess, “Discipline and Cherish: Foucault on Power, Domination and Government” 
in Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 104. 
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possibility of a critical evaluation of power and the concrete opportunities for 
resistance are enabled or precluded by this characterization. The first perspective takes 
the view that Foucault’s description of disciplinary power posits bodies as completely 
fabricated, which leads to the conclusion that there is no body simpliciter that pre-
exists relations of power and which therefore precludes a normative evaluation and the 
possibility of resistance. The second perspective complicates this reading, holding that 
while Foucault’s account may appear to lead to such conclusions, this misunderstands 
the true operation of disciplinary power, which, when conceived in terms of 
inscription, actually posits bodies as external to relations of power. Although this view 
appears to then open up the possibility for a normative evaluation, it causes further 
problems by rendering Foucault’s accounts of power as internally incoherent. Finally, 
I turn to more sympathetic readings of Foucault’s ‘docile bodies,’ which argue contra 
the previous positions that disciplinary power presupposes an account of bodies as 
imbued with certain capacities and powers.  
 Discipline and Punish describes the way in which disciplinary power, which 
Foucault thinks characterizes our modern societies, ‘fabricates’ individuals.18 The 
body’s forces, capacities and strengths are deployed as instruments in this fabrication, 
through which the mechanisms of disciplinary power ‘produce’ docile body-
subjects.19 Under this account (which I explore in more detail in Chapter Three), 
‘bodies’ can be read as completely fabricated within the disciplinary machine. 
Foucault’s emphasis on the production of bodies under this model means that bodies 
cannot be accounted for as pre-existing or ‘outside’ the disciplinary regime. Foucault’s 
emphasis in The Will to Knowledge on the impossibility of standing outside networks 
of power relations supports this reading. 
The subsequent impossibility of accounting for bodies in themselves, in this 
view, precludes the body from being a source of resistance, and even as a source of a 
normative evaluation of power. Nancy Fraser takes this view, arguing that under 
Foucault’s account of disciplinary power, “the notion of the body simpliciter, as a 
substratum prior to power, upon which power inscribes its figures, drops out of the 
picture altogether. That sort of body would be merely another version of the Ding-an-
sich, since it can never be encountered and has no identifiable properties 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” 93. 
18 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin Books, 1991), 217.  
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whatsoever.”20 She is critical of Foucault because he fails to provide an account of 
bodies independent of their investment by relations of power. In order to posit them as 
a source of resistance, Foucault must provide an account of bodies “as they really are 
in themselves.”21 Foucault can provide neither an account of the body’s strengths, 
capacities or potential prior to their manipulation by disciplinary techniques, and by 
which individuals might resist power’s hold, nor a description of the body as a bearer 
of values. 
This latter point has been the focus of another angle of attack. Another function 
of discipline is to create the appearance of depth, of interiority. Indeed, Foucault 
thinks that this is one of its mechanisms: individuals inscribe in themselves the 
panoptic gaze, which takes its otherwise external application to new depths.22 In one 
of his most well-known (and now perhaps slightly cliché) phrases, Foucault describes 
the ‘soul’ that ‘inhabits’ the body to be a mechanism of power that gives the 
appearance of an internality or depth, further imprisoning the body.23 In this way, 
Foucault appears to conceive the body as merely surface: any depth or interiority is 
merely an effect of external power relations. As David Michael Levin describes it, 
“the body is merely a surface for the inscription of social order, a material substratum 
for the application and imposition of power, the power in socially controlled 
meaning.”24 Without depth, it is argued, there is nothing that might ‘escape’ power. 
Resistance, according to Levin, cannot be located in a body that is merely an “object 
produced by historical forces.”25 This is because a body which is merely the product of 
a certain historical arrangement of power cannot be a bearer of values: bodies are 
objects produced entirely by heteronomous forces and are therefore “without 
‘subjectivity.’”26 
In conceiving the body as merely surface, as merely a material object and 
product of historical processes and power, Foucault fails to provide normative grounds 
on which to evaluate the processes that constitute it. As Levin argues: 
                                                                                                                                            
19 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, especially 135-141. 
20 Fraser, “Foucault’s Body-Language,” 61. 
21 Ibid., 60. 
22 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 202-203. 
23 Foucault states: “The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the 
prison of the body.” Ibid., 30. 
24 David Michael Levin, “The Embodiment of the Categorical Imperative: Kafka, Foucault, 
Benjamin, Adorno and Levinas,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 no.4 (2001): 5. 
25 Ibid., 5 
26 Ibid., 5. 
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[T]his conception, consigning the body to a mute materiality, does 
not permit him to articulate any praxis of resistance to these historical 
processes [which constitute the body]; nor does it even permit him to 
speak of these processes as processes of subjugation, since this is a 
normative interpretation which must implicitly assume that the body 
is a source and medium of values and ideals not completely 
conditioned by history.27 
For Levin, Foucault’s account of disciplinary power and docile bodies has two 
significant consequences, which are both of concern to the arguments presented here: 
Foucault can provide neither practical strategies for resisting power, nor any basis for 
a normative critique by which some exercises of power might be described as 
unacceptable. I return to these points in conclusion below. 
Judith Butler complicates this line of reasoning. Although Foucault’s account 
certainly appears to posit the body as the product-effect of disciplinary power, this is 
based on a misunderstanding of how disciplinary mechanisms actually operate. Butler 
argues that while Foucault’s account appears to posit bodies as constituted within a 
network of power relations, “his theory nevertheless […] conceives the body as a 
surface of and a set of subterranean ‘forces’ that are, indeed, repressed and transmuted 
by a mechanism of cultural construction external to that body.”28 In Butler’s view, the 
disciplinary mechanisms that Foucault describes actually operate as a form of 
inscription, which posits the body as external to those mechanisms. Butler writes: 
“Although Foucault appears to argue that the body does not exist outside the terms of 
its cultural inscription, it seems that the very mechanism of ‘inscription’ implies a 
power that is necessarily external to the body itself.”29 Following Nietzsche, Butler 
suggests that history as inscription destroys the body in order to produce cultural 
                                                     
27 Ibid., 5. Levin’s rejection of Foucault’s account of the body as providing a source of 
resistance is two-fold: because without ‘depth’ there is no part of the body that escapes power 
(which he considers a condition for the possibility of resistance); that a notion of ‘depth’ is 
required in order to conceive of the embodiment of moral law, which would provide the values 
and standards required to distinguish between forms of power, whereby the body becomes a 
foundation for normative evaluations. 
28 Judith Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” in The Journal of 
Philosophy 86, no. 11 (November 1989), 602. 
29 Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” 603. According to Butler: “the 
cultural construction of the body is effected through the figuration of ‘history’ as a writing 
instrument that produces cultural significations—language—through the disfiguration and 
distortion of the body, where the body is figured as a ready surface or blank page available for 
inscription.” 
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signification: “If the creation of values, that signifying practice of history, requires 
the destruction of the body, much as the instrument of torture in Kafka’s Penal Colony 
destroys the body on which it writes, then there must be a body prior to that 
inscription, stable and self-identical, subject to and capable of that sacrificial 
destruction.”30 
Disciplinary mechanisms should thus be characterized not in terms of 
internalization, but inscription. Butler thus re-reads Foucault’s comments about the 
deployment of the soul: “The figure of the interior soul understood as ‘within’ the 
body is produced through its inscription on the body; indeed, the soul is inscribed on 
the surface, a signification that produces on the flesh the illusion of an ineffable 
depth.”31 She goes on: 
Indeed, the soul requires the body for its signification, and requires 
also that the body signify its own limit and depth through corporeal 
means. Furthermore, the body must signify in a way that conceals the 
very fact of that signifying, indeed that makes that signifying practice 
appear only as its reified ‘effect,’ that is, as the ontological necessity 
of a defining and immaterial internality and depth.32 
In this way, discipline creates the appearance of an internality or interiority. The body 
bears the marks and signs of the relations of power in which it is situated – the cultural 
significations of position, relationships, identity – which are supposed to be the 
expressions of an inner self, inner being, but which are defined by exteriority. 
Disciplinary power – or the rules or norms against which the individual is disciplined 
– is therefore written upon the body. Described another way, using earlier Foucaultian 
terms, disciplinary power fixes the somatic singularity with a particular subject-
position, producing the ‘individual’ who possesses an apparently prior inner depth.33 
This gives the appearance of internalization. Butler goes on: “In this sense, then, the 
soul is a surface signification that contests and displaces the inner/outer distinction 
                                                     
30 Ibid., 604. 
31 Ibid., 605. 
32 Ibid., 605-6. 
33 See Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973 – 1974, ed. 
Jacques Lagrange, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2008), 55. 
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itself, a figure of interior psychic space inscribed on the body as a social signification 
that perpetually conceals itself as such.”34 
Elsewhere, Butler makes a similar point with regards to the operation of 
disciplinary power; she suggests that ‘incorporation,’ rather than ‘internalization,’ 
better describes its mechanism.35 That which is signified through the deployment of 
the inner/outer distinction is signified through incorporation, rather than 
internalization. That is, the sign is applied to the body, adopted by it as part of itself, 
yet reveals itself as the external expression of an interiority. Butler takes the example 
of law applied to the body:  “That Law is not literally internalized, but incorporated, 
with the consequence that bodies are produced which signify that law on and through 
the body; there the law is manifest as the essence of their selves, the meaning of their 
soul, their conscience, the law of their desire. In effect, the law is at once fully 
manifest and fully latent, for it never appears as external to the bodies it subjects and 
subjectivates.”36 For Butler this means that contrary to Foucault’s claim, bodies are 
not entirely ‘produced’. That is, while the normalized body-subjects that signify 
interiority – resulting in the perception of externality as expressing inner identity – are 
contingent, the mechanism that Foucault describes actually allows a conception of the 
body in itself. 
Turning to more sympathetic readings, the question arises as to whether, if an 
alternative characterization of the body can be found in Foucault’s account of 
disciplinary power, this might re-open the possibility not only of a praxis of resistance, 
but some form of non-normative or quasi-normative (in a different sense than that 
required by Habermas et. al., however) foundation from which to critically evaluate 
power. In contrast to the general position that Foucault’s description of disciplinary 
power entirely fabricates bodies, it can be argued that the very conception of ‘docile 
bodies’ is actually predicated on the assumption that the body has certain forces or 
capacities which can be disciplined. In Discipline and Punish Foucault writes clearly 
of the body’s ‘forces,’ ‘aptitudes,’ and ‘capacities.’37 Some scholars have read into 
these passages evidence that Foucault does indeed conceive of the body as endowed 
                                                     
34 Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” 606. 
35 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Ney York and 
London: Routledge, 1999), especially 170-171. 
36 Ibid., 171. 
37 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, especially 135-141 and 221. 
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with some ‘power’ or ‘force.’38 As such, their manipulation as instruments in the 
exercise of disciplinary power is only one possible outcome: they might also be 
deployed by the individual herself to various ends. As such, these forces can even 
provide a source of resistance. Disciplinary power renders the body’s forces docile in 
order to ensure its own efficacy and in order to fabricate the individual. If power 
relations as inscribed with the very possibility of resistance, then insofar as the 
operation of power is a disciplinary relation these capacities might well give rise to 
recalcitrance. I discuss this further in Chapter Three. 
A potential problem arises, however, if the recognition of such capacities places 
the body, or at least the capacities themselves, as ‘outside’ or pre-existing networks of 
power, which would affirm aspects of Butler’s interpretation. If this was shown to be 
the case, given Foucault’s insistence that points of resistance can only be located 
within relations and networks of power, his broader account of power would be 
rendered internally incoherent. The task remains, then, to give an account of these 
capacities and forces without falling into an essentialism of the body—a conception of 
the body in itself as it is prior to its entrance into networks of power. 
By way of conclusion, let me make the following observations. The 
implications and questions that result from the first perspective outlined above are as 
follows: first, there remains the question of whether, as Levin and Fraser argue, 
Foucault’s failure to account for the body as pre-existing relations of power have the 
consequences that Levin identifies. Namely, a lack of normative foundation by which 
to critically evaluate power, according to the values and attributes that such an account 
would provide, and the inability to articulate any practical means for resisting power. 
These questions, of course, are closely related to the questions posed in the first part of 
this chapter. Levin’s view in particular, however, has specifically ethical implications, 
which come to the fore later in this thesis.  
For Levin the claim to interiority is not only important in terms of the above 
questions, but is essential to the conception of ethical beings that he feels we ought to 
                                                     
38 See, for example, Elizabeth Grosz, “Inscriptions and Body-maps: Representations and the 
Corporeal,” in Feminine/Masculine and Representation, ed. Terry Threadgold and Anne 
Cranny-Francis (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990): 62-74; Cressida J. Heyes, Self-
Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); and Paul Patton, “Foucault’s Subject of Power,” in The Later Foucault, ed. 
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Three. 
  
 
26 
be. While he sees depth as a possible means of escape – that is, the means of resisting 
the imposition of power through withdrawal – more importantly he thinks that the 
absence of interiority precludes the embodiment of a moral order. That is, without a 
conception of a ‘deep body’ there can be “no rudimentary moral predispositions, no 
inscription of the moral law safely hidden within the protection of the flesh.”39 In this 
view, the ethical status of individuals arises out of a pre-embodied code: an attitude 
that is prior to any actual interaction that calls for ethical deliberation. For Foucault, 
however, this is not the case, as we see further on. But it is worthwhile noting the 
implied question: from where, then, does the ethical status of Foucault’s late subject 
emerge? 
For Butler, the central question that arises is whether the operation of power as 
inscription entails that the body has an “ontological status” independent of that 
inscription.40 Of course, the answer to this question has far-reaching implications for 
several aspects of Foucault’s later work. Here, its primary importance is that it might 
serve as the sort of normative foundation that Habermas et. al. seek, but that Foucault 
rejected. Should the answer be in the affirmative, Butler’s critique forces Foucault into 
a normative position. That is, part of Foucault’s rejection of normative foundations is 
that they deny the extent to which they are produced through various historical 
mechanisms. If Butler’s reading of the application of power as inscription shows that 
Foucault falls back in to an account of the body independent of and prior to its 
construction, then it would appear that Foucault not only failed to describe the 
operation of power without resorting to normative language, but, more importantly, 
that the accounts of power in Discipline and Punish and the Will to Knowledge are 
internally incoherent.  
Both Fraser’s and Levin’s rejections of the body as a site of resistance turn on 
the understanding that bodies are entirely constituted through power, or as Levin 
describes it, as merely ‘surface’. In a sense, they are right in suggesting that the body 
simpliciter cannot form the foundation of values and ideas that would qualify as a 
normative foundation upon which to evaluate power. But they are right for the wrong 
reasons. For Foucault, bodies are never just bodies; they are always body-subjects.  
                                                     
39 Levin, “The embodiment of the categorical imperative,” 6. 
40 Butler, “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions,” 603. 
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In Chapters Two and Three I demonstrate how Foucault’s late descriptions of 
ethics, care of the self and power (and his later account of power as government) 
presuppose a body-subject endowed with certain ‘capacities.’ I argue, however, that 
such capacities do not place the body or its capacities prior to or outside the historical 
processes of its constitution. Rather, the capacities of body-subjects are contingent 
upon the socially and historically specific relations in which they arise. They are 
neither an inherent bodily strength or power, nor some form of internality or depth. 
One of the tasks of this thesis, then, is to illustrate how a non-normative notion of 
capacities can constitute a source of resistance. Building on the work of Paul Patton, I 
argue that this account of the body-subject can form the foundation of a meaningful 
notion of resistance without recourse to the types of normative ideals insisted upon by 
Habermas and Fraser and that Foucault would find so problematic. Perhaps it is that 
Foucault – and those who continue in his footsteps – will always be working at cross-
purposes to scholars such as Habermas, Fraser and Levin. Indeed, it may be futile to 
even attempt to reconcile their respective positions. Foucault will always fail to meet 
the criteria set down by those who desire recognition of ahistorical a priori normative 
claims precisely because he rejects that very framework.  
But for Foucault, bodies are never just bodies, nor bearers of ‘values’ as such. 
They are culturally coded, and culturally and historically contingent. Foucault’s own 
work precludes him from being able to give an account of bodies in themselves. As 
McWhorter notes, he cannot stand outside the genealogy of bodies in order to define 
what they really are.41 As I argue in Chapters Two and Three, Foucault’s later 
conceptions of ethics as rapport à soi – and, consequently, the relationship between 
his conceptions of ethics and ‘power’ – presuppose an account of body-subjects. That 
is, bodies can only be thought of in relation to their social, cultural, historical position, 
to which the qualities, characteristics and predispositions that we ascribe to it refer. 
For Foucault it is not only impossible to describe a body simpliciter: there is no body 
simpliciter. These ascriptions, I suggest, refer to the subject-position tied to that 
body.42 
                                                     
41 McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures, 150. 
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The politics of a ‘self-centred’ ethics 
This section essays three significant threads of critical evaluation regarding Foucault’s 
late foray into ethics—understood broadly as including the ideas of rapport à soi, the 
care of the self and the aesthetic practices of self-stylisation. First, Foucault’s account 
of ethics is often seen to be far too focused on the ‘self.’ This is partly because of the 
importance he places on the concept of rapport à soi: the reflexive relationship with 
oneself. Rapport à soi represents the point of intersection with aspects of his thought; 
particularly in bringing together his ideas about relations of power and the constitution 
of subjects. The apparently self-centred nature of his ethical account is only further 
emphasised by the central place that Foucault gives to the theme of the care for the 
self, as we see further below. Such critiques generally defer to a Levinasian-style 
respect for the Other as the yardstick for evaluating the value of Foucault’s account of 
ethics. Closely related to the first, the second critical thread calls into question the 
centrality that Foucault gives to ancient practices of aesthetic self-stylisation. This is 
partly because it is seen to further embed Foucault’s ethics in a ‘culture of the self.’ 
Critical positions taken in regard to this aspect tend to be particularly concerned with 
Foucault’s proposal that ethics conceived in aesthetic terms could form the basis of a 
modern alternative to traditional moral frameworks. Finally, although it is not a focus 
of the thesis, I note briefly certain criticisms of Foucault’s use of ancient texts. I do so 
in order to foreground the reasons and objectives behind Foucault’s turn to ancient 
ethics. I note particularly Pierre Hadot’s appraisal of Foucault’s interpretation of 
ancient practices of the self.  
Among the various criticisms levelled at Foucault’s conception of ethics, the 
common thread is that Foucault focuses far too heavily on the ‘self’ to the detriment of 
other aspects of ethics. Particularly, in positing rapport à soi as the cornerstone of 
ethics, Foucault appears to prioritise the relationship with oneself over one’s relations 
with others. As we see in Chapter Three, rapport à soi is central to Foucault’s re-
formulation of ‘the subject.’ The four-fold structure of rapport à soi enables the 
articulation of a self-constituting ethical subject that remains consistent with the work 
on power. Part of the problem with this account is that in articulating ‘ethics’ 
primarily in reference to rapport à soi, Foucault fails to provide a generalised ethical 
framework within which the responsibility and obligations of the subject can be 
meaningful. Again, this is partly because an ethics conceived in terms of rapport à soi 
and elaborated through aesthetic practices is seen to lead unavoidably into egoistic and 
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narcissistic territory. Christopher Cordner, for example, argues that “[The] ethical 
subject described in Foucault’s later writings is too self-concerned” and that 
Foucault’s account of ethics “does not sufficiently acknowledge the authority of ‘the 
other’ in our ethical interaction.”43 But this is also because the subject that Foucault 
develops through rapport à soi emerges as part of the social and political field 
delimited by relations of power. As such, the subject can be seen neither as the bearer 
of a priori values, nor as bearing a primordial responsibility to others. 
His emphasis on the care for the self, moreover, appears to further entrench the 
possibility of a modern ethic of the self in an egoistic, if not solipsistic, view of ethics. 
Although much of Foucault’s analyses of this theme emphasise the connections 
between care for the self and the ability to care for others, the problem is that there is 
no necessary relationship between the two. This is further complicated by Foucault’s 
suggestion that care for the self should precede care for others.44 As such, while it is 
clear that care for others can follow from the care for oneself, there is nothing to show 
that the latter entails care for others. In placing the rapport à soi as the foundation of 
ethics (in the absence of traditional foundations which Foucault thinks are waning), 
Foucault implies that other people do not, or cannot, provide such a foundation. 
Moreover, as Cordner points out, the result of Foucault’s description of ethics is that 
care for others only “comes into play through the primacy of one’s rapport à soi.”45 
As we see in more detail in later chapters, this appears to preclude any meaningful 
account of the subject as morally bound to others. 
Arising from this position, too, are questions about the moral responsibility of 
the subject. Recalling the points made earlier about the fabrication of individuals 
within regimes of power, the question arises about how it is that subjects so conceived 
can be the bearers of moral responsibility. That is, given the fabrication of individuals, 
and given Foucault’s view that care of the self takes precedence over care for others, 
Foucault is therefore unable to articulate any account of the subject as bearing inherent 
                                                     
43 Christopher Cordner, “Foucault, Ethics and the Other,” (unpublished paper, 2007), 1. Later 
published as “Foucault, Ethical Self-concern and the Other,” in Philosophia 36 (2008), 593-
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44 See Foucault, “The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with 
Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984,” conducted by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Helmut Becker 
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responsibilities.46 These responsibilities pertain not only to other people as the 
foundation of a meaningful ethics, but those responsibilities that should be inherent in 
the exercise of power.47 
As noted above, such critiques tend to presuppose a Levinas-inspired ethical 
orientation toward others. Broadly speaking, such a view holds that care for others can 
only be genuine if it reflects a prior normative foundation that posits others at the 
centre and very raison d’etre of ‘ethics.’ For Cordner for example, an account of the 
relation of self to other must do more than guarantee that others will be cared for by 
virtue of the care for self. It must posit the other as the source of meaning and the 
primary objective of ethical behaviour.48 In this view, Foucault’s account of ethics 
falls down not only because care of the self is prioritized over care for others, but 
because these forms of care fail to realize a genuine valuation of the other prior to our 
social and ethical interaction. The attitude underlying this view seems to be that 
Foucault’s ethical priorities are misdirected: that in positing the care of the self as the 
condition for care for others he was prioritizing the self above all others. It is correct 
that Foucault prioritized the self insofar as claiming that caring for oneself enabled the 
capacity to care for others: an examination of this idea constituted one of the central 
themes in the final stage of his work. I argue, however, that this prioritization is 
structural and has little bearing on the spirit of Foucault’s conception of ethics. 
This brings to the fore the second line of evaluation. There are a number of 
questions about the political implications of Foucault’s ethics, given his emphasis not 
only on rapport à soi, but on the aesthetic practices of self-stylisation. The use of 
‘aesthetics,’ particularly a Nietzsche-inspired one, only entrenches the view of 
Foucault’s ethics as ultimately egoistic and narcissistic. This appears particularly 
dangerous because it suggests that Foucault seeks to completely abandon conventional 
morality and values. Further, Foucault’s emphasis on self-stylisation diminishes others 
to the status of mere tools in the aesthetic pursuit. As such, an ethic of the self founded 
in the processes of self-creation or self-stylization appear insufficiently embedded 
                                                     
46 Barry Smart queries: “Subjects have the potential to block, change, overturn or reverse the 
relation of guidance, direction, influence, etc. Is there an implication here that the subject is, in 
part at least, responsible for his or her own fate, in so far as there is always the potential to 
transform a relation of power into an adversarial confrontation?” “Foucault, Levinas and the 
Subject of Responsibility,” in The Later Foucault, 81. 
47 Smart asks further: “And what of the responsibilities intrinsic to the exercise of power and 
relations of guidance and direction, the responsibilities which might be argued to be a corollary 
of actions which structure the field of other possible actions?” [my emphasis]. Ibid. 
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within social and ethical relationships and fail to respond adequately to social 
interaction.49 
Moreover, Foucault undermines the political potential of his account of self-
constitution by describing these practices in aesthetic terms. Primarily this is because 
aesthetic practices are usually seen to be private activities. In this way, while Foucault 
wants to posit self-constitution as a political activity that challenges given forms of 
power and self-understanding, he undermines this possibility by locating this process 
in the ‘private’ sphere. As such, aesthetic activities are seen to be devoid of real 
political potential, precluding the possibility that such practices could have political 
ramifications. 
I turn finally to Foucault’s interest in Antiquity. Reflecting the importance of 
ancient philosophy to Foucault’s later books and lectures, there are questions 
regarding the accuracy of Foucault’s portrayal and use of ancient sources. While this 
thesis does not seek to address this aspect of Foucault’s work, it is concerned with 
certain criticisms that bear upon broader issues surrounding his account of ethics. 
Pierre Hadot argues that Foucault misrepresents the nature of spiritual exercises with 
the phrase and description of ‘techniques of the self.’ In Hadot’s view, Foucault is 
“focused far too much on the ‘self,’ or at least on a specific conception of the self.”50 
The crucial element of this argument is that Foucault does not sufficiently 
acknowledge that it is the transcendence of the self that is the primary focus of 
spiritual exercises. For example, the description that Foucault gives of the ‘full 
enjoyment of oneself’ (noted above) achieved in the relationship to oneself does not 
capture the extent to which the self is overcome. The identification of the ‘best portion 
of oneself,’ according to Hadot, is simultaneously the transcendence of oneself. 
Martha Nussbaum thinks that Foucault fails to sufficiently delineate the Hellenist’s 
                                                                                                                                            
48 See Cordner, “Foucault, Ethical Self-Concern and the Other,” 607. 
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50 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 
ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 207. Hadot’s use of 
‘spiritual exercises,’ as he explains, is intended to encapsulate the various types of exercises 
that would be illegitimately limited by the use of more narrow terms such as ‘ethical exercises’ 
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emphasis on philosophical practices or techniques of the self, from more general 
practices of the self, which, according to Nussbaum, the Hellenists shared with 
broader cultural and religious movements.51 Central to this delineation is that 
philosophical practices of self were committed to reason and rationality in regards to 
oneself, through which the self is freed. 
Hadot characterises spiritual exercises as the means for attaining self-
realisation. He argues, in contrast to Foucault’s characterisation, that self-realisation 
should not be read as a form of moral aestheticism, whereby these exercises adopt a 
positive tone as means of ‘creating,’ ‘fabricating,’ or positing a style, attitude, or 
personality. Rather, they are the removal and elimination of extraneous and 
unnecessary elements of oneself, which allows the true form – already in existence – 
to appear. It is this ‘taking-away’ that ties spiritual exercises to freedom; they are the 
means of releasing us from those aspects of ourselves that cause frustration and 
unhappiness. In Hadot’s words, “It follows that happiness consists in independence, 
freedom, and autonomy. In other words, happiness is the return to the essential: that 
which is truly ‘ourselves,’ and which depends on us.”52 In stark contrast to Foucault, 
Hadot thus characterizes spiritual exercises as a return to the self, rather than as the 
possibility for self-creation and transformation suggested by Foucault. The self, then, 
is “no longer our egoistic, passionate individuality: it is our moral person, open to 
universality and objectivity, and participating in universal nature or thought.”53 Hadot 
takes as an example Foucault’s discussion of writing as a spiritual exercise, in regards 
to which he argues:  
It is [thus] incorrect to speak of ‘writing the self’: not only is it not the 
case that one ‘writes oneself,’ but what is more, it is not the case that 
writing constitutes the self. Writing, like the other spiritual exercises, 
changes the level of the self, and universalizes it. The miracle of this 
exercise, carried out in solitude, is that it allows its practitioner to 
accede to the universality of reason within the confines of space and 
time.54 
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Spiritual exercises, in this view, are not the means of a positing a relationship to the 
self whereby the self is fabricated or constituted. Nor are they means of further 
individualising the subject of the exercise. In contrast to Foucault’s reading, spiritual 
exercises allow individuals to participate in a form of universality.  
The differences between Hadot’s and Foucault’s respective readings extends to 
significant differences between their conceptions of the role/s of others within spiritual 
(or otherwise) exercises. For Hadot, the encounter or inclusion of the other occurs 
through the participation of the ascended self in a form of universality common to that 
which is other, whereas for Foucault encounters with others are delimited by the 
individual’s practices of self. While Hadot agrees with Foucault’s interpretation in 
regards to the transformative movement or ‘conversion’ toward the self (constituted 
by the practices that liberate the self from certain attachments, exteriority, and desires 
and those that allow self-observation or self-mastery), for Hadot the movement 
constitutes an elevation of the self: 
In this way, one identifies oneself with an ‘Other’: nature, or universal 
reason, as it is present within each individual. This implies a radical 
transformation of perspective, and contains a universalist, cosmic 
dimension, upon which, it seems to me, M. Foucault did not 
sufficiently insist.55 
While his critique is primarily methodological, in the sense that he believes Foucault 
misinterprets and misrepresents ancient texts, for Hadot this has implications for the 
value of the resulting account of ethics that Foucault proposes. He suggests that 
Foucault’s misinterpretation of spiritual exercises and his subsequent focus upon the 
conversion of and care for the self is dangerous: “by defining his ethical model as an 
aesthetics of existence – M. Foucault is propounding a culture of the self which is too 
aesthetic.”56 This is particularly significant precisely because Foucault wants to use 
aspects of ancient ethics as a model for a modern ethic of the self.  
Conclusion 
In section one of this chapter, I outlined how Foucault fails to provide the sort of 
normative basis that would render his call to resistance meaningful in the eyes of 
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critics such as Habermas, Fraser and Levin. It is not my aim, however, to defend 
Foucault on this point by arguing that there are normative foundations to concepts 
such as resistance: Foucault will always fail in this regard, since he explicitly rejects 
such a framework. Even if claims to the presence of concepts that might count as 
quasi-normative, suggested by Paul Patton and Judith Butler for example, are accepted 
and defended (as they are in Chapters Two and Three), it is unlikely these would 
suffice as the kind of ‘hard’ a priori norms that Habermas et. al. require. As Patton 
notes of his identification of a ‘thin’ conception of human being in Foucault’s account 
of the subject and power, such conceptions actually move away from normative 
standards.57 
In the second section of this chapter I outlined how the potential for the body to 
serve as a basis for either a transcendent critique or practical avenues of resistance 
turns on the question of whether the body is entirely fabricated by disciplinary 
mechanisms. I suggested, however, that framing the question in this way ignores other 
possibilities for a meaningful account of resistance. Rather than appealing to an 
account of the body simpliciter, it is the body-subject – in conjunction with Foucault’s 
distinctions between power, freedom and resistance – that provides such a point of 
departure. In this I draw on the work of Paul Patton, who uses the notion of ‘capacity’ 
to develop a non-normative standard of human agency by which acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of power might be identified. In Chapters Two and Three, I 
develop this claim, illustrating how Foucault’s account of power in Discipline and 
Punish – and his later characterizations of power as government – presuppose a body-
subject with certain capacities and abilities, which arises within networks of power, 
thus avoiding a potential internal inconsistency. 
The third section outlined three critical points aimed specifically at Foucault’s 
account of ethics. Each of these points in their own way takes issue with Foucault’s 
apparent emphasis on the ethical significance of the self over others. In Chapter Four I 
examine the ethical implications of the roles of rapport à soi and the care of the self in 
more detail. I take up the issue of Foucault’s emphasis on the precedence that care for 
oneself ought to take over care for others, arguing that this precedence is structural, 
and has little bearing on the spirit of Foucault’s ethics. In Chapter Five I draw out in 
more detail the political implications of these ideas, focussing particularly on aesthetic 
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self-stylisation. I challenge the view that aesthetic practices are devoid of political 
significance, particularly on the basis of the apparently ‘private’ nature of aesthetic 
activities. I explore the role of aesthetic practices in relation to politics further in 
Chapter Six, where I note their relationship to the critical attitude. Finally, I 
considered very briefly criticisms of Foucault’s use and deployment of historical and 
philosophical texts. I do not address these further in the thesis: I merely note them 
contextually, as I do not think they bear upon the value and implications of Foucault’s 
oeuvre.    
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Chapter Two: Resisting ‘power’—foundations of an ethic  
Introduction 
Foucault’s account of power relations, I argue, provides the foundations for an ‘ethic 
of power.’ This is not a framework through which specific exercises of power can be 
described as acceptable or otherwise. It is an ethic that governs the exercise of power 
in the constitution of ourselves and others as subjects of power. 
By way of argument for this position, this chapter has three subordinate aims. 
First, to provide a critical overview of the central facets of Foucault’s account of 
power insofar as they pertain to the broader argument at hand. Second, to defend 
Foucault against the claims outlined in Chapter One, principally, that Foucault fails to 
provide a basis upon which to critically evaluate exercises of power in order to 
determine some as good and others as bad. Third, to draw out the threads of the 
ethical, aesthetic and political themes that are the focus of Foucault’s later work. The 
chapter is divided into two parts.  
Part One examines two theoretical aspects of Foucault’s project, which provide 
an important part of the critical framework for my examination of ‘power’ and related 
arguments. It is not an exhaustive account by any means, but draws out the themes and 
commitments that are consistent across different stages in Foucault’s work. Here I 
focus on Foucault’s archaeological, genealogical, and critical approaches to the 
question/s of the relationships between power, ethics, and politics, and the relationship 
between the subject and truth. It has two sections. The first section considers briefly 
Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches, focusing less on their 
methodological aspects than on their underlying critical commitments. It picks up the 
threads of Foucault’s self-proclaimed hostility to ‘the Subject,’ foregrounding the 
argument elaborated in Chapter Three that the subject he rejects in his earlier works is 
very different from the ethical self-constituting subject he describes later. The second 
section takes up Foucault’s analysis of critique, which, in a natural progression from 
the archaeo-genealogical approach, evolves into the ‘critical attitude’ underlying his 
genealogy of the modern subject. This critical attitude is, briefly, a certain way of 
thinking and behaving in relation to oneself, to others, and to the world that represents 
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a permanently questioning, challenging stance. For Foucault, it forms the foundation 
of the capacity to challenge the relationship between authority and truth, whereby the 
subject can call into question particular modes and formations of government. 
Part Two provides an overview of the central themes in Foucault’s account of 
power. It has six sections. The first section outlines Foucault’s account of the 
‘juridico-discursive’ model of power, which captures the prevailing assumptions about 
‘power’ most modern analyses implicitly assume. Most obviously, but most 
significantly, this model turns on the view that power is necessarily negative and 
repressive. I argue that the critical positions outlined in the first part of Chapter One 
are bound within the very conceptions of power that Foucault was trying to move 
beyond. In section two I provide a brief overview of the idea of ‘governmentality.’ 
Through his analyses of governmental technologies, Foucault de-couples political 
power from the state. Further, governmental concepts such as ‘the state’ and ‘civil 
society’ are posited as historically and socially contingent phenomena. In this way, as 
I discuss further in Chapters Five and Six, Foucault disrupts the usual alignment 
between the public and political spheres. Read in conjunction with Foucault’s concept 
of ‘relations of power,’ I foreground the argument that his project thus requires a 
renewed approach to understanding the nature of the political field.  
The third section outlines Foucault’s alternative account of power – focussing 
primarily on the ‘analytics’ of The Will to Knowledge and the essay published as “The 
Subject and Power” – within the context of the critical claims outlined in the first part 
of Chapter One. Namely, whether Foucault’s distinctions between ‘power relations,’ 
‘domination’ and ‘violence’ form an adequate basis upon which to evaluate power. In 
providing a preliminary analysis of Foucault’s idea that opportunities for resistance 
should be sought within networks of power relations, I foreground the argument that 
rapport à soi (the reflexive relationship with oneself) introduces a ‘permanent limit’ to 
exercises of power.  
The fourth section examines Foucault’s concept of ‘freedom’ within the context 
of his account of power relations. Foucault’s idea that ‘relations of power’ form an 
inalienable part of social interaction continues to cause debate among scholars with 
diverging views about its critical and political implications. Foucault’s critics have 
tended to read the ubiquity of power as precluding any possibility of resisting power. 
This is particularly because Foucault appears to fail to offer a strong normative 
framework that would render concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ meaningful. 
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In response to these criticisms, I suggest an initial interpretation of freedom as a 
structural condition of power and question whether this might offer a meaningful 
foundation for the notion of resistance, or the basis for a critical evaluation of power. 
After identifying a strong objection to this position, I turn in the next section to 
Foucault’s analysis of freedom in relation to the liberal tradition. In doing so, 
Foucault’s description of freedom as a ‘field of possibilities’ (which appears initially 
as a condition of power) appears inconsistent with his rejection of the liberal model. I 
defend Foucault’s account by demonstrating how the criticisms outlined in parts one 
and two of Chapter One tend to lean on conceptions of power and freedom bound 
within liberalism and the juridico-discursive model of power. Finally, I argue that 
Foucault’s own idea of freedom is better understood relationally. That is, rather than a 
‘field of possibilities’ tied to the individual, freedom refers to a political domain that 
emerges between subjects of power. 
In conclusion I note that the inscription of the possibility of resistance within 
networks of power requires a re-thinking of what ‘resistance’ means. It does, in part, 
refer to the capacity to resist – meaning to prevent, stop or counter specific exercises 
of power – yet this does not go far enough in capturing its critical element.  
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Archaeology, genealogy, ethics 
Foucault’s work is often divided into three methodological ‘stages’ or identified as 
operating on three methodological planes: the archaeological, genealogical and 
ethical. As noted in the Introduction, I use these distinctions loosely.58 Although they 
                                                     
58 There are different views on this of course. Thomas Flynn suggests that the archaeological 
and genealogical approaches do not exclude each other, but are more like “successive waves 
breaking on the sand, each is discovered after the fact to have been an implicit interest of the 
earlier one, for which it served as the moving force.” See Flynn, “Foucault’s Mapping of 
History,” in The Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28. Béatrice Han argues that “the Foucauldian journey as a 
whole could […] be described as the passage from an archaeological interrogation of the 
conditions under which a subject can speak the truth, to the genealogical claim that truth is per 
se the major condition of possibility for the constitution of the self as subject.” See Béatrice 
Han, ‘Introduction’ in Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the 
Historical, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 10.  
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are useful in allowing ease of reference to a particular dominant theme, as indicative 
of distinct methodologies they are nominal at best. In any case, it is not my intention 
here to investigate the intricacies of Foucault’s method, nor to provide a 
comprehensive argument for this view. I consider them here in order to draw out 
certain critical commitments that are important for the broader argument presented 
here. 
‘Archaeology’ refers to the investigation into what Foucault calls the ‘archive,’ 
which is “the mass of things spoken in a culture, presented, valorized, re-used, 
repeated and transformed. In brief, this whole verbal mass that has been fashioned by 
men, invested in their techniques and in their institutions and woven into their 
existence and their history.”59 Foucault’s archaeological method seeks to bring into 
focus the structures of discourse that have drifted out of view simply because they are 
so much a part of everyday scenery; as Foucault describes it, “What I’m looking for 
are not relations that are secret, hidden, more silent or deeper than the consciousness 
of men. I try on the contrary to define the relations on the very surface of discourse; I 
attempt to make visible what is invisible only because it’s too much on the surface of 
things.”60 Foucault admits that the term ‘archaeology’ might imply a search for 
‘origins,’ but he explicitly rejects such a characterization, stating that it is neither the 
“discovery of a beginning” nor a “bringing to light of the bones of the past.”61 
Foucault’s aim is to bring to light the way that knowledge (and history) has been 
structured by specific, historical discursive conditions. His method, as he describes in 
reference to The Order of Things, is to show how particular historical discursive 
practices engender specific ‘rules’ for how objects, concepts, and theories are 
formed.62 The problem of archaeology, then, Foucault poses as “How does it happen 
that at a given period something could be said and something else has never been 
said? It is, in a word, the analysis of the historical conditions that account for what one 
says or of what one rejects, or of what one transforms in the mass of spoken things.”63 
                                                     
59 Foucault, “The Birth of a World,” trans. John Johnston, in Foucault Live: Collected 
Interviews, 1961-1984, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (New 
York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 66. 
60 Foucault, “The Archaeology of Knowledge,” in Foucault Live, 57-58. 
61 Foucault, “The Birth of a World,” 65. Cf. “The Archaeology of Knowledge,” Ibid., 57. 
62 Foucault these as “the rules put into operation through a discursive practice at a given 
moment that explain why a certain thing is seen (or omitted); why it is envisaged under such an 
aspect and analyzed at such a level; why such a word is employed with such a meaning and in 
such a sentence.” “The Archaeology of Knowledge” in Foucault Live, 61. 
63 Foucault, “The Birth of a World,” 66. 
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It is Foucault’s archaeological approach that gives rise to the famous 
displacement of ‘the Subject’ as the foundation of and the principle of organization of 
knowledge. Indeed, this earlier period of his thought seeks to demonstrate the 
contingency – that is, the lack of necessity – of the conscious, ordering subject. Such a 
subject, as Foucault concludes in the final pages of The Order of Things, is merely the 
effect of a particular arrangement of knowledge.64 Foucault had argued that the 
Classical épistémè assumed an ahistorical, a priori subject, which while not appearing 
to feature as part of this épistémè, as part of the ‘table’ and order that it sought, 
nevertheless was the central organizing feature.65 Like the absence of the sovereign in 
Foucault’s analysis of Las Meninas, man as subject is present and constituted through 
its very absence: it is the “essential void”: “the necessary disappearance of that which 
is its foundation.”66 Thus Foucault suggests the problem, but the possibility 
nonetheless, of analyzing the history of knowledge without beginning with or passing 
through man as subject.67 But, Foucault argues, the space that would be left by the 
disappearance of man, simultaneous to the death of God as proclaimed by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, is not a ‘void’ or ‘deficiency.’68 Rather, “It is nothing more, and nothing 
less, than the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible to think.”69 By 
ridding himself of the founding, sovereign subject, Foucault was thus attempting to 
open a space in which to ‘think differently.’ 
But what really happened to the subject under the exercise of Foucault’s 
archaeological method? After all, he states that the death of man proclaimed in The 
                                                     
64 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002), 422. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid., 18. 
67 Foucault, “The Archaeology of Knowledge,” 59 
68 See the famous proclamation by Nietzsche’s madman: “‘Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will 
tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers […] God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him.” The Gay Science: with a prelude in rhymes and an 
appendix of songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), § 125, 181. As 
Milchman and Rosenburg point out, Foucault’s work is a response to the continuing cultural 
crisis – in morality, values, knowledge and truth – that erupted with Nietzsche’s claim. See 
Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenburg, “The Aesthetic and Ascetic Dimensions of an Ethics of 
Self-fashioning: Nietzsche and Foucault,” in Parrhesia 2 (2007), 44. 
69 Foucault, The Order of Things, 373. Foucault goes on: “To all those who still wish to talk 
about man, about his reign or his liberation, to all those who still ask themselves questions 
about what man is in his essence, to all those who wish to take him as their starting-point in 
their attempts to reach the truth, to all those who, on the other hand, refer all knowledge back 
to the truths of man himself, to all those who refuse to formalize without anthropologizing, 
who refuse to mythologize without demystifying, who refuse to think without immediately 
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Order of Things is “nothing to get particularly excited about.”70 Foucault defends this 
proclamation, stating that: “I don’t mean by it the death of god but the death of the 
subject, of the Subject in capital letters, of the subject as origin and foundation of 
Knowledge (savoir), of Freedom, of Language and History.”71 It is this movement that 
has been called the ‘decentering of the subject’ (I discuss this further in Chapter 
Three, with particular reference to the alternative idea of the subject that Foucault 
proposes). Foucault may have decentred the subject, but he did not rid himself of it 
completely: 
One can say that all of Western civilization has been subjugated, and 
philosophers have only certified the fact by referring all thought and 
all truth to consciousness, to the Self, to the Subject. In the rumbling 
that shakes us today, perhaps we have to recognize the birth of a 
world where the subject is not one but split, not sovereign but 
dependent, not an absolute origin but a function ceaselessly 
modified.72 
Indeed, Foucault never stops being interested in the relationship between truth and the 
subject (without the capital); it forms a central theme in his final years of lectures at 
the Collège de France, while ‘the subject’ is at the centre of his genealogical 
investigations. What Foucault seeks to do, following the conclusions of The 
Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things, is to restore the subject as a 
concrete, historical artefact: something that is an effect of particular arrangements of 
power/knowledge, rather than the a priori, ordering and knowing subject that sits 
outside history. 
Frédéric Gros notes that in the last year of lectures Foucault deliberately 
juxtaposes his approach to the relation of the subject to truth against the way he had 
conceived it earlier in terms of archaeology.73 In the opening lecture of this series, 
Foucault approaches this relationship through an analysis of the conditions whereby a 
                                                                                                                                            
thinking that it is man who is thinking, to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection we 
can answer only with a philosophical laugh – which means, to a certain extent, a silent one.” 
70 Foucault, “The Birth of a World,” 67. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 See Frédéric Gros, “Course Context,” in The Courage of Truth: the Government of Self and 
Others II: Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984, ed. Frédéric Gros, trans. Graham 
Burchell (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), especially 343-345. 
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subject is manifested – to others and to herself – through acts of truth-telling.74 
Foucault’s focus is on how individuals constitute themselves when they speak the 
truth. He states: 
Rather than analyzing the forms by which a discourse is recognized as 
true, this would involve analyzing the form in which, in his act of 
telling the truth, the individual constitutes himself and is constituted 
by others as a subject of a discourse of truth, the form in which he 
presents himself to himself and to others as someone who tells the 
truth, the form of the subject telling the truth.75 
Whereas the archaeological investigations are concerned with the historical and 
cultural conditions of the existence of true discourses, in these lectures he is concerned 
with how a subject’s relationship with herself and her relationships with others are 
dependent upon a specific form of speaking the truth.76 This is not, as Gros argues, a 
study that looks for the conditions that make true discourses valid or not, but which 
“examines the modes of being which true discourses entail for the subject who uses 
them.”77 
In the earlier lecture course of 1981-1982, published as The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject, Foucault describes what he calls the “Cartesian moment,” at which self-
knowledge was made the primary condition of the subject’s access to truth. The 
significance of this moment for Foucault is that it displaces the ancient precept of care 
of the self [epimeleia heautou] with the imperative to know oneself [gnōthi seauton].78 
Foucault sees this displacement as responsible for the exile of care of the self from 
philosophy.79 Within the broader context of Foucault’s archaeological and 
genealogical investigations, however, this description takes its place as part of 
                                                     
74 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 2-3. 
75 Ibid, 3. 
76 Frédéric Gros, “Course Context,” in The Courage of Truth, 344. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, 
ed. Frédéric Gros, trans Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2005), 14-15. 
79 Ibid., 14. Foucault thus provides the following definition of philosophy: “We will call, if you 
like, ‘philosophy’ the form of thought that asks, not of course what is true and what is false, but 
what determines that there is and can be truth and falsehood and whether or not we can 
separate the true and the false. We will call ‘philosophy’ the form of thought that asks what it 
is that enables the subject to have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the 
conditions and limits of the subject’s access to truth.  If we call this ‘philosophy,’ then I think 
we could call ‘spirituality’ the search, practice, and experience through which the subject 
carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth.” (15) 
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Foucault’s continuing concern with ‘knowing man’ as the underlying condition of 
truth. As Gros notes, “In ancient spirituality, the subject can lay claim to the truth on 
the basis of a transformation of his being, whereas for modern philosophy it is insofar 
as he is always enlightened by the truth that the subject can claim to change the way 
he conducts himself.”80 Thus the attention that Foucault gives to the theme of the care 
of the self in his last years of work can be seen as re-instituting not only the subject as 
part of the epistemological field, rather than as its external condition, but the sense in 
which access to the truth is the result of a transformation in the subject’s rapport à soi.  
This shift in the relationship between the subject and truth is reflected in 
Foucault’s transition to genealogy. Late in his career, when he had begun to 
investigate the ethical practices of Antiquity, Foucault re-cast his entire project as a 
genealogy of the modern Western subject. That is, as preoccupied with how, since 
Antiquity, we have been constituted as subjects not only through techniques of power, 
but through what Foucault calls ‘techniques of the self.’ (These are the technologies 
that “permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and 
way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”81) In one interview, Foucault 
frames his work on disciplinary power as forming part of a broader overarching 
project of conducting a genealogy of the Western subject.82 But he also simultaneously 
posits his late investigations into ethical practices as another facet of his general 
analysis of power: “Having studied the field of power relations taking techniques of 
domination as a point of departure, I would like, in the years to come, to study power 
relations starting from the techniques of the self.”83 Elsewhere, however, he is more 
explicit, claiming that his previous work had been less concerned with analyzing the 
                                                     
80 Frédéric Gros, “Course Context,” in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 522. 
81 Foucault, “Technologies in the Self” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Vol. 1 of Essential 
Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans Robert Hurley et. al. (London: Penguin 
Books, 2000), 225. In another interview these are referred to as ‘techniques’ rather than 
‘technologies,’ see “Sexuality and Solitude” in Ethics, 177. 
82 For example, Foucault states: “If one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in 
Western civilization, one must take into account not only techniques of domination but also 
techniques of the self. One must show the interaction between these types of technique. When I 
was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I perhaps insisted too much on the techniques of 
domination. What we call ‘discipline’ is something really important in this kind of institution; 
but it is only one aspect of the art of governing people in our societies.” “Sexuality and 
Solitude” in Ethics, 177. 
83 Ibid. 
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phenomena of power than with the “three modes of objectification which transform 
human beings into subjects,” of which the third – the study of “the way a human being 
turns himself into a subject” was the theme of his current work.84 In light of this, 
Foucault claims that “it is not power but the subject which is the general theme of my 
research.”85  
Foucault wants to show how our modern conceptions of the self and the subject 
are historical and cultural realities and as such are open to challenge, and to change.86 
He thus considers this genealogy to be part of the broader political task of conducting 
a ‘critical ontology of ourselves.’ Foucault states:  
Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology 
of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves 
as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in 
relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as 
subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to 
ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. 87 
This genealogy aims not to discover or establish “formal structures with universal 
value,” but to function rather as an investigation to the conditions that have led us to 
understand ourselves and each other in particular ways.88 Foucault thus re-cast his 
work on power as revealing the historical and cultural contingency of modern 
conceptions of the self, soul and subject.  
Genealogy thus reveals the historical specificity of events and identifies their 
associated discourses. In doing so it provides another perspective on the 
archaeological rejection of the Subject. This rejection is in fact a condition of the very 
possibility of conducting the genealogical project: “One has to dispense with the 
                                                     
84 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Critical Inquiry 8 (Summer, 1982), 777-778. The first 
part, “Why Study Power? The Question of the Subject,” was written in English by Foucault. 
The second part, “How is Power Exercised?” trans. Leslie Sawyer. First published as the 
afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
85 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 778. 
86 See “Sexuality and Solitude,” 177; and “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the 
Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth,” in Political Theory 21, no. 2, May 1993, 202. 
87 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” in The Foucault 
Reader (London, Penguin Books, 1991), 351. It is interesting to note here how Foucault 
characterizes his earlier work on power as concerned with the way subjects exercise power 
over each other. From the point of view of Discipline and Punish, at least, this characterization 
seems heavily influenced by the concerns of the late work. 
88 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Ethics, 315. 
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constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis 
which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. 
And this is what I would call genealogy.”89 But this does not constitute a complete 
rejection of the idea of subjects in general; Foucault merely removes ‘the Subject’ as 
the scaffold upon which epistemologies are constructed. In doing so, Foucault 
suggests that, “Maybe the problem of the self is not to discover what it is in its 
positivity, maybe the problem is not to discover a positive self or the positive 
foundation of the self. Maybe a problem is now to discover that the self is nothing else 
than the historical correlation of the technology built in our history.”90  
Corresponding to processes of subjectivation and objectivation, according to 
Foucault, are ‘techniques’ or ‘technologies.’ These are the matrices of practical reason 
that human beings use to understand themselves.91 Foucault claims that there are four, 
interdependent, types of technology, although it is the final two – the ‘technologies of 
power’ and the ‘technologies of the self’ – which are of most concern here.92 In 
contrast to technologies of the self, as defined above, are technologies of power, which 
“determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, 
an objectivizing of the subject.”93 While these respective technologies form a 
significant part of the content of Foucault’s investigations (especially those techniques 
of the self derived from Antiquity), they are, as Paul Veyne observes, an important 
tool in Foucault’s methodological approach in conducting a genealogy of the subject: 
[I]nstead of starting out with universals as a grid of intelligibility for 
‘concrete practices’ that are both thought about and understood, even 
if they take place in silence, one takes as one’s starting point those 
very practices and the singular and bizarre ‘discourse’ that they 
presuppose, ‘so as to, as it were, pass these universals through the grid 
of these practices.’94 
                                                     
89 Foucault, “Truth and Power” in Power/Knowledge, 117. 
90 Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self, 222. 
91 See Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Ethics, 224-225. 
92 The other two are: “technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or 
manipulate things” and “technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, 
symbols, or signification.” Ibid., 225. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Paul Veyne, Foucault: His Thought, His Character, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Polity 
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In this way, even Foucault’s latest enquiries into ancient practices of the self, and the 
corresponding ethic that Foucault develops, represent a continuation of his earlier 
intellectual endeavours, inverting the classical epistemological course. The objectives 
of these late enquiries, however, are somewhat different. As Edward McGushin 
argues: 
His genealogies offer us an understanding of our present situation in 
terms of the embodied practices through which we are concretely 
determined as subjects of philosophy, and as disciplinary subjects in 
general. Furthermore, his historical ontology of our selves as 
philosophers reveals the way that our contemporary situation is based 
on a historical neglect – the neglect of the spiritual model of truth and 
of care of the self.95 
From this perspective, Foucault’s investigations into ‘power’ can be seen as a 
genealogical unearthing of the techniques of domination that constitute not only 
subjects, but the ‘individual’ and ‘man’ within disciplinary institutions. The ethical 
investigations, however, focus on the various manifestations of technologies of the 
self from Antiquity to modernity. Foucault’s goal in this regard is to give an account 
of how, through ethical techniques that have developed from Antiquity we have 
directly constituted our identity.96 In this way, the genealogy of the subject is 
simultaneously a genealogy of ethics. That is, Foucault cannot provide an account of 
how the subject has constituted itself without providing an account of the various 
techniques and exercises through which this constitution occurs. For Foucault, as we 
see further below, ‘ethics’ broadly refers to the various processes and modes by which 
individuals are constituted as subjects. 
So, before turning to Foucault’s idea of critique, and then to his analyses of 
‘power’ proper, what implications do the above observations about the archaeo-
genealogical enquiries have for the arguments presented here? There is one point that 
should be especially noted at this stage. If genealogy reveals the conditions by which 
we come to understand ourselves as certain kinds of subjects who do, act, and think in 
certain ways, a further step is required in order to develop and crystallize the political 
                                                     
95 Edward McGushin, “Foucault and the Problem of the Subject” in Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 31 (5-6), 644. 
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possibilities this revelation presents.97 As Michael Clifford notes, an understanding of 
the conditions and determining factors of our emergence as subjects can be used 
‘tactically’ as a means of resisting our subjection. But this neither necessarily amounts 
to a condemnation of the underlying power/knowledge networks, nor to a claim about 
whether such subjection should be resisted.98 Neither the genealogical nor ethical 
aspects of Foucault’s work are intended to prescribe behaviour or indeed to promote 
certain political views. Yet more needs to be said about how these revelations can be 
deployed to usefully confront, and possibly undermine, these conditions and 
associated structures of power/knowledge. It is only through such a deployment that 
the possibilities of doing, acting, thinking, and being otherwise can be realized. From 
the revelation that the self is nothing more than a correlation of the technologies of our 
history emerges one of Foucault’s strongest political objectives: a proposal for how we 
may constitute ourselves as subjects in relative and partial independence from the 
historical technologies. This is taken up in Chapter Three, where I outline Foucault’s 
alternative account of the subject, which forms the foundation of how he thinks that 
we should constitute ourselves.  
Critical Attitudes: the politics of truth 
It is in the idea of ‘critique’ that the political aspects of Foucault’s genealogy come 
into their own. In a now well-known and popular text, Foucault describes his project 
as forming part of a ‘philosophical interrogation’ founded in the Enlightenment.99 He 
is careful to point out that the content of this interrogation is different than the 
Enlightenment project but thinks that they nonetheless share a similar critical 
                                                                                                                                            
96 Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals,” in Power, vol. 3 of Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin 
Books, 2002), 404. 
97 As Roger Deacon observes, genealogy investigates not only how we are constituted and 
recognized as subjects, but attempts to determine the possibility of doing, being and thinking 
otherwise. See Roger Deacon, “Theory as Practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematization,” 
in Telos 118 (Winter, 2000), 130. [Vol. 31 (115-118) 1999-2000] 
98 Michael Clifford, Political Genealogy After Foucault: Savage Identities, (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 157. In Clifford’s words: “Foucault's object is not to condemn the network 
of power/knowledge relations; his object is to expose the interplay of determining factors 
constituting this network as the source of our emergence as subjects, in the sense that the 
recognition and understanding of their subjection can be used tactically in order to resist it. 
Whether they will resist it or not is an arbitrary (though not necessarily irrational) choice, and 
Foucault is adamant in his conviction that his role as an intellectual is not to tell them whether 
or not they should resist it.” 
99 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 312. 
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approach: “one that simultaneously problematizes man’s relation to the present, 
man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous 
subject.”100 Foucault suggests that we think about modernity not as a period of history, 
but as a certain form of attitude, which he describes as “a mode of relating to 
contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of 
thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time 
marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. No doubt, a bit like what 
the Greeks called an ēthos.”101 Indeed, it is precisely under this kind of ethos that 
Foucault’s work is conducted. His work problematizes, marks a way of acting and 
behaving, and is a form of ‘ascesis’ in the way the Greeks envisaged. I return to these 
points below. 
Methodologically, critique is not entirely distinct from genealogy. Earlier 
Foucault does distinguish them as different, although not completely distinct, 
approaches to the analysis of discourse. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de 
France, he describes the critical task as analyzing the processes of rarefaction, of 
regrouping, and of the unification of discourses, and the genealogical approach as 
studying their formation.102 The critical task here was the analysis of the instances of 
discursive control.103 Later, in ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Foucault describes criticism 
as genealogical in design and archaeological in method.104 In this sense, the critical 
                                                     
100 Ibid. ‘Problematization’ for Foucault refers to the way in which a particular concept is 
constituted as an object of thought in relation to truth, through both discursive and non-
discursive practices. See Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: 
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specific times and under particular circumstances, certain phenomena are questioned, analyzed, 
classified, and regulated, while others are not.” “Theory as Practice,” 127. Problematization is 
part of “the specific work of thought.” See Foucault, “Problematics,” in Foucault Live, 421. 
101 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 309. 
102 Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” trans. Ian McLeod, in Untying the Text: A Post-
Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 71. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 315. He goes on: “Archaeological—and not 
transcendental—in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all 
knowledge [connaissance] or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the instances of 
discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this 
critique will be genealogical in the sense that it will not deduce from the form of what we are 
what it is impossible for us to do and to know; but it will separate out, from the contingency 
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project is “a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, 
saying.”105 But given the conclusions that Foucault draws from his archaeological and 
genealogical investigations, critique can be seen as a development not so much 
methodologically, but practically: “it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide 
as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”106 Its true force comes from the way it 
engages philosophy, through ethics, with politics: “I shall thus characterize the 
philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-
practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by 
ourselves upon ourselves as free beings.”107 Foucault’s interest in ancient practices of 
the self is motivated by this imperative, as I examine in later chapters. For Foucault 
these practices offer modern individuals a model for such a work of freedom.  
There are questions, however, about how this approach – and the genealogical 
method more broadly – can be truly critical and indeed be politically significant if 
Foucault denies the possibility of transcendent critique. This is essentially the point 
Habermas is getting at when he states that ‘resistance’ is meaningless because it is 
always inscribed in existing strategies of power.108 For Foucault critique is not 
conducted from ‘outside’ those structures or forms that one seeks to question. It is a 
lived activity that depends on the recognition of oneself as a concrete, historical 
reality. As such, I suggest, Foucault’s idea of critique should be thought in terms of a 
‘critical attitude.’ 
For part of the answer to this problem, we can look to Foucault’s definition of 
thought:  
Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its 
meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of 
acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and 
question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is 
freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one  
                                                                                                                                            
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we 
are, do, or think.” (315-316) 
105 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 315. 
106 Ibid., 316. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 283-284 
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detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it 
as a problem.109 
Thought not only enables critical activity, it is itself an activity and a practice of 
freedom. As Roger Deacon describes it, “Thought is considered to be not merely a 
mental, cognitive, speculative, or linguistic phenomenon, but rather, a set of practices 
in its own right, i.e., a process that participates in the constitution of the objects of 
which it speaks, and that has specific and identifiable political effects.”110 The 
possibility of critique is therefore inscribed in our very being and embodiment as 
historical and cultural realities, which is why it is for Foucault part of the work of 
freedom. It is, moreover, a work of freedom practiced within the networks and 
frameworks through which we are defined as certain historical and cultural beings. 
To further understand the political implications of the critical attitude, I turn 
now to an earlier lecture Foucault gave called “What is Critique?” in which Foucault 
characterizes the critical attitude as a mode of response to the problem of government. 
In this lecture Foucault argues that the sixteenth century saw a rise in the number and 
force of ‘arts of government’—the techniques used to govern and conduct individuals, 
families, and groups. (I discuss ‘government’ and ‘governmentality’ in more detail 
below.) For Foucault, arts and technologies of government give rise to the problem 
and question of how not to be governed; that is, how to respond to these new forms of 
government and control. In the context of the sixteenth century, Foucault posits the 
emergence of the critical attitude as contemporaneous with the subsequent recourse to 
natural law as such a mode of response. The critical attitude is thus concerned with 
‘how not to be governed.’ This is not a question of a complete rejection or refusal of 
government; in the sense that individuals should refuse to be governed at all. It is not a 
call to complete anarchy or complete autonomy. Rather, it is “a perpetual question 
which would be: ‘how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those 
principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, 
not like that, not for that, not by them’ [Foucault’s emphasis].”111 In the sixteenth 
century, then, according to Foucault, it was natural law that formed the foundation of 
the critical attitude. It was from this basis that the question of how not to be governed 
                                                     
109 Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” 
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was formulated in terms of its legitimacy: “from this perspective, confronted with 
government and the obedience it stipulates, critique means putting forth universal and 
indefeasible rights to which every government, whatever it may be, whether a 
monarch, a magistrate, an educator or a pater familias, will have to submit.”112 Thus 
Foucault concludes, “Natural law is certainly not an invention of the Renaissance, but 
from the sixteenth century on, it took on a critical function that it still maintains to this 
day. To the question ‘how not to be governed?’ it answers by saying: ‘What are the 
limits of the right to govern?’ Let us say here critique is basically a legal issue.”113 
Thus part of its political enterprise is to call into question the relationship 
between authority and truth and in this way to pose the possibility of disrupting 
established orders of knowledge, epistemological frameworks and their corollary 
structures of power. Foucault complicates the relationship between truth and authority, 
stating that “‘to not to want to be governed’ is of course not accepting as true […] 
what an authority tells you is true, or at least not accepting it because an authority tells 
you it is true, but rather accepting it only if one considers valid the reasons for doing 
so. And this time, critique finds its anchoring point in the problem of certainty in its 
confrontation with authority.”114 Indeed, Foucault poses the practice of critique in the 
refusal of government to be “akin to the historical practice of revolt, the non-
acceptance of a real government.”115 This indicates, then, the starting point for 
understanding Foucault’s idea of resistance: as beginning in the refusal of a given 
mode of government, by calling into question the relationship between truth and 
authority to which it has recourse. 
Indeed, it is in this operation of the critical attitude that the significance of 
‘critique’ for Foucault’s account of politics begins to become clear. Foucault links the 
refusal of forms of government with the possibility of ‘desubjugating the subject’: 
[I]f governmentalization is indeed this movement through which 
individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through 
mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I say that 
critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right 
to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its 
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discourses of truth. Well, then!: critique will be the art of voluntary 
insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would 
essentially ensure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of 
what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.116 
The arrangements of power-knowledge linked with particular forms of government, 
legitimized and normalized by their relation to authority, make intelligible particular 
formations of subjectivity. As Butler describes it, “To be governed is not only to have 
a form imposed upon one’s existence, but to be given the terms within which 
existence will and will not be possible.”117 By calling into question this relationship 
between authority and truth Foucault thinks that we can disrupt the lines of this 
intelligibility, and therefore introduce the possibility of understanding ourselves in 
different ways. For Foucault, as we see further below, this possibility is intimately 
linked with the possibility of resistance more broadly.  
In linking the desubjugation of the subject with the refusal of forms of 
government, it is clear that Foucault thinks that certain forms of power call for 
resistance. Yet the role of the critical attitude here is not to provide a transcendent 
critique of forms of power or government. For Foucault, the critical attitude is linked 
to the ‘right’ to call authority into question. It points to an activity or stance that must 
be adopted in order to present the possibility of the subject’s desubjugation. In this 
way, Foucault places critique at the apex of the axes of truth, power and the subject. 
He states that “the core of critique is basically made of the bundle of relationships that 
are tied to one another, or one to the two others, power, truth and the subject.”118 The 
critical attitude, then, is “a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain 
relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to 
society, to culture and also a relationship to others.”119 Thus Foucault concludes: 
The critical ontology of ourselves must be considered not, certainly, 
as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge 
that is accumulating; it must be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a 
philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and  
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the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on 
us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.120 
The ‘critical attitude’ is essential to how Foucault understands ethics as not only 
related, but indispensable, to politics. This is because (as I demonstrate in later 
chapters) the ethical and aesthetic practices of self-constitution are intimately linked 
with the critical attitude, and therefore the capacity to question authority on its relation 
to truth.  
In the context of the criticisms outlined in Chapter One, then, the critical 
attitude takes a central role in how Foucault’s concept of ‘resistance’ should be 
formulated and understood. Yet if the problem of ‘how not to be governed’ is still 
current today, and assuming that the sixteenth century recourse to natural law fails to 
answer this problem as it arises now, the question for Foucault, and for the argument 
presented here, is to what does our own critical attitude have recourse? That is, what is 
the foundation of our critical attitude today? What form does critique take? I return to 
these questions in later chapters.  
Power: ethical foundations 
Beyond the juridico-discursive model 
The accounts of ‘power’ that Foucault gives in Discipline and Punish and The Will to 
Knowledge each mark an attempt to move beyond traditional theories of power. For 
Foucault, ‘power’ – short for ‘relations of power’ – should be conceived neither as a 
simple physical capacity, nor as a capacity attained by right or consent, by which its 
exercise is legitimized. Neither should it be characterised merely in repressive terms. 
In this section I introduce Foucault’s account of power relations by outlining those 
traditional ideas about power that Foucault wants to dispel. In doing so, I argue that 
many of the criticisms outlined in parts one and two of Chapter One maintain certain 
assumptions and ideas about power of the very sort that Foucault was trying to 
overcome. 
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault explicitly posed his 
‘analytics’ of power in contrast to what he calls the ‘juridico-discursive’ 
                                                     
120 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 319. 
  
 
54 
representation of power, which he sees as embedded in political analyses of power 
throughout the history of the West.121 For Foucault, this is a theory of power defined 
by its essentially negative and prohibitive character. In this way, it presupposes a 
legalistic binary structure of acts as legal or illegal, licit or illicit, permitted or 
forbidden.122 This structure operates as a framework of intelligibility through which 
acts are interpreted and evaluated, according to their relationship to and place within 
this binary system. It is through language that this power functions: discourse is a 
mechanism that articulates and sets down the relation of acts to this binary structure. 
As such it sets up an opposition between power and the subject: subjects are defined in 
a relation of obedience to legislative power.  
What puzzles Foucault is why such a model – which for him is clearly deficient 
in its account of how power actually operates and clearly ignores other formations and 
mechanisms – should continue to pervade modern ideas about power. He suggests that 
the juridico-discursive model is so successful precisely because power masks its own 
operation: “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. 
Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.”123 For Foucault, 
the ingenuity in its success lies in its recourse to ‘freedom.’ That is, following the 
tradition of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, power is posed as the opposite of 
freedom and as the legitimate limit placed on individual liberty. Foucault argues that 
“Power as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its 
acceptability.”124 In this way, the juridico-discursive model leans on a representation 
of the effects of power as either, on the one hand, promising the possibility of 
liberation (by characterizing power as taking hold of something prior to it, therefore 
positing the possibility of its release), or, on the other hand, as constitutive of that 
which it appears to repress (and therefore presenting no alternative).125 That is, 
Foucault thinks that the very idea that the only alternative to a repressive model of 
power is that power must therefore be all-constitutive, and therefore inescapable, is 
itself a mechanism of the juridico-discursive model. 
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It is particularly this characterization of power that appears to be the target of 
the criticisms made by Habermas et. al., as outlined in Chapter One. For example, the 
view that the apparently all-pervasive nature of Foucault’s account of power means 
that there is no escaping power, and thereby precludes the possibility of resistance. As 
already noted above, this is founded on the idea that the possibility of resistance can 
only be sought in a concept of the subject or body as pre-existing or independent of 
power relations. The view that a rejection of such concepts necessarily precludes the 
possibility of resistance to power results in one of the two effects of the juridico-
discursive model that Foucault identifies: namely, that one is always-already ‘trapped’ 
by power. Habermas et. al. seem to prefer the alternative: that, given a subject or body 
that is conceived of as independent of power relations, there is only to release power’s 
hold and so liberate the individual. In this way, views such as those held by Habermas, 
Fraser and Taylor presuppose certain conceptions of power and freedom of the very 
sort that Foucault was attempting to overcome.126 Taylor’s insistence that ‘power’ and 
‘domination’ must have recourse to the notion of constraint of human agency in order 
to be meaningful makes just such a presupposition.127 This refers precisely to the 
characterization of power as necessarily repressive and negative that Foucault 
identifies as part of the juridico-discursive model.128  
Indeed, Taylor argues that in line with the recognition that power and 
domination are only meaningful in terms of constraint or repression, so ‘freedom’ is 
only meaningful if it refers to a lessening or lifting of that restraint. He suggests,  
‘[P]ower’ belongs in a semantic field from which ‘truth’ and 
‘freedom’ cannot be excluded. Because it is linked with the notion of 
the imposition on our significant desires/purposes, it cannot be 
separated from the notion of some relative lifting of this restraint, 
from an unimpeded fulfillment of these desires/purposes. But this is 
just what is involved in a notion of freedom.129 
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Taylor’s characterization of freedom in this passage clearly draws on traditional 
liberal ideas of (negative) freedom as the extent to which one is free from imposition 
and control. Contrary to Taylor’s view, Foucault does talk about freedom and it 
becomes an increasingly important theme in his later work. The problem with how 
Taylor conceives of freedom here is that liberty is posited as the opposite of power: 
that freedom and power are in inverse proportion to one another. Within this 
framework, then, Taylor is right to argue that the terms ‘power’ and ‘domination’ are 
only meaningful if understood under the rubric of ‘constraint,’ and that freedom is 
only meaningful if understood as liberation from that constraint. But it is precisely this 
conceptual relationship between the terms ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ that Foucault 
disrupts. For him, as we see in detail below, freedom is not posed as the opposite of 
power.  
Foucault states explicitly the need for an analytics of power to ‘free itself’ from 
the juridico-discursive model.130 His point is that the latter is no longer adequate to 
describe the operation of power in societies of our own time. The continuing 
preoccupation with questions of right and consent, the conception of power in terms of 
juridical binaries, the problems of freedom and will, the state, and sovereignty are, in 
Foucault’s view, all because we have yet to dispose of an underlying monarchical 
model.131 Foucault does not think that these forms and questions have ceased to be 
important, but that the juridico-discursive model has failed to keep pace with societal 
change and corollary changes in power that are irreducible to this historical model.132 
The juridico-discursive model, Foucault argues, “is utterly incongruous with the new 
methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by 
law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are 
employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.”133 
Foucault thus places his own analytics of power as an alternative to this model; his 
own work addresses explicitly the modern operation of power as technique, 
normalization, and discipline, as they operate throughout society and in individual 
relationships. Foucault goes on: 
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One remains attached to a certain image of power-law, of power-
sovereignty, which was traced out by the theoreticians of right and the 
monarchic institution. It is this image that we must break free of, that 
is, of the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to 
analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its 
operation. We must construct an analytics of power that no longer 
takes law as a model and a code […] We shall try to rid ourselves of a 
juridical and negative representation of power, and cease to conceive 
of it in terms of law, prohibition, liberty, and sovereignty.134 
Foucault’s alternative account of power, then, must be evaluated not only in terms of 
how far it enables a move beyond the juridico-discursive model, but in terms of a 
framework in which to articulate an alternative conception of ‘resistance.’ 
The analytics of governmentality 
Consistent with his rejection of the juridico-discursive model of power, and in 
developing his account of power relations, in his later work Foucault turns to the idea 
of ‘government.’ This represents a dual movement: on the one hand, Foucault uses 
‘governmentality’ as an analytical framework through which to conceive of the arts 
and technologies of government since the sixteenth century.135 On the other hand, as 
we see further below, Foucault uses ‘government’ to refer to interpersonal exercises of 
power characterised as the ‘conduct of conduct.’ Adopting Thomas Lemke’s phrase, 
the ‘analytics of governmentality’ represents the conceptual and analytical framework 
that Foucault proposes as an alternative way of understanding the operation of 
political power.136 My aim here is to provide a preliminary overview of the analytics 
of governmentality, focussing on the key ideas that contribute to a renewed approach 
to conceiving the political field. 
In providing the framework for an alternative critical approach to the operation 
of political power, ‘governmentality’ offers a number of useful poles of reference for 
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understanding Foucault’s ideas about politics. Most significantly, ‘governmentality’ 
re-frames the operation of political power in modern Western societies. In his analyses 
of arts and technologies of governmentality Foucault de-emphasises the 
individualising role of discipline, turning instead to population-focused ‘biopolitics.’ 
Although much of Foucault’s investigation into governmentality and biopolitics is 
structured by a critique of liberalism, the poles of analysis that Foucault develops 
through this investigation nevertheless mark a significant departure from the juridico-
discursive model of power. This is particularly the case in the way that Foucault de-
couples political power from the state, which in turn requires a conceptual overhaul of 
the concepts of ‘state,’ ‘civil society’ and even ‘politics’ itself.  
In using ‘governmentality,’ Foucault is usually taken to refer to the various arts 
and regimes of government and administration.137 In the opening lecture of The Birth 
of Biopolitics, Foucault sets up the object of analysis of government as concerned not 
with actual governmental practice, but with governmental rationalities. That is, the 
internal rationalities underlying the limits that government sets for itself, the 
technologies that it uses, and the reasons or values to which it has recourse for its 
justification and legitimisation. Foucault argues that he wants to study the “reasoned 
way of governing best,” the “reflection on the best possible way of governing” and to 
“grasp the level of reflection in the practice of government.”138 Foucault’s aim in 
focusing on governmental rationalities is to bring into focus the discursive conditions 
of specific formations and technologies of government. That is, to clarify the ways 
that specific formations of governmental power – the state being the prime example – 
rely upon particular discourses (and thereby their underlying épistémès) to justify and 
support the exercise of power. As I discuss further below, a prime example of this is 
the way that liberal governmental rationalities rely on discourses about ‘freedom’ and 
‘security.’  
Consistent with his archaeo-genealogical commitments, Foucault is explicit in 
not taking such concepts as ‘the state’ and ‘sovereignty’ as points of origin from 
which to analyse governmental practices.139 Rather, he inverts the normal course of 
other forms of analysis (sociological for example) and poses governmental practice as 
the starting point from which to approach these concepts as specific historical and 
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social phenomena. As Walters points out, governmentality is therefore closely tied 
with a genealogy of the modern state.140 In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault 
argues that a genealogy of the modern state can be constructed “on the basis of a 
history of governmental reason.”141 In addition to exploring the state at the level of its 
concrete practices, then, it also includes the reason whereby government legitimises 
and rationalises itself. In this way, governmentality can be seen as an extension of 
Foucault’s archaeo-genealogical method of analysis. He uses specific practices (for 
example, the kinds of routines and exercises that prisoners are subject to) as the 
starting point for examining purportedly universal concepts or given social formations 
(for example, the prison). Instead of using ‘universals’ as grids of intelligibility, he 
uses historical and social practices as the grids of intelligibility for universals.142 In 
doing so he is able to show how the concepts and formations of ‘the state,’ ‘society,’ 
‘sovereign’ and ‘subjects’ emerge, thereby placing their status into question.143 
In this way, Foucault analyses the formation of the state and the formation of 
subjects from a single analytical perspective.144 As we see further in later chapters, this 
is significant because it enables an alternative vision of politics and political power 
that sees subjects as emerging as part of the political field. At this point it is important 
to note how the analytics of governmentality foregrounds this alternative by 
disassociating political power from the state. In the first instance, an analytics of 
governmentality enables a critical analysis of statism and specific governmental 
rationalities that does not pose the subject (that is, the investigating, analysing subject) 
as external to the phenomena under investigation. As Lemke notes, the analytics of 
government does not “take for granted the idea of some originating subject that pre-
exists and determines political processes and is referred to as the state.”145 The concept 
of government, moreover, is supposed to enable an investigation of the conditions and 
circumstances from which ‘the state’ emerges, thus enabling its historical situation. 
Like the concepts of politics and the economy, for Foucault ‘the state’ as such 
does not exist. He argues politics and the economy “are things that do not exist and yet 
which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the 
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false.”146 The state can be thought of, then, as the actualisation of a particular 
arrangement of power and knowledge, the concept of which is reified through certain 
discursive conditions. The state, as a specific governmental technology, is thus a 
“transactional reality”: a real but non-substantive effect of a particular arrangement of 
power relations.147 Lemke describes this as “a dynamic ensemble of relations and 
syntheses that at the same time produces the institutional structure of the state and the 
knowledge of the state.”148  
Similarly, Foucault places in question the phenomena of ‘civil society.’ He 
argues that civil society is a correlative concept of liberal governmental technology.149 
It does not exist as such, but represents a particular arrangement of social and power 
relations inscribed with the concept of civil society, as defined through a particular 
technology of government. What Foucault wants to dispel is the characterisation of 
civil society in political and philosophical discourse as “a reality which asserts itself, 
struggles, and rises up, which revolts against and is outside government or the state, or 
the state apparatuses or institutions.”150 Foucault is questioning the extent to which we 
can deploy the idea of civil society against particular governmental technologies. In 
what should now be a familiar strategy, Foucault undermines this possibility by 
pointing out that there is no civil society, just a historically and socially delimited 
concept, which may be one day itself be viewed as part of the archive of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
What is especially significant here is that Foucault thereby undermines the idea 
that social organisations defined over and against ‘the state’ can offer a community a 
collective source of resistance. Although this does indeed appear to limit even further 
critical and practical avenues for conceiving resistance to political power, it 
nevertheless simultaneously presents an alternative way of conceiving political power 
and politics. Particularly, I am interested in the way that Foucault’s de-coupling of 
political power from the state requires a renewed approach to thinking about the 
sources of political power and its extension throughout society. Moreover, it requires 
an alternative way of conceiving political activity. Read in conjunction with the 
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description of power relations, as we see further below, Foucault opens up the 
possibility of conceiving politics in ways that make political activity and resistance 
available in alternative forms and spaces. Before turning to this, however, it is 
necessary to examine in further detail the concepts of ‘relations of power,’ ‘freedom’ 
and ‘resistance.’ 
Questions of power: is ‘resistance’ possible? 
In this section I outline the key elements of Foucault’s account of power – focusing 
primarily on the ‘analytics’ of The Will to Knowledge and the account provided in 
‘The Subject and Power’ – within the context provided by the critical claims outlined 
in the first part of Chapter One. The subsequent questions that I aim to address are: 
First, given that in Foucault’s account the possibility of resistance is inscribed within 
networks of power relations, is the possibility of a critical approach to exercises of 
power precluded in the way that Habermas’ view suggests? Second, do Foucault’s 
distinctions between ‘power relations,’ ‘domination’ and ‘violence’ form an adequate 
basis upon which to critically evaluate power? I proceed by first providing an 
overview of these three key concepts, before providing a preliminary answer to these 
questions. (In the next section I then turn to the question of whether Foucault’s 
descriptions of ‘liberty’ and ‘resistance’ provide such a foundation.) Providing an 
answer to these questions is important because they speak to the political relevance of 
Foucault’s account of power, and of his work more broadly. As I outline at the end of 
the chapter, they also have a bearing on the ethical and political aspects of his later 
work.  
Foucault’s account of power appears to offer few avenues for critically 
evaluating power as either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ or deeming some exercises of power to be 
legitimate and others illegitimate. This is often taken to lead inevitably to the 
conclusion that Foucault’s account fails to offer any practical possibilities for resisting 
power. The most significant reason for this is Foucault’s assertion that “[p]ower is 
everywhere.”151 When he made this claim, however, he did not mean that power is all 
constitutive, totalizing, and therefore ‘inescapable.’ In The Will to Knowledge, 
Foucault clarified this by opposing it to traditional models that associate power as 
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emanating from a single point, from a “unique source of sovereignty.”152 Rather, 
power is everywhere because it “comes from everywhere.”153 What Foucault means is 
that power is produced everywhere and by everyone in a given society. 
This indicates another key facet of Foucault’s account. ‘Power’ for Foucault is 
always short for ‘relations of power,’154 meaning both that power is a relation of force 
between two or more points and that relations of power are co-extensive with social 
relationships. As Foucault argues:  
Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to 
other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge 
relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are 
the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and 
disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the 
internal conditions of those differentiations; relations of power are not 
in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or 
accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they 
come into play.155  
In the “The Subject and Power,” Foucault clarifies this point, explaining that power 
relationships are a necessary and unavoidable facet of social relationships, and 
therefore completely pervade society. They are “rooted deep in the social nexus.”156 
As Barry Hindess notes, “power – and the resistance and evasion that it provokes – 
must be regarded as a ubiquitous feature of human interaction.”157 
It is the “strictly relational character” of power relations that provides the key to 
understanding the relationship between power and resistance.158 For Foucault, the 
possibility of resistance is inscribed within power relations: “Where there is power, 
there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position 
of exteriority in relation to power.”159 He argues that to pose the problem of resisting 
power in terms of ‘escaping’ power relations or as a matter of approaching power 
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from its ‘outside’ is to misunderstand its very nature, and therefore the nature of the 
problem. Power relations depend on “a multiplicity of points of resistance,” which are 
“present everywhere in the power network.”160 In this way Foucault rejects, and poses 
an alternative to, the binary structure of power he associates with the juridico-
discursive model: “there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers 
and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix.”161 This, as 
we will see below, is closely related to how Foucault conceives of the relationship 
between power and freedom. The point to note here is that power is never one-sided; it 
is never located and exercised solely from one point over and against another point 
that ‘has no power.’  
Here we come to the other significant feature of power for Foucault, and which 
also marks another significant point of departure from traditional liberal conceptions. 
Power for Foucault can be described neither in terms of capacity nor strength. He 
argues that it “is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared.”162 Neither is it a 
physical capacity.163 Foucault distinguishes the power of physical strength or 
capacities employed in our everyday use and manipulation of objects from the 
exercise of power in a relation: it is “that which is exerted over things and gives the 
ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them—a power which stems from 
aptitudes directly inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments.”164 Foucault 
explicitly rejects the idea that power involves a simple or quantitative capacity: it is 
not “a certain strength we are endowed with.”165 This idea, which in modern political 
theory can be traced back to Hobbes, posits power as a capacity that can be measured, 
held and exercised.166 Hindess describes it simply as a “generalized capacity to act.”167 
By returning to Foucault’s view that ‘resistance’ is in fact a defining feature of 
relations of power we can begin to define ‘domination.’ In The Will to Knowledge, 
Foucault insists that resistances are “inscribed” in relations of power as their 
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“irreducible opposite” [my emphasis].168 Here we have the key point of 
differentiation between what Foucault means by ‘power’ and what he means by 
‘domination.’ States of domination, according to Foucault, are when “relations of 
power, instead of being variable and allowing different partners a strategy which alters 
them, find themselves firmly set and congealed.”169 A state of domination is what 
occurs when a power relation or set of relations have become static such that the 
opportunities for resistance are removed or have become so minimal that there is no 
real possibility of transforming that relation or set of relations. In states of domination 
“relations of power are fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and 
the margin of liberty is extremely limited.”170 Foucault uses an historical example of 
marriage to illustrate this point: 
To take an example, very paradigmatic to be sure: in the traditional 
conjugal relation in the society of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, we cannot say that there was only male power; the woman 
herself could do a lot of things: be unfaithful to him, extract money 
from him, refuse him sexually. She was, however, subject to a state of 
domination, in the measure where all that was finally no more than a 
certain number of tricks which never brought about a reversal of the 
situation.171 
Foucault’s point is that while in such a situation there may be some avenues for what 
appears to be acts of resistance, they do not go far enough in provoking the possibility 
of a ‘reversal’ of the situation: regardless of these small avenues, the ‘dominated’ 
person is unable to disrupt the asymmetry of the relation. 
Of course there are many examples – such as the asymmetrical relation between 
parent and child or institutional examples such as schools – that would qualify under 
this description as a state of domination, and yet be considered socially legitimate. 
Indeed, Foucault’s definition as it stands is insufficient to condemn some states of 
domination and not others, even though it is clear from some of his comments that he 
thinks that some should be.172 In this way, Foucault’s definition of domination is 
problematic. He needs to go further in order to account for how some states of 
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domination are acceptable, even if this does not resort to a priori categories. There is, 
I argue, a way around this problem, if we consider the use of domination within the 
context of Foucault’s work on ethics. 
In a state of domination the concrete possibilities for effective resistance are 
removed, which is when power becomes equivalent to physical determination.173 In 
this way, Foucault lays the foundation for distinguishing power and domination from 
violence. While domination is ‘equivalent’ to a physical determination, Foucault is 
very clear that neither domination nor power is reducible to violence. Violence, 
according to Foucault, “acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks 
on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite pole can 
only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other option but 
to try to minimize it.”174 In line with this description of violence, Foucault further 
refines what he means by relations of power. In contrast to violence, “what defines a 
relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and 
immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on 
existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.”175 He argues 
further that the exercise of power 
is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it 
incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the 
extreme constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a 
way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of 
their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other 
actions.176 
What Foucault means is that the exercise of power merely refers to the kinds of 
actions and strategies we use every day to influence the behaviour and actions of the 
people around us. He goes on, “to live in a society is to live in such a way that action 
upon other actions is possible—and in fact ongoing. A society without power relations 
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can only be an abstraction,”177 at the same time emphasizing the fact that power 
relations are co-extensive with the social field. 
Returning the questions posed at the beginning of this section, it is clear that 
Foucault does distinguish between relations of power and states of domination, on the 
one hand, and relations of violence on the other. The problem, however, is Foucault’s 
failure to posit these distinctions in relation to any predetermined normative 
conceptions of what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate exercises of power. His very 
description of the nature of ‘power’ is taken to preclude both concrete opportunities 
for resistance and the very possibility of an evaluative critique. Even Foucault’s 
insistence that resistance is the irreducible opposite of power is not seen as a serious 
commitment to a political or emancipatory agenda. For Habermas, at least, the 
characterization of resistance in terms of power prevents such a political reading. But 
Foucault states explicitly that this is not the case, stating that “this does not mean that 
they [resistances] are only a reaction of rebound, forming with respect to the basic 
domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to defeat.”178  
Paul Patton suggests that we approach this problem by making further 
distinctions between ‘power,’ ‘power over,’ and ‘domination.’179 Power, according to 
Patton, should be understood as “the capacity to do or become certain things.”180 As he 
notes, this form of power is always at play in human interaction, when the actions of 
one person affect the actions or field of possible actions of another person. This leads 
to the subsequent characterization of ‘power over’ as being when one person has 
succeeded in modifying the actions or field of possible actions of another person.181 As 
Patton notes, “‘Power over’ in this sense will be an inescapable feature of any social 
interaction.”182 Moreover, there is no guarantee that an attempt to affect someone’s 
field of actions will necessarily succeed, because “power is always exercised between 
subjects of power, each with their own distinct capacities for action” and because of 
this “resistance is always possible.”183 Most importantly, however, is that given this 
characterization the exercise of power is normatively neutral. As Patton argues, “It 
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involves no reference to action against the interests of the other party.”184 Similarly, 
given Foucault’s characterization of domination does not refer to the oppression or 
restriction of ‘essential’ human qualities, but to the relatively stable organization of 
relations of power, such that the successful modification of another person’s actions is 
guaranteed, ‘domination’ fails to carry normative weight. As Paul Patton notes for 
Foucault “the exercise of power over others is not always bad, and states of 
domination are not always to be avoided.”185  
To clarify some of these points, I turn momentarily to the account of power 
proposed by Hannah Arendt. Arendt, like Foucault, moves away from certain 
traditions in theorizing power, although the subsequent alternatives proposed by each 
thinker are for the most part strikingly different. Where they each break from the 
liberal tradition, and arguably also their closest point of similarity, is in their 
respective rejections of the characterization of power in quantitative terms of capacity 
or strength.186 For Foucault, as we have already seen, this is primarily in response to 
the idea that power is something that can be held, and therefore transferred or 
exchanged, as it is in the liberal tradition. In contrast Foucault argues that power 
should only be thought of in relational terms and then only insofar as it is exercised. 
For Arendt too power must be clearly distinguished from any sense of capacity 
or physical strength. It cannot be quantified or held; it cannot be possessed. In The 
Human Condition she states: “power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for 
emergencies, like the instruments of violence, but exists only in its actualization. […] 
Power is always, as we would say, a power potential and not an unchangeable, 
measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength.”187 As Foucault states in The 
Will to Knowledge, power is not “a certain strength we are endowed with.”188 But for 
Arendt, however, the critical force of this distinction does not come from the fact of its 
irreducibility to physical strength; it is in the implicit assumption that as capacity or 
strength power belongs to the domain of the individual. Its defining feature is that it is 
the condition of plurality that gives rise to power: “While strength is the natural 
                                                     
184 Ibid., 67. 
185 Ibid., 69. 
186 For a good analysis of the details of their similarities and differences, see Amy Allen, 
“Power, Subjectivity, and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault,” in International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 10:2 (2002, published online 8 December, 2010), 131-149. 
187 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
200.  
188 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 93. 
  
 
68 
quality of an individual seen in isolation, power springs up between men when they 
act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.”189  
Human plurality is the cornerstone of Arendt’s political philosophy; it is the 
condition of all political life.190 Thus Arendt states: “whoever, for whatever reasons, 
isolates himself and does not partake in being together, forfeits power and becomes 
impotent, no matter how great his strength and how valid his reasons.”191 Power arises 
between people in community with one another: it emerges out of their being together. 
The condition of this emergence is the ‘space of appearance.’ This is the public, 
political space for which the potential exists wherever people are together. In Arendt’s 
words: “The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the 
manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal 
constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the 
various forms in which the public realm can be organized.”192 In this way it is not 
bound to the physical arrangements that signify public or community places, like the 
town square, parliament, community hall.193 It is the fact of unique individuals being 
in community with one another, through speech and action. These, too, are predicated 
on human plurality, which renders human beings both equal and unique: it is the 
“paradoxical plurality of unique beings.”194 For Arendt power arises when people 
speak and act in community with one another, it is a power that can be exercised 
collectively to a common purpose.195 
Foucault thus positions his analytics of power as both a critique of and an 
alternative to traditional theories of power. Like Arendt, for Foucault power is not 
negative: it does not imply the repression of freedom. Yet for Foucault, the positivity 
of power has different implications than for Arendt, for whom power is positive 
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because it makes collective political action possible, by guaranteeing the space of 
appearance. Significantly, both thinkers emphasise the relational nature of power, 
although it leads them to different conclusions. For Foucault, as we have seen, 
relations are a constitutive condition of the exercise of power; but this does not lead to 
a shared or consensual model. His description of ‘power relations’ represents a clear 
break from the idea that political power bears an intrinsic link to the ideas of consent 
and legitimacy. For Arendt, alternatively, power is normatively positive, referring to 
the collective force that arises out of community. As Amy Allen points out, Arendt 
and Foucault’s respective accounts of power may be more complementary than 
normally thought. Indeed, they can each be seen as addressing weaknesses in the 
other’s thought. Particularly, as Allen notes, in focusing on the positive aspects of 
collective action, Arendt tends to neglect instances of power that are directed toward 
negative or nefarious ends.196 Conversely, Allen argues that Arendt’s concept of 
power enables us to “understand how the collective power that is generated in public 
spheres can serve as a resource for individuals who are struggling to resist the kinds of 
problematic and disturbing power relations that Foucault exposed.”197 
Returning to Foucault’s account of power relations, I want to make one final 
observation before turning to his idea of freedom. It is precisely because of their co-
extension with, or embeddedness within, the social nexus that power relations are 
contingent upon the specific historico-social order in which they arise, and therefore 
open to subversion. Foucault’s analysis, far from implying that their inherence places 
power relations beyond criticism suggests that social being has the critique of power at 
its heart. Foucault states: “I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into 
question of power relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the 
intransitivity of freedom is a permanent political task inherent in all social 
existence.”198 Indeed, it is their immanence in social relations that, rather than 
constituting a normative framework of evaluation, provides a situational and praxis-
based critique. I take up this point in later chapters: it is the relationship to self that 
forms the basis or foundation for this limitation. The task of questioning relations of 
power – which might manifest as the resistance to exercise of power or arts of 
government – is founded in the critical praxis of self-constitution. I argue, furthermore 
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that the relation to self can be thought of as the ‘permanent limit’ to relations of 
power. 
Questions of power: what is freedom? 
Foucault’s use of ‘freedom’ initially appears to offer few possibilities for a seriously 
political reading of his account of power more broadly. This is partly because his 
description of freedom appears to place the latter as a conditional counterpart to 
relations of power. In this way, the meaning of power remains tied to freedom, but not 
in the way that Taylor thinks it should be. As such, Foucault’s account is certainly 
vulnerable to criticism that his use of ‘freedom’ is politically meaningless. In tying 
freedom so close to power, it certainly appears that such an account could only fail in 
being able to articulate a source of resistance. In conducting this analysis, I examine 
Foucault’s description of freedom in the context of certain liberal ideas about freedom. 
Foucault explicitly rejected both the idea that liberty is an inviolable space inalienable 
from the individual and the corollary idea that power and freedom are mutually 
exclusive. Despite this, Foucault’s description of the relationship between freedom 
and power is liable to lead to misunderstandings about what ‘freedom’ really means. I 
offer then an amended description of freedom that attempts to avoid these problems.  
According to Foucault’s definition, as we have already seen, power can only be 
exercised within a relation as actions upon acting subjects or subjects capable of 
action. As such, freedom can be understood in the first instance as a structural 
condition of power. Foucault makes this point forcefully when he states that:  
[A] power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two 
elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power 
relationship: that ‘the other’ (the one over whom power is exercised) 
be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person 
who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up.199 
A relation can only be one of power if it is founded on the possibility of a greater or 
lesser number of alternative actions. In this way, Foucault appears to identify freedom 
with a field or range of possible behaviours and actions, which is a condition of 
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relations of power. Indeed, Foucault explicitly states that the ‘free subject’ is a 
condition for the exercise of power. He argues that: “Power is exercised only over free 
subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective 
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, 
several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized.”200 Freedom thus 
appears in its most basic form to refer to a field of possibilities or possible actions. 
Foucault’s description of the exercise of power as government – in the broad 
sense of the management of the behaviour and conduct of individuals or groups – 
appears to support this reading of freedom. He suggests for example that “[t]he 
exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order 
the possible outcome.”201 It describes the ways – including those deliberate, overt or 
tacit ways – that we get other people to do or not to do things. To govern in this sense, 
according to Foucault, “is to structure the possible field of action of others.”202 But this 
is where Foucault’s description of freedom runs into problems. As suggested above, 
the respective characterisations of freedom in relation to power and government both 
imply a general idea of freedom as a ‘field of possible actions.’ This characterisation 
appears to place Foucault’s idea of freedom closer to the liberal conception, in the 
sense that freedom is usually conceived as a ‘space’ or ‘area’ of freedom, and by 
portraying the individual as the site or locus of this freedom. In guiding the possibility 
of conduct, government appears to operate by shaping and curtailing the field of 
possibilities within a given relation. As such, government as the conduct of conduct 
can be seen as both emerging from and shaping the relations between subjects. As 
such, this has been taken to mean that government ‘shapes freedom.’203 This particular 
description aligns Foucault’s idea of freedom closer to the liberal tradition: it suggests 
that power operates over and against freedom.  
Moreover, in posing freedom as a defining counterpart of government, Foucault 
posits the individual as the locus of a quality or state of freedom. He notes: “It is free 
individuals who try to control, to determine, to delimit the liberty of others and, in 
order to do that, they dispose of certain instruments to govern others. That rests indeed 
on freedom, on the relationship of self to self and the relationship to the other.”204 As 
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Walters points out, government thus assumes a degree of freedom on both sides of 
the power relation.205 Dean takes this to mean that government thus “entails the idea 
that the one governed is, at least in some rudimentary sense, an actor and therefore a 
locus of freedom.”206 Under Dean’s reading, subjects are free because they are 
endowed with bodily and mental capacities.207 These capacities are thought to be 
primary to the relations of government through which they are exercised and 
manipulated. Dean argues that “[t]he notion of government as the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ presupposes the primary freedom of those who are governed entailed in the 
capacities of acting and thinking.”208  
Thus the description of freedom as a ‘field of possible actions’ complicates 
Foucault’s attempt to displace the concepts of power and freedom associated with the 
juridico-discursive and liberal traditions. Specifically, in using this description to 
assist in the definition of power relations, the ‘field of possible actions’ recalls the 
spatial aspect of liberal conceptions of freedom, thus attributing ‘freedom’ as a quality 
of individuals. Moreover, it appears to posit freedom as located in individuals’ 
capacities prior to the governmental relation in which they are exercised. If conduct 
‘shapes’ freedom, therefore, government is implicitly posited as that which takes hold 
of these capacities, thereby falling back into a conception of power as that which 
represses freedom. Foucault wants to say that freedom and power are not defined in 
opposition to one another, but are conditions of one another in the sense both must be 
present. Power is not that which reduces or represses an originary freedom. As such, 
the description of freedom as a ‘field of possibilities’ appears inconsistent with this 
view. There is I suggest a way around this problem, if we re-examine what Foucault 
means by ‘field’ and the relational context of both power and freedom. I return to this 
below.  
Before doing so, there is more to be taken from Foucault’s characterisation of 
power in terms of government. At first glance this does not appear very different from 
his characterisation of the exercise of power as actions that modify the actions of 
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others. But it is in his use of ‘conduct’ that the shift becomes clear.209 When he 
writes, “to ‘conduct’ others is at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to 
mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving 
within a more or less open field of possibilities,”210 he is doing more than describing 
the way in which someone can affect another’s behaviour within, or by structuring, a 
field of possible actions.211 He is linking together the exercise of power over others 
with the individual’s own behaviour. That is, the manner in which the exercise of 
power over others is intrinsically tied to one’s own comportment and mode of being. I 
return to this idea in detail in following chapters. What should be noted here is the 
way that the ‘practice’ of liberty is evoked in this double use of ‘conduct.’ That is, the 
actualisation of freedom in ‘actions’ does not go far enough in capturing the sense in 
which for Foucault freedom implies deliberate practice and exercise. This arises, for 
example, when Foucault uses ‘freedom’ to clarify the distinction between power and 
domination. In a state of domination, according to Foucault, “the practice of liberty 
does not exist or exists only unilaterally or is extremely confined and limited.”212 
Indeed, it is because of its intimate connection with power that the practice of liberty 
is a problem (I discuss this further in Chapter Five). It is sufficient to note here how 
the ‘practice of liberty’ indicates a decisive move away from the ideas about freedom 
corollary to the theories of power that Foucault rejects. I note here some of these 
ideas, before returning to Foucault’s own formulation. 
Freedom and liberalism: technologies of government 
As part of his analysis of eighteenth century liberal arts of government in the lectures 
of The Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault points to some of the problems with 
conceptualizing, comparing and analyzing ‘freedom’ under the different political and 
governmental models. Foucault thinks that there are two main, albeit broad, reasons 
for this: first, that freedom cannot be quantified in such a way as to allow a 
comparison of the amounts of freedom allowed by different governmental models; 
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second, that freedom does not have an ultimately universal nature that can be tracked, 
as it were, through its various manifestations and variations.213 Indeed, Foucault 
questions the way in which freedom, in the liberal tradition at least, has been 
conceptualized in terms of space. He argues that freedom 
[I]s not a universal which is particularized in time and geography. 
Freedom is not a white surface with more or less numerous black 
spaces here and there and from time to time. Freedom is never 
anything other—but this is already a great deal—than an actual 
relation between governors and governed, a relation in which the 
measure of the ‘too little’ existing freedom is given by the ‘even 
more’ freedom demanded.214 
It is clear from this passage that Foucault rejects the idea that ‘freedom’ is somehow a 
space or area linked to the individual prior to their participation in the social and 
political domain. Rather, Foucault sees freedom as relationally defined. As I argue 
further below, for Foucault there is no essential state of freedom, just a socially and 
politically defined relation. Foucault thus sets up an alternative way of thinking about 
freedom relationally.215  
Foucault further complicates the relationship of liberalism to ‘freedom,’ arguing 
that rather than just a matter of the recognition and guarantee of the amount of 
freedom ‘agreed’ between individuals and the state or sovereign, liberalism produces 
the requisites of freedom: that is, guaranteeing those conditions that enable freedom.216 
There is a tension between the production of those conditions and the freedom that 
they are supposed to enable. Thus Foucault states: “Liberalism […] entails at its heart 
a productive/destructive relationship [with] freedom. […] Liberalism must produce 
                                                                                                                                            
212 Foucault, “The Ethic of Care,” 3. 
213 See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 62-63. 
214 Ibid., 63. 
215 Thomas L. Dumm points out that both Berlin’s conceptions of positive and negative liberty 
turn on a conception of ‘natural’ space that delimits the ‘area’ or amount of freedom. He argues 
that: “In contrast to Foucault Berlin’s epistemological assumption concerning space is that it is 
of itself: as an empty neutrality, space operates as the ground upon which his argument 
concerning freedom is constructed, and as the product of the boundaries that produce it, space 
is the container for freedom, that which protects it as a possession of the boundaries created by 
its own exercise.” (Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom, Vol. 9 of Modernity and 
Political Thought [Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996], 47-48.) As Dumm points out, however, 
Berlin’s account fails to problematize (to use Foucault’s term) the constructed or architectural 
aspect of this supposedly neutral space of non-interference (Ibid., 48).  
216 See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 63. 
  75 
freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of 
coercion, and obligations relying on threats etcetera.”217 Foucault’s point is that 
‘freedom’ is deployed as a technology of the liberal government rationality. As such, 
it refers to the problem of ‘security.’ This is really the question of the extent to which 
the interests of individuals should be secured against the encroachment of the interests 
of others (and the representation of those interests by the state), and the extent to 
which the interest of the state (representing the collective interests of its members) 
should be secured against the interests of individuals.218 The interplay of freedom and 
security, for Foucault, results in what he calls the problems of the ‘economy of 
power.’219 This is really the traditional issue at stake in contractual models of political 
power. I return to this in a moment. 
Foucault points out that as a consequence of this liberal economy of power, that 
the liberal art of government actually requires an increase and extension of 
“procedures of control, constraint, and coercion which are something like the 
counterpart and counterweight of different freedoms.”220 Indeed, the development of 
such disciplines, which includes Bentham’s Panopticon, is “exactly contemporaneous 
with the age of freedoms.”221 Foucault’s point is that the discourses surrounding 
liberalism and its particular art of government have glossed over the extent to which 
its conceptions of ‘freedom’ rely on ever increasing modes and techniques of 
discipline and control. There are two clear points then on which Foucault explicitly 
sets himself apart from this tradition. First, he does not think that freedom should be 
conceived as an area of non-interference, against which power is defined as that which 
encroaches upon this area. Indeed, he undermines the liberal conception of freedom by 
pointing out that it is in fact a technology of liberal rationalities of government. In this 
way, Foucault undermines criticisms of his own account that implicitly or explicitly 
refer to this tradition. Second, Foucault similarly calls into question the 
characterisation of liberty as an essential quality or condition of human beings, 
particularly, as a quality inalienable from the individual. As we see further below, for 
Foucault liberty arises in relations between people.  
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Indeed, it should be noted how strongly Foucault rejects the liberal tradition’s 
recourse to ‘human nature’ and ‘natural rights’ in the definition and delimitation of 
liberty. In response to the problem of how to determine the minimum area that ought 
to be inviolable, the classical view of negative liberty turns to a conception of human 
nature: 
We must preserve a minimum area of personal freedom if we are not 
to ‘deny or degrade our nature’. We cannot remain absolutely free, 
and must give up some of our liberty to preserve the rest. But total 
self-surrender is self-defeating. What then must the minimum be? 
That which man cannot give up with offending against the essence of 
his human nature.222  
Following the Lockean tradition, the individual (‘man’) is thus set off as pre-existing 
the social arrangement or contract by which she agrees to limit the inalienable 
freedom that is part of her human nature. Locke of course conceived of liberty as a 
natural and inalienable right. While requiring compromise and certain limitation 
through the social contract, Locke sees the latter as ultimately guaranteeing 
individuals’ natural rights within civic society.  
In contrast to Locke, who thinks that the social contract establishes and 
maintains man’s natural rights within civic society, therefore reinforcing the 
inalienability of natural rights such as liberty, for Rousseau natural rights are alienable 
to the extent that they are exchanged for civic rights. Thus the right to freedom gained 
through the contract is inalienable: but it is a different kind of freedom than that of 
man in his ‘natural’ state. Thus he argues: “What man loses by the social contract is 
his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that tempts him and that he can 
take; what he gains by the social contract is civil liberty and the legal right of property 
in what he possesses.”223 Freedom for Rousseau, then, is more than the ability and 
opportunity to follow one’s desires and wants: this is the lesser form of freedom – or 
‘independence’ as he calls it – associated with man as he is in nature. As Rousseau 
describes it elsewhere, 
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Liberty consists less in doing one’s own will than in not being subject 
to that of another; it consists further in not subjecting the will of 
others to our own […] In the common liberty no one has a right to do 
what the liberty of any other forbids him to do; and true liberty is 
never destructive of itself. Thus liberty without justice is a veritable 
contradiction […] There is no liberty, then, without laws, or where 
any man is above the laws […] A free people obeys, but it does not 
serve; it has magistrates, but not masters; it obeys nothing but the 
laws, and thanks to the force of the laws, it does not obey men.224 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau identifies ‘independence’ or ‘natural liberty’ with 
physical strength: “we must clearly distinguish between natural liberty, which has no 
limit but the physical power of the individual concerned, and civil liberty, which is 
limited by the general will; and we must distinguish also between possession, which is 
based only on force or ‘the right of the first occupant,’ and property, which must rest 
on a legal title.”225 Rousseau continues: “We might also add that man acquires with 
civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be 
governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes for 
oneself is freedom.”226 
For Rousseau, it is only upon entering civic and political society that individuals 
(and people as a society) gain any ‘rights’; whereby the social order established under 
the aegis of the social contract forms the basis for all other rights: “the social order is a 
sacred right which serves as a basis for all other rights.”227 Like Locke, Rousseau 
thinks that men are born free, and as such liberty is inalienable.228 For Locke, of 
course, the natural right of liberty is maintained and ensured by the social contract, 
given that individuals give up a certain amount of this liberty. The social contract thus 
functions to preserve natural rights, although this inevitably requires the forfeiture of 
some of these. For Rousseau, however, the social contract represents the exchange of 
any so-called ‘natural rights’ for those real rights gained upon entering political 
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society.229 Thus for Rousseau, man’s independence prior to entering society cannot 
properly be called a right; rather than surrendering their liberty, men convert their 
independence into moral and political freedom.230  
Relations of freedom 
Taking into account his critique of liberalism, then, it is clear that an interpretation of 
the ‘field of possibilities’ that leads closer to the liberal view would indeed be 
inconsistent with Foucault’s underlying philosophical commitments. However, we do 
not need to discard this description of liberty—especially since doing so would 
compromise his broader account of power relations. Rather, we need to focus instead 
on the relational aspect of freedom.  
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Foucault’s own conception of 
freedom is that is inalienable from power. In Foucault’s view, liberty and power are 
not opposed to one another; freedom is not thought as that where power has failed to 
take hold, or the space left in which to act. 
[T]here is no face to face confrontation of power and freedom which 
is mutually exclusive (freedom disappears everywhere power is 
exercised), but a much more complex interplay. In this game freedom 
may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power (at the 
same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be 
exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility 
of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical 
determination).231 
Foucault clearly rejects both the characterization of freedom and power as mutually 
exclusive and that the idea that an exercise of power necessarily results in a reduction 
or elimination of liberty. He argues that “if there are relations of power throughout 
every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere” [my emphasis].232  
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Exercises of power therefore do not necessarily result in a ‘reduction’ of the 
field of possibilities, and therefore in a minimization of opportunities for resistance. It 
is the case, however, that Foucault’s use of ‘field’ [un champ] in his description of 
freedom is liable to lead to such misunderstandings. A field of possibilities [un champ 
de possibilité]233 can give the impression of a space delimited by power, as in the 
liberal tradition (and the French lends itself to this reading as much as its English 
translation). It should, however, be read more in the sense of a field or domain of 
actions [un champ d’action] or, even better, as a political field [un champ politique]. 
Under this reading, freedom would not be a field of possible actions insofar as they are 
‘permitted’ by power, but refer to the political domain that arises between subjects. 
Indeed, in casting liberty as a condition of power, Foucault poses this ‘field’ as 
a battleground, in constant tension between exercises of power and acts of 
resistance.234 Thus Foucault suggests that “Rather than speaking of an essential 
freedom, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’—of a relationship which is at the 
same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which 
paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation.”235 This is why, in the passage 
above, Foucault states that freedom is nothing other than an actual relation between 
subjects of power. It is always contested, negotiated. (This idea of freedom as 
encompassing a form of agonism is taken up in later chapters, where this agonism is 
manifest in the interplay of subjectivation [assujettissement] and self-constitution as a 
practice of freedom.) As such, freedom refers less to a field of possible actions than to 
a political domain that emerges only between individuals in relation to one another. 
Thus what Foucault calls the ‘field’ of possibilities is not a ‘personal’ area of 
freedom: it is not attached to the individual as such, and it certainly does not 
conceived as an essential aspect of our ‘human nature.’ Freedom as a political domain 
arises in relation between two or more people. We can hear here an echo of Arendt’s 
idea of power: an individual in isolation cannot be free. For Arendt, of course, 
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plurality is a condition of freedom, since the latter can only be actualized through 
action. For Arendt, freedom is tied to ‘beginning’: the capacity for creation that arises 
out of natality.236 Action renews the originary beginning of natality: “action has the 
closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in 
birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the 
capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.”237 Freedom, then, consists in 
the potential to create something anew, to do something unexpected, but which can 
only be realized through action in the space of appearance. According to Arendt: “The 
fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from 
him, that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this again is possible 
only because each man is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new 
comes into the world.”238 Freedom is inexorably political, since it only arises within 
community, like power, in the space of appearance. Similarly, Foucault departs from 
the idea of liberty in liberal political theory when he characterises freedom, like 
power, as relational. But what we get from Arendt is the idea that the actualization of 
freedom relies upon a plurality of people, which is itself the condition of political life. 
In Foucaultian terms, this is significant because it renders the practice of liberty 
meaningful according to the terms and context of that relation of power. 
This is further clarified by what we can take from reading Foucault in the 
context of Rousseau. That is, the idea that liberty takes its real meaning and 
significance from its social context. For Rousseau, it is not ‘natural liberty’ that is 
meaningful: it is the idea of freedom as an aspect of our being in society with one 
another. Not dissimilarly, Foucault emphasizes an idea of freedom as that which is 
defined between people in relation to one another. I am not suggesting that Foucault 
has a corollary conception of ‘natural liberty,’ but that Foucault’s description of 
freedom emerges from the more fundamental idea that freedom and power are 
constitutive components of the social. Freedom would then refer to a practice within a 
relationally defined domain or field of action. In this way, the field of action should be 
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thought it terms of the actions and behaviours made meaningful within that relation. 
For Foucault, liberty arises in relations between individuals. As we see in later 
chapters, it is this idea that gives rise to the imperative for a practice of liberty that 
refers to the subject’s ēthos.  
 What needs further clarification, however, is how this relationship between 
power and freedom contributes to Foucault’s political objectives. I have argued that 
freedom is only coherent within Foucault’s broader account if conceived as an aspect 
or quality of the relation between individuals in society with one another. As has been 
made clear, Foucault’s idea of freedom cannot therefore act as a normative basis upon 
which to conduct a transcendent critique of power. This could be taken as evidence as 
to a complete failure to articulate a concept of freedom that enables a critical and 
political analysis of power. But as already suggested in previous sections, such a 
reading loses sight of the reasons behind Foucault’s disruption of freedom as it relates 
to the liberal and juridico-discursive models. 
Foucault wants to distance himself from the liberal tradition’s recourse to 
natural law and natural rights, founded on an a priori idea of human nature. He is 
concerned principally with the vulnerability of this recourse to political and 
ideological manipulation. Isaiah Berlin expresses a similar concern, pointing out that 
both the negative and positive notions of liberty refer to particular ideas of ‘man’ or 
‘human being’: “conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what 
constitutes a self, a person, a man. Enough manipulation with the definition of man, 
and freedom can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes.”239 Foucault 
rejected the idea of liberation on similar terms, arguing that it would inevitably refer 
back to an essential human nature or self that could be liberated: 
[T]here is the danger that it [‘liberation’] will refer back to the idea 
that there does exist a nature or a human foundation which, as a result 
of a certain number of historical, social or economic processes, found 
itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive 
mechanism.240 
In tying liberty so closely to power Foucault dislocates it from a priori definitions of 
human nature, removes it from the domain of the individual and places it instead 
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between individuals—as a political field that forms part of Foucault’s idea of the 
social. This enables Foucault to move away from characterisation of power as a 
negative, repressive force, because it is no longer conceived as the binary counterpart 
to freedom.  
While both the positive and negative accounts of freedom as described by 
Berlin refer to an a priori conception of what it means to be a human being and agent, 
for Foucault liberty is a condition of the processes by which individuals become 
subjects. That is, the processes by which they become this or that kind of human 
being. Clearly this notion of liberty would not go far in addressing Taylor’s assertion 
that Foucault’s concepts of ‘power’ and ‘domination’ must be juxtaposed against a 
normative conception of human agency as constrained or limited in order to be 
meaningful. As demonstrated above, for Foucault this claim is made from a position 
that makes certain assumptions about what ‘freedom’ and ‘power’ mean, and are 
located within the very traditions from which Foucault was attempting to distance 
himself. While the political and philosophical reasons behind this movement may be 
clear, more needs to be said about how Foucault’s formulation constitutes more than a 
rejection of previous theories, and presents a politically and philosophically 
meaningful alternative. While the relational account of freedom I have outlined 
overcomes internal inconsistencies, it needs to be pressed further in order to show how 
it contributes to an alternative idea of politics, and a politically meaningful notion of 
resistance.  
Within the context of this chapter we can begin to see how the practice of 
liberty provides such a point of departure. Particularly, the way in which Foucault 
links the critical attitude and the practice of critique as part of the work of freedom. To 
be really free is not to be in a state of freedom; it consists in the possibility of stepping 
back from the frameworks and institutions within which the conception of our formal 
freedoms are legitimized. As John Rajchman describes it, 
Thus our real freedom does not consist in telling our true stories and 
finding our place within some tradition or ethical code, in completely 
determining our actions in accordance with universal principles, or in 
accepting our existential limitations in authentic self-relation. We are, 
on the contrary, ‘really free’ because we can identify and change 
those procedures or forms through which our stories become true, 
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because we can question and modify those systems which make 
(only) particular kinds of action possible, and because there is no 
‘authentic’ self-relation we must conform to.241 
Recalling Foucault’s characterization of thought, freedom is thus the ability to step 
back from, reflect upon, and challenge the frameworks of interpretation and practice 
through which we understand and constitute ourselves. As Rajchman observes, 
Foucault’s philosophical project attempts to offer a means of this stepping-back: 
“Foucault invents a philosophy which would ‘free’ our experience of ourselves and 
our subjectivity.”242 The actualization of freedom thus consists in the ability to 
perform practices that would challenge given modes of being. 
What then can be said in response to the questions posed at the beginning of this 
section? Freedom is not only a structural condition of power; it refers to a specific 
political domain that emerges simultaneously to relations of power. This is why 
Foucault refuses to characterize freedom as an essential quality of individuals. He 
speaks instead of practices of liberty, and of the critical attitude referring to the ‘work’ 
of freedom carried out within this political domain. Does this mean that it cannot 
function as a source of resistance, or even as a conceptual foundation from which to 
begin to articulate ideas of subjectivity and resistance? More needs to be said about 
how the practice and work of liberty can form the basis of a critical evaluation of 
power, let alone how the practices of freedom can actually function as resistance to 
power.  
Conclusion 
What are the ethical and political stakes of this account and of the conclusions drawn 
so far? For Foucault freedom is neither an absolute state to be attained, nor an inherent 
quality of being human. It is, however, an inalienable feature of social interaction: of 
people living in relation to one another. It refers to a political domain that arises within 
and contemporaneous to networks of power, between subjects of power. In this way, 
the discursive field that gives meaning to the range of actions and behaviours within 
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this relation defines the ways in which certain actions and behaviours will be 
interpreted.  
In the first part of the chapter I suggested that Foucault’s critical ontology of 
ourselves in the present continues his broadly ‘archaeo-genealogical’ approach. 
Particularly, his genealogy of the modern subject seeks to bring to light the discursive 
conditions of our particular ways of understanding ourselves and others. In this way, 
Foucault re-institutes the subject as part of the discursive and epistemological field, 
demonstrating that these ways of understanding are therefore open to challenge. In the 
critical attitude, Foucault describes a stance taken in relation to forms and 
technologies of government, whereby one gives oneself the ‘right’ to question 
authority on its relation to truth.  
For Foucault, the possibility of resistance is inscribed in networks of power 
relations. It is because of this that it has been rejected as a basis for distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable instances of power, although it is seen as 
evidence that Foucault at least wanted to make such distinctions.243 In Chapter Three 
we see that part of its meaning is bound within the subject’s capacity for self-
constitution; that when we think about the ‘possibility’ of resistance we are referring 
to the capacity for self-constitution that is bound within body-subjects. Yet, limiting 
the meaning of resistance in this way ignores the critical operation that should be 
central to the concept of resistance. As we have seen, Foucault likens the critical 
attitude to ‘revolt’: to a ‘non-acceptance.’ He further posits critique as referring to the 
‘undefined work of freedom.’ In this way, we begin to see that resistance to power 
should be thought as founded in this right to question the relationship between 
authority and truth. 
As I point out in later chapters, this sheds new light on Foucault’s emphasis on 
ancient practices of the self. As we will see, Foucault sees such practices as cultivating 
this ‘right’ to question the relationship between authority and truth. Yet the central 
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exercise of power as such, but “to know how you are to avoid in these practices [associated 
with government and the conduct of conduct] […] the effects of domination which will make a 
child subject to the arbitrary and useless authority of a teacher, or put a student under the power 
of an abusively authoritarian professor, and so forth. I think these problems should be posed in 
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question raised in part two of Chapter One remains: namely, how can Foucault 
invoke notions of freedom and resistance and yet claim that ‘the individual’ is the 
internal product-effect of disciplinary power? I address this in detail in the next 
chapter. 
                                                                                                                                            
terms of rules of law, of relational techniques of government and of ethos, of practice of self 
and of freedom.” (Foucault, “The Ethic of Care,” 18-19.) 
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Chapter Three: Subjects of power and ethics 
Introduction 
The conclusion that Foucault cannot speak about resistance in a genuine way – 
because his account does not admit the body as either a bearer of a priori values or as 
endowed with a minimum strength or agency – relies on the view that to posit the 
body as inextricably located within networks of power is to posit the body as 
necessarily determined by power. Similarly, the idea of ‘production’ when read in 
conjunction with  Foucault’s statement that ‘power is everywhere’ is liable to lead to 
the interpretation of any ‘capacities’ or ‘skills’ associated with the body or subject as 
produced by power, and therefore as entirely determined by power. In this way, the 
body produced by disciplinary techniques appears to be an object incapable of 
resistance not only because the actions of which the body is capable are those that are 
forced and controlled by heteronomous sources, but because there is no internality or 
depth that ‘escapes’ power. Not only does this interpretation fall back upon the 
juridico-discursive concept of power, as noted in Chapter Two, but it relies too heavily 
on a limited but popular reading of Foucault’s ‘docile body’ that denies its subjective 
aspects. In this chapter I offer an alternative account of the ‘body-subject.’  
The chapter is divided into two parts. In part one, I argue that Foucault’s 
concept of disciplinary power actually presupposes an active body-subject that has 
capacities and skills that arise internal to the disciplinary mechanism. In undertaking a 
preliminary analysis of how Foucault approaches ‘the subject’ in the archaeo-
genealogical work compared with the approach that he adopts later, I suggest that his 
movement toward a self-constituting ethical subject is not inconsistent with his earlier 
philosophical position. By examining how ‘the individual’ arises within a network of 
force relations, I introduce the argument that the operation of disciplinary power 
presupposes subjective experience, thereby offering an alternative account of the 
‘docile subject.’ This is supported by the work of Elizabeth Grosz, whose alternative 
reading of the operation of power as inscription (in contrast to Butler’s reading as 
outlined in Chapter One), presupposes subjective experience of disciplinary 
techniques. Similarly, Paul Patton’s idea of ‘meta-capacity’ – that is, the ability to use, 
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develop and experience one’s own capacities – presupposes subjective experience 
and a sense of control over one’s capacities that allows a subject-centred approach to 
the ‘evaluation’ of power. Read together these accounts provide further weight to the 
argument that disciplinary power presupposes body-subjects.  
I turn in the second part of the chapter to Foucault’s idea of the reflexive 
relationship to self (rapport à soi). This forms the conceptual foundation of Foucault’s 
idea of the ethical subject who emerges as part of the historico-social reality of power 
relations. The four-fold structure of rapport à soi describes the modes by which 
individuals constitute and recognise themselves as subjects. These modes, however, 
are not independent of broader mechanisms of subjectivation (assujettissement), but 
exist in constant tension with them. Drawing on work by Deleuze and Butler, which 
demonstrates how the social relations in which we live are incorporated into the very 
constitution of the self, I argue that the body-subject can give rise to skills and 
capacities that emerge within networks of power yet which can be deployed 
responsively and spontaneously.  
Powerful Subjects 
Foucault’s subject 
Before turning to a preliminary analysis of Foucault’s various views on ‘the subject,’ 
it is worth noting the ongoing debate that gives context to this discussion. Foucault 
clearly takes different positions with regard to ‘the subject’ throughout his work. 
These differences are sometimes read as indicating a substantial theoretical shift. 
While I do not wish to wade into the depths of this debate, nor into the broader context 
of the history of the philosophy of the subject, there are several points of particular 
relevance to the arguments presented here.244  
On one hand, claims to a fundamental shift rely upon a particular comparative 
reading of the ethical subject of Foucault’s later work over and against the work on 
                                                     
244 For contextual discussions about ‘the Subject’ in Foucault’s work, and in the French context 
more broadly, see, for example: Michel Henry, “The Critique of the Subject,” in Topoi 7 
(1988): 147-153; Neve Gordon, “Foucault’s Subject: An Ontological Reading,” in Polity 31, 
no. 3 (Spring, 1999): 395-414; and Nina Power, “Philosophy’s Subjects,” in Parrhesia 3 
(2007): 55-72. 
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power.245 This reads the ‘active’ and self-constituting subjects of ethics as 
conceptually opposed to the regimented self-policing subjects of power.246 Although 
these descriptions are not incorrect as such, they are caricatures that misrepresent the 
nuances of Foucault’s account.247 The potential for disciplinary subjects to act and 
resist is refused, while the capacity for self-constitution of ethical subjects over-
emphasized. The consequences of this interpretation have especial implications for the 
political potential of Foucault’s work, partly because the possibility of resistance is 
taken to be the condition of any real political significance. In addition, the over-
emphasis on the aesthetic aspects of self-constitution are thought to be devoid of any 
real political relevance, not to mention their purportedly egoistic underpinnings. 
Rather, as Colwell argues, “We need to see that the subject is neither entirely active 
nor passive in either the early or the later works. The subject is constituted/constitutes 
itself within a system of constraints, whether they be described as disciplinary or 
aesthetic.”248 As I argue further throughout the thesis, the key to understanding the 
political possibilities of an ethic of power lie within a more synthesised account, 
whereby the ethical aspects of the subject are seen as providing critical and theoretical 
depth to Foucault’s earlier thought. Such an approach even opens up new avenues of 
addressing perceived problems in the earlier work. One of the aims of this chapter is 
                                                     
245 Peter Dews, for example, asserts that the late appearance of such a subject constitutes an 
“abrupt theoretical shift.” (“The Return of the Subject in the Late Foucault,” in Discourse: The 
Glasgow Journal of Philosophy, no. 4 [Autumn/Winter 1988], 38). Eric Paras argues along 
similar lines, also reading Foucault’s late work as representing a ‘turn’ to subjectivity and 
therefore a rather radical break with earlier thought. In characterizing subjects as reflexive, 
active and self-constituting, he posits the ‘subject’ as something concrete, reified (Foucault 2.0, 
13). He goes as far as to claim that in Foucault’s late works there is the presence of what Paras 
calls a ‘prediscursive subject,’ which he describes as “a subjective nucleus that precedes any 
practices that might be said to construct it” (Ibid., 14). 
246 Peter Dews, “Power and Subjectivity in Foucault,” in New Left Review I, no. 144 (March-
April, 1984), 77.  
247 This has significant implications. Particularly, there is the question of how other themes in 
Foucault’s work are to be read in light of this apparent shift in subjectivity. Of most importance 
to the arguments presented here is the view that the movement from the self-disciplining 
subject and docile body of Discipline and Punish to the self-constituting subject of volumes 
two and three of The History of Sexuality indicates a corollary decline in the role and 
importance of ‘power.’ Rudi Visker makes exactly this point, arguing that corresponding to the 
‘turn’ to subjectivity is the disappearance of the concept of power. He suggests that while 
techniques of subjectivization may be associated with techniques of power, they are essentially 
distinct. Under this reading power would seem to be no longer of concern to Foucault in his 
late works, or, if it is, it is only insofar as power resurfaces through the idea of government and 
practices of the self, which are essentially different from techniques of power anyway. (See 
Rudi Visker, Michel Foucault: Genealogy as Critique, trans. Chris Turner [London: Verso, 
1995] 87-88.) I take the opposite view. 
248 C. Colwell, “The Retreat of the Subject in the Late Foucault,” in Philosophy Today 38, no. 1 
(1994), 66. 
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precisely to offer an account of the subject that arises within a network of power 
relations, yet which has relatively undefined and unrestricted capacity for ethical self-
development and responsiveness.  
On the other hand, there is one school of thought that interprets this shift as a 
‘return’ to the subject, which seems to imply that Foucault is returning to a position 
that he had previously rejected. This would posit Foucault’s late work as representing 
a significant movement away from his earlier philosophical concerns.249 Yet Foucault 
does not re-adopt the same ideas that he had previously questioned. The subject to 
which he objected so strongly in The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of 
Things is not re-instituted late in his career. As Thomas McCarthy points out, Foucault 
‘turns’ to a conception of subjects as social and embodied, following his previous 
rejection of the rational and autonomous Cartesian subject individuated from the 
world.250 While he again takes up the theme of subjectivity in relation to ancient 
ethics, it does not refer to the subject as the centre and condition of knowledge. The 
underlying philosophical commitments are consistent. In the discussion presented here 
I take the view that while there is certainly conceptual development and changes in 
approach and style in Foucault’s thinking about the subject, this does not in itself 
represent a fundamental philosophical shift. While he rejects certain theories of the 
subject in his archaeo-genealogical analyses, this rejection is not inconsistent with the 
account of subjectivity that he adopts later. As he notes in one late interview, “I don’t 
think there is actually a sovereign, founding subject, a universal form of subject that 
one could find everywhere. I am very sceptical and very hostile toward this conception 
of the subject.”251 Indeed, he even emphasizes the importance of the genealogy of the 
modern self and subject – epitomized in his studies of ancient ethics and practices of 
the self – precisely because it enables the circumvention of the traditional philosophy 
of the subject.252  
This appears then as a strategic move: a way of enabling a different approach to 
the way that we in the present are constituted and constitute ourselves in relation to 
                                                     
249 See for example: Peter Dews, “The Return of the Subject,” “Power and Subjectivity in 
Foucault,” and Logics of Disintegration: Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical 
Theory (London, Verso, 1987); Thomas McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault 
and the Frankfurt School,” in Political Theory 18, no. 3 (August, 1990): 437-469; Paras, 
Foucault 2.0; and Visker, Michel Foucault.   
250 McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason,” 438. 
251 Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” in Foucault Live, 452. 
252 See Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” 225n26. 
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truth and to power. Thus Foucault clarifies his position: “I had to reject a certain a 
priori theory of the subject in order to make this analysis of the relationships which 
can exist between the constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and 
games of truth, practices of power and so forth.”253 Foucault does not place the subject 
as the condition of experience, but as the result of experience.254 This is what Foucault 
means by subjectivization [assujettissement]: “the process through which results the 
constitution of a subject, or more exactly, of a subjectivity which is obviously only 
one of the given possibilities of organising a consciousness of self.”255 The subject that 
features in the late work is neither founding nor sovereign. While he does reject an a 
priori theory of the subject, Foucault is careful to contextualize this move as part of a 
deliberate strategy in approaching the problem of the relationship between the subject 
and truth. Rather than establishing a theory of the subject in order to arrive at an 
approach to the problem of how knowledge is possible, Foucault is interested in how 
the subject is constituted, by others and by herself, through practices that bear a 
particular relation to truth.256 These late comments and qualifications are prefigured by 
Foucault’s attitude toward both the subject and corollary conception of ‘Man’ in The 
Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, as noted in Chapter Two. 
Foucault thinks that ‘Man’ was really an invention of the Classical épistémè, and as 
such is passing away, as he stated notoriously in the closing pages of The Order of 
Things.257 But this strategic approach must also be understood within the context of 
Foucault’s suspicion of humanism, as I discuss below. 
                                                     
253 Foucault, “The Ethic of Care,” 10.  
254 Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” in Foucault Live, 472. 
255 Ibid. 
256 See Foucault, “The Ethic of Care,” 10. 
257 Foucault, The Order of Things, 421-422. Foucault writes: “one can be certain that man is a 
recent invention. […] As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of 
recent date. And perhaps one nearing its end.” Hannah Arendt’s comments about the problems 
with trying to define ‘Man’ are useful in this context. For Arendt, the attempt to define ‘Man’ 
is caught up in a more general problem of description: “The moment we want to say who 
somebody is, our very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a 
description of qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type 
or a ‘character’ in the old meaning of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness 
escapes us” (The Human Condition, 181). For Arendt, the attempt to describe who someone is 
belies the unique distinction which can only be disclosed through the subject’s speech and 
action. Attempting to describe what ‘Man’ is, according to Arendt, shares a similar result: 
“This frustration has the closest affinity with the well-known philosophic impossibility to 
arrive at a definition of man, all definitions being determinations or interpretations of what man 
is, of qualities, therefore, which he could possibly share with other living beings, whereas his 
specific difference would be found in a determination of what kind of a ‘who’ he is” (Ibid.). 
Within the context of Arendt’s philosophy, the very attempt to make such a definition ignores 
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Political subjects: what is ‘man’?  
It would be a mistake to derive from Foucault’s ‘problematization’ of the concept and 
use of ‘human nature’ a general apathy toward the concrete, shared experiences of 
human beings. It is through the experience of power, as we see below, that Foucault 
conceives human commonality and solidarity. He merely calls into question the 
legitimacy of certain notions of human nature and the ways that they have been 
employed. ‘Man’ is the result of a certain mechanism of disciplinary power, deployed 
in order to cement the very operation of this mechanism. In Foucault’s words: “The 
man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a 
subjection much more profound than himself.”258 As Cordner puts it: “The 
normalizing forces of disciplinary power shape the conviction that there is a shared 
human essence, and then operate to confine people in accordance with it.”259 
Similarly, Foucault describes the emergence of the ‘man’ of modern humanism as 
arising out of the hold that disciplinary power has upon the body.260 
Indeed, Foucault thinks that the very idea that human beings have a universal 
nature cannot help but be a reflection of the social, historical and cultural situation 
from which this idea emerges. He argues that “at least since the seventeenth century, 
what is called ‘humanism’ has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of 
man borrowed from religion, science, or politics. Humanism serves to color and to 
justify the conceptions of man to which it is, after all, obliged to take recourse.”261 For 
Foucault, the problem lies less in the actual ideas about what this human nature might 
be than in the characterisation of these historically and culturally specific ideas as 
necessary and universal. Failing to realise the contingency of these ideas, in Foucault’s 
view, limits our potential to imagine and understand ourselves in different ways, let 
alone to experiment with the possibility of living and being differently. 
Similarly, Foucault rejects humanism as a basis or framework through which to 
conduct political and philosophical analyses. In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault 
                                                                                                                                            
the uniqueness of human beings. The inability to define man in this way undermines any 
concrete, fixed conception upon which we might conduct human affairs and politics, or upon 
which we might base ethics. Thus this impossibility impacts politics in the space of 
appearance: that is, the inability to define human beings in this way undermines the stability of 
political or human affairs. It gives way to a constant movement and change.  
258 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 30. 
259 Christopher Cordner, “Foucault and Ethical Universality,” in Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 6 (December, 2004), 580. 
260 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 141. 
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argues that “we must not conclude that everything which has ever been linked with 
humanism is to be rejected, but that the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too 
diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection.”262 It is partly because 
humanism does not acknowledge the contingency of its own concepts that Foucault 
thinks it fails on political grounds. The assumption of its own truth and universality 
precludes the kind of geneo-critical method that Foucault wants to employ. He adopts 
instead “the principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our 
autonomy.”263 In doing so, Foucault also posits the critical and transformative aspects 
of the Enlightenment project in tension with humanism, rather than as its 
counterpart.264 
Yet Foucault’s characterisation of the political possibilities of humanism may 
be too severe, indicating perhaps a lack of political and philosophical pragmatism on 
Foucault’s part. Noam Chomsky, whom Foucault debated on Dutch television in 1971, 
argues that some conception of human nature, even if incomplete, is essential to 
understanding the nature of power and oppression and envisaging a future just 
society.265 Chomsky points out that the political and moral imperative to act in a 
response to a situation one feels to be wrong sometimes outweighs the importance of 
such intellectual and philosophical questions.266 Indeed, Chomsky’s response gives 
rise to the question of whether Foucault gives enough credit to humanism, particularly 
in terms of its potential to be self-critical. Chomsky observes: 
Our concept of human nature is certainly limited; it’s partially 
socially conditioned, constrained by our own character defects and 
the limitations of the intellectual culture in which we exist. Yet at the 
same time it is of critical importance that we know what impossible 
goals we’re trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the 
                                                                                                                                            
261 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 314. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid., 313-314. 
265 Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Human Nature, 
foreword by John Rajchman (New York: The New Press, 2006), 41-42. 
266 Chomsky suggests: “I think that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the 
domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of 
human nature, we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action, 
namely, that of being impelled to do something, because the problems are so great, and yet 
knowing that what we do is on the basis of a very partial understanding of the social realities, 
and the human realities in this case.” (Ibid., 44) 
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possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to 
speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge, 
while remaining very open to the strong possibility, and in fact 
overwhelming probability, that at least in some respects we’re very 
far off the mark.267 
In contrast to this self-characterization of the political stakes of the humanist thematic, 
Foucault’s own concerns seem to fall too far on the side of the merely theoretical, 
placing philosophical stakes before social and political realities.  
Yet Foucault maintains that the critical and political potential of ‘human nature’ 
is undermined by the fact that it cannot help but be a product of a particular socio-
historical situation. He queries: 
If you say that a certain human nature exists, that this human nature 
has not been given in actual society the rights and the possibilities 
which allow it to realize itself […], doesn’t one risk defining this 
human nature―which is at the same time ideal and real, and has been 
hidden and repressed until now―in terms borrowed from our society, 
from our civilization, from our culture?268 
In this way Foucault ties the attempt to define the nature of human beings with the 
more general idea that power acts as an exclusory, repressive force. This is of course 
in line with his general criticisms of liberalism. Elsewhere Foucault describes the 
notion of human nature as an ‘epistemological indicator,’ marking certain types of 
discourse in relation to certain fields of knowledge (such as theology, biology or 
history).269 In this way it is part of the archive—a remnant of a certain set of discursive 
conditions. While this is certainly useful in thinking about humanist ideals as remnants 
of liberal discourses, it also offers an alternative approach to the question of why 
Foucault finds humanism – or more accurately, humanism’s recourse to human nature 
– so problematic.  
This is not to say that Foucault’s critique of liberal political theory is irrelevant; 
his critique of the various expressions of liberalism and the forms of freedom they 
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entail certainly sets the theoretical scene for his general attitude toward humanism.270 
But it is perhaps more fruitful to take the idea of an epistemological indicator as an 
alternative point of departure. The problem is that overemphasising this connection 
between his problems with liberalism with his apparent anti-humanism might 
misconstrue what it is about humanism that Foucault finds problematic. As Michael C. 
Behrent suggests, the ‘humanism’ brought into question in The Order of Things is 
primarily epistemological, not that which affirms the inherent worth of human life.271 
Understood in this way, Foucault’s ‘anti-humanism’ may be less opposed to liberalism 
that usually thought.272 If his problem with humanism is more to do with the 
epistemological favouritism of ‘man’ and less with the values and meanings ascribed 
to human beings, this might present the opportunity to read Foucault’s appraisal of 
liberal political theory more favourably, in this regard at least. This may in fact go 
some way in addressing the view, outlined in Chapter One, that Foucault’s apparent 
rejection of humanism is inconsistent with his valuation of ‘resistance’ and the 
autonomy of self-constitution.  
Indeed, an earlier interview appears to support this reading.273 In this he 
criticises the discourses surrounding ‘human nature,’ which appear to posit the subject 
as powerful and sovereign, yet which actually operates to increase its subjection. He 
states: “By humanism I mean the totality of discourse through which Western man is 
told: ‘Even though you don’t exercise power, you can still be a ruler. Better yet, the 
more you deny yourself the exercise of power, the more you submit to those in power, 
then the more this increases your sovereignty.’”274 In this way, our observance of 
social standards, laws or even moral codes is presented as self-directed, equating 
                                                     
270 For a discussion of Foucault’s interest in economic liberalism, see Michael C. Behrent, 
“Liberalism without Humanism: Michel Foucault and the free-market creed, 1976-1979” in 
Modern Intellectual History 6, no. 3 (2009): 539-568. 
271 Behrent, “Liberalism without Humanism,” 543. 
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273 See Foucault, “Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now’” in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and Introduction by Donald F. Bouchard, trans. 
Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 218-233. 
274 Ibid., 221. Foucault goes on: “Humanism invented a whole series of subjected 
sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in a 
context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control 
of personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, 
but accepting the demands of an outside world and ‘aligned with destiny’).”   
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sovereignty with the autonomy of subjectivity. Indeed, we can find the roots of this 
idea in Rousseau, who suggests that the social contract in its true form posits 
individuals as simultaneously subject and sovereign.275 Sovereignty is corollary to 
subjection because the power of the state is legitimised by consent. Foucault argues: 
In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that restricts 
the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes the 
possibility of power being seized. The theory of the subject (in the 
double sense of the word) is at the heart of humanism and this is why 
our culture has tenaciously rejected anything that could weaken its 
hold upon us.276 
It is this tendency of humanism to deny human beings ‘power’ that Foucault finds 
objectionable. But this merely reinforces the reasons he rejects liberalism for its 
claims to guarantee human rights and freedoms. As we saw in Chapter Two, Foucault 
thinks that such rights and freedoms are governmental technologies. Jon Simons 
describes Foucault’s view in slightly different terms: “If power is, as Foucault 
understands it, a positive, constitutive relation, then the restriction of the desire for 
power refers to the unwillingness to take responsibility for one’s own subjectification. 
Humanism seems to endow us with every power of agency except for agency with 
respect to ourselves.”277  
Thus we can see in Foucault’s own account of subjects’ self-constituting 
practices the desire to restore power to human beings. But this is not, as we will see, 
the restoration of the power given up through consent to a sovereign authority. For 
Foucault it is a power defined by the capacity for self-constitution, and I argue in later 
chapters, for the critical self-relation at the foundation of how Foucault conceives of 
the possibility of resistance.  
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Powerful body-subjects 
In this section I provide a brief overview of Foucault’s account of disciplinary power, 
by way of the argument that his description of the emergence of ‘the individual’ goes 
some way in explaining how it is that the capacities and skills of the body arise within 
networks of power. As the second part of this chapter details further, this description 
also prefigures Foucault’s conception of the reflexive relation to self (rapport à soi) as 
arising out of relations with others. First I outline Foucault’s idea that ‘the individual’ 
is a product of power, like ‘man’ and ‘human nature.’ Second, I examine in detail the 
mechanism that ‘fixes’ the ‘subject-function’ to the ‘somatic singularity’ through 
which the individual emerges.  
Foucault describes disciplinary power as a specific manifestation and mode of 
operation of power, epitomized in the eighteenth century by the ‘discovery’ of the 
body as an ‘object and target of power.’278 Disciplinary power “may be identified 
neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for 
its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of 
application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.”279 Its 
targeting of individual bodies is one of the key differences from biopower, which 
targets people as a collective group or population. In contrast to sovereign power, 
which is conceived in hierarchical terms and is exercised from the top down, 
disciplinary power is exercised laterally, across all relations.280 Despite the differences 
between Foucault’s accounts of discipline and biopower, they both articulate, albeit in 
different ways, alternative models of power de-identified from the state or sovereign 
and infiltrating all levels of social organisation. 
Perhaps the key defining feature of discipline is the idea that the body is both a 
target and an instrument of the exercise of power. In the 1973-1974 lecture course 
Psychiatric Power, Foucault describes disciplinary power as “a total hold, or, at any 
rate, [it] tends to be an exhaustive capture of the individual’s body, actions, time, and 
                                                     
278 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 136. 
279 Ibid., 215. 
280 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish; and Hindess, Discourses of Power, for a discussion of 
sovereign power especially as it relates to questions of consent and legitimacy. Hindess 
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behaviour.”281 Foucault identifies three ‘disciplines’ that ensure both the constant 
subjection of the body’s forces and impose upon it a relation of ‘docility-utility.’ The 
first simultaneously individualizes and works upon the ‘mechanisms’ of the active 
body (its movements and gestures). The second takes as its object the economy of the 
body and works upon its forces. The third refers to the mode of discipline: the constant 
supervision and coercion of the body’s operations.282 Foucault refers to these 
disciplines as “an art of the human body,” which was “directed not only at the growth 
of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation 
that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and 
conversely.”283 In this way, “Discipline ‘makes’ individuals; it is the specific 
technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its 
exercise.”284  
Foucault thus conceives of ‘the individual’ in much the same way as ‘the 
subject’ and ‘man’: as a product-effect of a particular mechanism of power. In 
characterising disciplinary power as constitutive of individuals, Foucault disrupts the 
usual way of thinking about the operation and effects of power in terms of repression 
(as already noted in Chapter Two). In doing so, he undermines the possibility of 
recourse to natural rights as a basis upon which to articulate ‘resistance’ as freeing the 
individual from these effects. He argues: “There is no point then in wanting to 
dismantle hierarchies, constraints, and prohibitions so that the individual can appear, 
as if the individual was something existing beneath all relationships of power, 
preexisting relationships of power, and unduly weighed down by them.”285 The 
consequences of such an account are taken by Foucault’s critics to be that there are 
limited, if any, avenues for articulating a politically or ethically meaningful idea of 
resistance.  
Foucault’s account of the emergence of ‘the individual,’ however, provides the 
first step toward an alternative reading of the productive effects of disciplinary power 
(and relations of power more broadly) that does not preclude the possibility of 
undetermined ‘capacities’ and spontaneous actions. Recalling the description of the 
network of power relations, where power is exercised from ‘innumerable points’ and 
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between which there are innumerable ‘force relations,’286 the individual can be said 
to ‘emerge’ at the point of intersection of these relations. They are the points upon 
which power is exercised and applied, which are defined and delimited by relations of 
power, but which also define and delimit those relations. As Colwell describes it, 
networks of power relations are ‘differential systems,’ in which “relations of power 
arise out of the differences between the subject positions” and it is “within this 
network, within this play of forces, that the contemporary form of subjectivity and the 
contemporary subject is produced.”287 It is the manner in which individuals are led to 
observe and regulate themselves under disciplinary power that subjects emerge as 
differential relations to themselves.288 Colwell argues that “[g]iven this understanding 
of power we can now see how the subject can be a relation to itself without positing 
any originary self to which the gaze is turned by disciplinary tactics.”289 The poles of 
the subject-as-relation emerge simultaneously within the network of power. Here we 
might recall Foucault’s definition of the subject of power, which is tied to its own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.290 
The individual is reified as a correlative result of disciplinary mechanisms that 
fasten “the subject-function to the somatic singularity.”291 What Foucault means is that 
the subjective aspects of individuals are defined through social and power relations. It 
is through such relations that human beings are labelled and categorized as this or that 
kind of subject (or this or that kind of person)—the ‘mad’ subject, the ‘criminal’ 
subject. As Foucault describes it, “the subject-function of disciplinary power is 
applied and brought to bear on the body, on its actions, place, movements, strength, 
the moments of its life, and its discourses, on all of this.”292  
  Foucault does not mean that individuals are concretely produced, but that the 
individual as a bearer of attributes, meanings and symbols – as a subjected body – 
emerges at the point of intersection of relations of power. The “fundamental property” 
of disciplinary power, Foucault argues, is that it “fabricates subjected bodies; it pins 
the subject-function exactly to the body. It fabricates and distributes subjected bodies 
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[…] the individual is nothing other than the subjected body [my emphasis].”293 ‘The 
individual,’ then, is really short-hand for how Foucault conceives of the operation of 
relations of power in constituting body-subjects. In this way, power appears to ‘pre-
exist’ the emergence of the individual: “In fact, the individual is the result of 
something that is prior to it: this mechanism, these procedures, which pin political 
power on the body.”294 This may appear to imply that bodies – the ‘somatic 
singularity’ – stand, as it were, ‘outside’ power, which would present the possibility 
that the body could be a bearer of values before its subjectivation [assujettissement]. 
Two preliminary defensive points can be made: first, the ‘techniques’ of power may in 
a sense be external to the body, at least on first appearance, but this does not place the 
somatic singularity outside the network itself. Second, the operation and efficacy of 
these techniques presuppose that they are subjectively experienced (I discuss this in 
the next section below). It is in this way, I argue, that disciplinary power presupposes 
body-subjects. 
There is one final point to be noted before turning to Foucault’s description of 
the docile body. In the passage cited above, Foucault states that disciplinary 
techniques “pin political power on the body.”295 This foregrounds the argument 
developed below: namely, that understanding how the individual emerges within 
networks of power relations, means that the ‘capacities’ or ‘skills’ of the body-subject 
arise contemporaneously with the individual. This is not to say, however, that these 
capacities and skills are therefore completely determined. As we see below, these 
emerge with un-directed possibilities and the potential for spontaneous acts. 
Nevertheless they are (insofar as they emerge within a certain historically and socially 
specific arrangement of power relations) defined and given certain meanings by the 
discursive field in which they arise. What this means is that Foucault thinks of 
‘political power’ as arising internal to networks of power; not founded in any strength 
or capacity of the body or human being as opposed to power. Significantly, this means 
that the potential for resistance arises in the application of disciplinary power to the 
body: it emerges within and through the network of power relations. The very 
operation of power engenders the possibility of its resistance.  
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Body-subjects: docility and recalcitrance 
In light of the above account of the emergence of the individual, it is clear that 
Foucault’s description of ‘docile bodies’ is only coherent within the broader account 
of disciplinary power if they too are shown to assume some form of ‘capacity.’ As I 
suggested initially in Chapter One, for Foucault bodies are never just bodies. They can 
only be thought in relation to their social, cultural and historical positions, to which 
the qualities, characteristics and predispositions that are ascribed to them refer. As 
such it is not ‘bodies’ as such to which Foucault’s accounts refer, but to culturally 
encoded, historically and socially contingent body-subjects.  
The aim of disciplinary power is to produce docility: “A body is docile that may 
be subjected, used, transformed and improved.”296 ‘Docility’ involves two elements by 
which the body is characterized and categorized: analysis, which posits the body in a 
specific relation to truth and knowledge; and control, by which it can be manipulated, 
coerced, transformed, created and which posits it in a specific relation to power.297 
“That is to say,” as Foucault describes it, “there may be a ‘knowledge’ of the body that 
is not exactly the science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more 
than the ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what 
might be called the political technology of the body.”298 Thus the defining 
characteristic of disciplinary power is the way that it makes use of the body as an 
instrument in its operation, but does not take it as its final target. Foucault writes: “The 
body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to 
imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that 
is regarded both as a right and as property.”299  
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Foucault states clearly that the body has ‘capacities’ and ‘skills’ and is capable 
of ‘operations.’ In the following passage, Foucault characterizes these more generally 
as ‘forces’: 
Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of 
utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of 
obedience). In short, it dissociates power from the body; on the one 
hand, it turns it into an ‘aptitude,’ a ‘capacity,’ which it seeks to 
increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of the energy, the 
power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict 
subjection.300 
Foucault clearly thinks that bodies have some kind of ‘power’ which can be coerced 
and directed. But it is not simply a matter of repressing or stymieing that power; in 
order to operate in its ideal form, and to achieve whatever objectives discipline is 
deployed to achieve, the disciplines must use that power. Thus the aim of disciplinary 
mechanisms directed at the body is to manipulate these forces or capacities so as to 
produce docility. The disciplines subject the body’s forces and impose upon them a 
“relation of docility-utility.”301 The assumption of these skills or forces is necessary to 
Foucault’s claim that individuals are themselves instruments of the exercise of 
disciplinary techniques.302 Indeed, in the above passage Foucault states that ‘it’ – the 
body’s ‘power’ – is dissociated and used to subject the body. 
We might recall here Foucault’s idea that power relations are coextensive with 
the social field: a facet of power relations that he emphasized in The Will to 
Knowledge. This co-extensivity was foreground in Discipline and Punish, in which 
Foucault described the panopticon as a ‘diagram’ of social organization. Foucault 
writes: “The Panopticon […] must be understood as a generalisable model of 
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men 
[…] it is the diagram of a mechanism, of power reduced to its ideal form.”303 Deleuze 
describes it as a cartography that is coextensive with the social field.304 It is, however, 
a model of how disciplinary power functions. Foucault emphasizes that as such it is an 
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‘ideal form’ that is “abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction.”305 In this 
way, it fails to account for the possibility of recalcitrance or challenge. This point is 
made by Michelle Perrot (in dialogue with Foucault and Jean-Pierre Barou), in an 
interview conducted after the publication of Discipline and Punish, who observes that 
Bentham may have underestimated the objects of panoptic discipline: “One feels he 
[Bentham] has a very inadequate awareness if the degree of opacity and resistance of 
the material to be corrected and integrated into society—the prisoners.”306 She 
comments further that: “In the domain of prisons, the convicts weren’t passive beings. 
It’s Bentham who gives us to suppose that they were. The discourse of the penitentiary 
unfolds as though there were no people confronting it, nothing except a tabula rasa of 
subjects to be reformed and returned to the circuit of production.”307 From this 
perspective, the analytics of The Will to Knowledge rectifies this absence, positing 
recalcitrance and opposition as an inevitable and unavoidable aspect of the power 
network. Foucault incorporates this inevitability of resistance as a defining feature of 
the operation of power itself. 
In Chapter One I outlined one possible reading of the body based on Foucault’s 
account of discipline; namely, that the production of ‘docile bodies’ posits bodies as 
mere effects of mechanisms of power. An alternative reading, however, is that the 
disciplining of bodies, far from positing bodies as inherently quiescent, renders bodies 
docile, and therefore presupposes some active potential or ‘power.’308 Paul Patton, for 
example, points out that the body subject to discipline “is a body composed of forces 
and endowed with capacities.”309 Foucault notes, for example, that through discipline, 
the body is “reduced as a ‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful 
force.”310 What might Foucault mean here by ‘political force’? Re-read within the 
context of the analytics of The Will to Knowledge, such forces might even be read as 
implicitly referring to their potential for resistance. However, although Patton suggests 
that these capacities and powers are ‘primary,’ he does not think that the ‘thin’ notion 
of human being that they amount to allows such a measure.311 This is because these 
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capacities or ‘powers’ depend on a broader social framework to give them meaning. 
As such there is no ‘minimum power’ that might serve as a normative measure of 
exercises of power more generally.  
Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of the Foucaultian body can be applied usefully 
here.312 Grosz characterizes the way in which power functions upon the body as a 
form of inscription, through which human beings are attributed with ideas, beliefs and 
values. The application of power to the body is a form of codification, which places it 
in a certain position and with a certain meaning in the social order. However, the 
application of power as inscription is not completely constitutive; Grosz’s reading of 
Foucault supports the interpretation that power is applied to a body that, prior to that 
application, is active. 
But if the body is the strategic target of systems of codification, 
supervision and constraint, it is also because the body and its energies 
and capacities exert an uncontrollable, unpredictable threat to a 
regular, systematic mode of social organization. As well as being the 
site of knowledge-power, the body is thus also a site of resistance, for 
it exerts a recalcitrance, and always entails the possibility of a 
counterstrategic reinscription, for it is capable of being self-marked, 
self-represented in alternative ways.313 
The exercise of power as corporeal inscription posits particular kinds of bodies as 
meaningful within a particular historical and cultural context and as specific to 
particular structures of power. This account of inscription, however, does not 
necessarily place the body outside the processes of its inscription, as it does for Butler. 
For Grosz, the process of inscription does not occur only on the surface of the body; 
this process, which she calls ‘body-writing,’ relies equally on ‘internal’ techniques. 
Such techniques presuppose a ‘body-subject,’ rather than conceiving of the body 
merely as an inert object.  
These internal techniques, which re-make or transform the body, presuppose 
subjective experience. Actions that aim to transform the body – into a desired or 
proposed form or mode of being – demonstrate self-conscious experience of the body, 
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indicative of internality. Thus the application of power to the body does not 
constitute it as merely surface:  
The subject is named by being tagged or branded on its surface, 
creating a particular kind of ‘depth-body’ or interiority, a psychic 
layer the subject identifies as its (disembodied) core. Subjects thus 
produced are not simply the imposed results of alien, coercive forces; 
the body is internally lived, experienced and acted upon by the subject 
and the social collectivity.314 
The internal techniques of body-writing rely equally on the subject’s self-recognition 
and self-understanding in terms of the social context and frameworks of intelligibility 
in which these practices are carried out. Such subjective or self-conscious experience 
of the body points to the fact that it is body-subjects that exist within networks of 
power, and to which techniques of power are applied. Grosz’s idea that the exercise of 
power as bodily inscription presupposes the possibility of self-conscious self-
inscription provides a useful point of departure for thinking about the experience of 
the exercise of power, including the power that the subject exercises over herself.   
For Patton, the ability to distinguish between forms of power that involve 
domination and those that do not turns on a ‘fuller’ conception of human being, which 
he identifies with the notion of ‘meta-capacity’; that is, the ability to use, develop and 
experience one’s own capacities.315 This meta-capacity is the first step to identifying a 
concept of ‘autonomy’ in Foucault’s work. It is not, however, a notion of autonomy 
that presupposes an essential freedom, as Patton points out. Insofar as meta-capacities 
turn on individuals’ ability to determine their own actions, autonomy is bound to 
freedom as a concrete field of possible actions. As such, this autonomy is bound 
within the relations of power out of which this field arises, and which gives it 
meaning. Patton describes autonomy as “a capacity to govern one’s own actions which 
is acquired by some people, in greater or lesser degree, and in respect of certain 
aspects of their bodies and behaviour.”316 States of domination would thus be 
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identified as those that limit or remove the autonomous control of one’s capacities. 
To quote Patton at length: 
So long as human capacities do in fact include the power of 
individuals to act upon their own actions, we can see that Foucault’s 
conception of human being in terms of power enables us to 
distinguish between those modes of exercise of power which inhibit 
and those which allow the self-directed use and development of 
human capacities. To the extent that individuals and groups acquire 
the meta-capacity for the autonomous exercise of certain of their own 
powers and capacities, they will inevitably be led to oppose forms of 
domination which prevent such activity.317 
We can see that Patton’s notion of meta-capacity is similar to the self-conscious 
experience of the body that allows self-inscription. For both Patton and Grosz, 
Foucault’s account of the body-subject of power enables a reading that places the 
body as always within networks of power, yet capable of some form of resistance. 
The idea of capacities governed by an overarching meta-capacity emphasizes 
the importance of the situational account of human interaction to a Foucaultian idea of 
autonomy. In this way, Patton’s characterization of capacities illustrates the extent to 
which subjects – even in their self-constitution – are influenced by their cultural and 
historical situation. In addition to the limits imposed by an individual’s physical 
constitution, for example, the “kinds of action of which a human body is capable will 
depend […] in part upon the enduring social and institutional relations within which it 
lives, but also upon the frameworks of moral interpretation which define its acts.”318 
Our actions – encompassing our motivations, objectives, the means or method we 
choose, and the meanings we ascribe to them – are embedded within, and to a large 
extent determined by, the social nexus.  
For Patton, and for the argument presented here, this is important because the 
manner in which we relate our actions and behaviour to their social and historical 
context reflexively affect both our actions and the feelings we have about those 
actions, and therefore about ourselves. We are self-conscious of the motivations, 
intentions and possible consequences of our actions. As Patton notes: “the peculiarity 
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of human action is that it is not only conscious but self-conscious: we are happy or 
sad according to whether our actions produce a feeling that our power is enhanced or a 
feeling that it is diminished. In other words, our own actions, and the actions of others 
upon us, produce affective states and these affective states in turn affect our capacity 
to act.”319 Such affective states, for example those produced by the success or failure 
of our actions to produce the desired outcome, contribute to our feeling or sense of 
ourselves as agents (for example, having confidence in my actions or ability to 
persuade others). 
For Patton, this ‘feeling of power’ – the way in which we experience our actions 
and their effects within the world – presupposes a more complex conception of 
subjectivity than Foucault’s account of human beings as subjects of power allows.320 
This account, in his view, while permitting the description of particular subjects’ 
capacities, with reference to the social context in which these capacities are formed, 
does not extend to the possibility of describing how subjects might experience the 
formation – either through external techniques or through self-applied techniques – of 
these capacities. Foucault must, according to Patton, “suppose a fuller conception of 
human subjectivity which takes into account both the interpretative and the self-
reflective dimensions of human agency.”321 For Patton, therefore, Foucault’s account 
of the subject of power as endowed with the capacities to do and become certain 
things – and with the meta-capacity for autonomy over these capacities – while 
allowing for a limited distinction between forms of power – principally those that 
involve or constitute domination, and those that do not – does not go far enough in 
allowing an account of how human subjects may experience these different forms. But 
Patton does acknowledge that perhaps this was where Foucault was heading. He 
suggests that Foucault’s later enquiries into ancient Greek practices might be seen as a 
recommendation of an ethics based on values internal to types of individual and social 
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being.322 I take up this idea in a slightly different way in Chapter Four, where I 
suggest that rapport à soi enables a situational evaluation of power.323  
A description of individuals’ somatic capacities as a subject of power, however, 
only allows a ‘thin’ conception of human being and which can only be described in 
terms of those capacities in reference to the social networks of which they are a part. 
In themselves, the capacities for action that are the criteria for Foucault’s ‘free’ subject 
are not sufficient to determine some relations as legitimate exercises of power and 
others as illegitimate states of domination. Patton argues that such distinctions can 
only be drawn by presupposing that individuals have the capacity to experience some 
relations as positive – those that enhance a feeling of power and autonomy – and 
others as negative – for example, where individuals have a feeling of powerlessness. 
The evaluation of relationships of power must also presuppose systems or networks of 
interpretation. This form of agency, however, does not commit Foucault to a universal 
conception of humans as essentially free or universal experiences of agency. Such 
experiential aspects of agency are specific to individuals. Any evaluation of relations 
of power based on these internal and particular feelings or experiences will be internal 
to specific social and historical contexts. 
In the next part of the chapter I turn to Foucault’s concept of rapport à soi – the 
reflexive relationship with oneself – in order to develop an account of the body-
subject that would contribute to an alternative account of politics. Rapport à soi, I 
argue, goes some way in accounting for how subjects can emerge contemporaneously 
with relations of power, yet not be entirely determined. As such, rapport à soi 
contributes to the possibility of an evaluation of power relations based on subjective 
experiences internal to particular historical and social contexts. 
Ethical subjects 
In his late work Foucault runs to the notion of rapport à soi – the reflexive 
relationship with oneself – as both the foundation of ethics and as the base of his idea 
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of ‘subjectivity.’ Foucault defines rapport à soi as follows: “the kind of relationship 
you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi, which I call ethics, and which 
determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of 
his own actions.”324 On one hand, this relation to oneself is the focus of a domain of 
enquiry relatively independent of morality or moral systems, in the sense of a 
universal prescriptive or proscriptive moral code. He does not do away with this 
conception of morality, but poses ethics as rapport à soi as the alternative to this 
model and thinks that at different times in history, one or the other of these forms has 
been more heavily emphasized than the other. (As I detail further in Chapter Five, 
Foucault thinks that an ethic of the self founded on this idea of rapport à soi presents a 
viable alternative ethical model for the present age.) On the other hand, the concept of 
rapport à soi arises corollary to Foucault’s increased interest in the way that subjects 
constitute themselves, in contrast to the way they are made subjects through 
heteronomous exercises of power. It is the four-fold structure of rapport à soi that 
provides the framework for how Foucault conceptualizes the processes of self-
constitution. But it also provides the framework for a re-thinking of the operation of 
power. The processes of rapport à soi are not independent of the socio-historical 
situation in which they are carried out. Rather, the reflexive relationship with self is 
bound within relations to others and even interconnected with the rapport à soi of 
other people.  
The constitution of the self as an ethical subject: rapport à soi 
Within the context of volumes two and three of The History of Sexuality, the 
explication of rapport à soi is the cornerstone of Foucault’s genealogy of the desiring 
subject.325 That is, of the analysis of the practices involved in the relationship of the 
self with self through which individuals understand themselves as subjects of desire. 
This genealogical analysis, Foucault thinks, is necessary in order to achieve the 
broader objective of these two volumes, namely, to understand how modern 
                                                     
324 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 352. 
325 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley 
(London: Penguin Books, 1992), 5. Foucault states: “This does not mean that I proposed to 
write a history of the successive conceptions of desire, of concupiscence, or of libido, but 
rather to analyze the practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire, bringing 
into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to 
discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen [my emphasis].” 
  109 
individuals have experienced themselves as subjects of ‘sexuality.’326 Thus he 
describes his aim: “I would like to show how, in classical Antiquity, sexual activity 
and sexual pleasures were problematized through practices of the self, bring into play 
the criteria of an ‘aesthetics of existence.’”327 Thus Foucault notes, “It seemed 
appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the 
individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject.”328 Methodologically, 
Foucault places these analyses at the intersection of the “archaeology of 
problematizations” and the “genealogy of practices of the self,” the consequence of 
which Foucault describes as the displacement of a history of moral systems with a 
“history of ethical problematizations based on practices of the self.”329 (I note this 
broader objective of the latter volumes of The History of Sexuality merely to note the 
context in which Foucault’s explication of rapport à soi is located.) 
The explication and analysis of rapport à soi, however, has a much broader but 
nonetheless pivotal role in Foucault’s conceptions of ethics, particularly in the 
interplay of techniques of the self and techniques of power. This is itself connected to 
what Foucault means by ‘the subject’ and how he thinks about ‘subjectivity’ more 
broadly. The idea of a reflexive relationship with oneself can be seen as clarifying 
how it is that Foucault conceives of the reflexive interplay of the two aspects of the 
definition of ‘the subject’ that he provides, as we have seen, in ‘The Subject and 
Power.’330 Rapport à soi, as we see below, explains how it is that subjects are tied to 
their own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge, and provides the basis for 
Foucault’s analysis of the practices that come into play. But it also explains how 
Foucault thinks that our subjection to heteronomous forces comes into play and 
contributes to this reflexive identity. While Foucault’s later analyses in this regard 
tend to focus on positive and transformative external forces – like the guidance 
provided by a spiritual guide – nevertheless they also refer to the negative forces of 
subjection of discipline and normalization. In this way, rapport à soi also explains the 
interpretative and self-reflective dimensions that come into play when individuals 
evaluate the purpose, meaning and value of their actions through a broader framework 
of intelligibility, and that contributes to their ‘feeling of power.’  
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In a similar way, the four-fold structure of rapport à soi is also the framework 
through which Foucault conceives of ethical relationships between people. As I argue 
below, the reflexive relationship with oneself arises out of relationships with others. 
What I seek to point out here and in the next section is the way that the structure of 
rapport à soi embeds our ‘subjectivity’ in relations with others and within the world. 
This is important for the arguments presented here for two reasons: first, in 
foregrounding the argument that runs throughout Chapters Four and Five, which 
defends Foucault against claims that his conception of ethics is ultimately egoistic. 
Second, it speaks to the reflective and interpretative dimensions that are essential for 
Foucault’s idea of critique, therefore providing the basis upon which individuals 
engage with the world and with politics. 
Foucault thinks that there are three broad approaches that one could take when 
undertaking a history of ‘morality.’ These include a history of moral behaviours, 
which would be a study of specific actions and behaviour in response to given rules or 
codes, and a history of the codes themselves, which would be an analysis of a given 
system or code and its mode of operation within a given society. An investigation of 
ethics as founded in the reflexive relationship to self represents for Foucault the third 
possibility. This would be 
a history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute 
themselves as subjects of moral conduct [which] would be concerned 
with the models proposed for setting up and developing relationships 
with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for 
the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations that 
one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object. This last is what might 
be called a history of ‘ethics’ and ‘ascetics,’ understood as a history of 
the forms of moral subjectivation and of the practices of the self that 
are meant to ensure it.331 
At different times in a given society one of the elements might be emphasized over the 
others. As I suggested above, Foucault thinks that our own societies (in the West, at 
least) are gradually placing less emphasis on the first and second forms, with 
increasing attention paid to cultures and ethics of the self. As I note in Chapter Five, 
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Foucault claimed explicitly that we might adopt from ancient ethics the ideas of 
practices and care of the self. 
But this is not to say that ethics as founded on the self is completely 
independent of these two other aspects of morality. An individual’s rapport à soi is 
constituted in relation to what he calls the ‘moral code’ – which is, broadly speaking, 
made up of the moral and religious values and precepts, social rules, expectations and 
norms – of the society and culture in which that individual lives. From the outset, then, 
Foucault’s conception of ethics as rapport à soi incorporates the broader social and 
cultural context as a constitutive component. He distinguishes between two forms of 
‘moral code.’ The first – the codification of acts – is the over-arching prescriptive and 
prohibitive moral system particular to a specific social and historical situation, which 
determines which acts are permitted or forbidden.332 In this sense ‘morality’ means, 
according to Foucault, “a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to 
individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the 
family (in one of its roles), educational institutions, churches, and so forth.”333 The 
second – the manner of observation – is the code that evaluates behaviour, rather than 
prescribing or prohibiting specific acts. In regard to this second form, morality refers 
to the way that individuals respond to and behave in relation to the prescriptive moral 
code. For Foucault, then, ‘morality’ refers to the “manner in which they comply more 
or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey or resist an 
interdiction or a prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of 
values.”334 
In this way, Foucault conceptualizes rapport à soi in terms of ‘conduct.’ Given 
the framework of intelligibility – the moral code – there is both a ‘rule of conduct’ (the 
prescription or interdiction) and ‘actual conduct’ (individuals’ actual behaviour). That 
is, through rapport à soi, the individual constitutes their self as a subject in reference 
to this framework. Foucault states: “For a rule of conduct is one thing; but the conduct 
that may be measured by this rule is another. But another thing still is the manner in 
which one ought to ‘conduct oneself’—that is, the manner in which one ought to form 
                                                     
332 See Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 352. 
333 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 25. 
334 Ibid. 
  
 
112 
oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make 
up the code.”335 Thus Foucault goes on: 
Given a code of actions, and with regard to a specific type of actions 
(which can be defined by their degree of conformity with or 
divergence from the code), there are different ways to ‘conduct 
oneself’ morally, different ways for the acting individual to operate, 
not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of this action.336 
Foucault’s point here is that the kind of subject that one becomes depends not only on 
an action and the framework within which this action is carried out, but the manner in 
which one relates to oneself in terms of this action. Sebastian Harrer explains this 
usefully: “Two instances of a given type of action may be identical in respect of the 
positive properties that we may use to describe either of them; they may also be 
identical in respect of a moral law that they seem to abide by. However, the relation to 
self (‘rapport à soi’) that is involved in each of the two instances may be different in 
significant ways.”337 This will become clearer as we examine the four aspects of 
rapport à soi below. What is important to note here is that given Foucault’s 
employment of the term ‘conduct,’ rapport à soi can be understood as mediating the 
kind of subject one becomes in response to a field of possibilities. 
Foucault describes rapport à soi as having four constitutive aspects, which 
Deleuze calls the ‘four folds.’338 The first of these aspects is the ‘ethical substance’; 
that is, the material, site or object that will form the focus of one’s attention and 
concern. This might include the subject’s thoughts, her ways of behaving, her manner 
of response to certain situations, and her feelings. In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault 
describes this aspect of the relation to self as concerned with “the determination of the 
ethical substance; that is, the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that 
part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct.”339 This involves the 
subject’s identification, through consciousness and self-knowledge, of that part or 
aspect of herself which requires attention, and so posits that part of herself as an object 
of her own knowledge and as the object of ethical exercises.  
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  The second aspect is the ‘mode of subjection,’ which is “the way in which the 
individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put 
it into practice”340 or “the way in which people are invited or incited to recognize their 
moral obligations.”341 It is this aspect that refers to the subject’s self-conscious relation 
to the broader moral code, that incorporates not only the rules or values to which they 
subscribe or are subjected, but the reasons for that adherence. For example, there is a 
difference between choosing not to litter because one recognizes that littering is illegal 
(and is perhaps afraid of punishment) and not littering because one considers the 
environment valuable (and sees oneself as having a personal responsibility for 
maintaining one’s environment). 
The third aspect of rapport à soi, as Foucault describes it, is ‘ethical work.’ This 
is the work that one “performs on oneself, not only in order to bring one’s conduct 
into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical 
subject of one’s behaviour.”342 This work encompasses the various practices that one 
performs or the techniques that one uses to effect change in area delimited as the 
ethical site. It is “the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become 
ethical subjects.”343 It is, simply, ‘what one does’ in order to become the kind of 
ethical subject one wants to be. This might be the activities one undertakes, such as 
meditation or the practices one adopts, such as vegetarianism. These refer generally to 
the ‘techniques of the self.’  
The final aspect of rapport à soi is the ‘telos.’ This determines both the ethical 
site and the practices required; but it is more than simply the aim or goal of ethical 
practices. The telos places specific actions and exercises of self in relation to the other 
acts and exercises that together constitute an individual’s behaviour, and whereby it is 
attributed a status or value according to the individual’s overall behaviour and the 
mode of being to which they aim. Foucault writes that: 
[A]n action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also 
moral in its circumstantial integration and by virtue of the place it 
occupies in a pattern of conduct. […] A moral action tends towards 
its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the 
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establishing of a moral conduct that commits an individual, not only 
to other actions always in conformity with values and rules, but to a 
certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical 
subject.344 
This passage is significant because it highlights that actions (as the ethical substance) 
are evaluated not only in terms of their specific relationship to the moral code 
(whether as an action it conforms or transgresses a particular prescription or interdict) 
but in terms of their contribution or subtraction from the variety and structure of an 
individual’s total actions and the mode of being that they manifest. 
It is the interrelation and interplay of these four elements that constitutes the 
reflexive relationship Foucault calls rapport à soi. Foucault provides the following 
summary, where rapport à soi is  
not simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject,’ 
a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will 
form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to 
the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that 
will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon 
himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself.345 
The elements of rapport à soi ultimately describe the processes of self-subjectivation; 
the process through which individuals constitute themselves as subjects. As I argue 
further below, the structure of rapport à soi embeds the processes of self-
subjectivation within the world. Indeed, it is this reflexive structure that allows 
Foucault to formulate an idea of ‘the subject’ or ‘subjectivity’ that moves away from 
the sovereign, founding subject to which Foucault was so hostile. Thus Foucault 
proposes his alternative formulation: “I think on the contrary that the subject is 
constituted through practices of subjection, or, in a more anonymous way, through 
practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity, starting of course from a number 
of rules, styles and conventions that are found in the culture.”346 
Foucault is thus explicit in stating that it is through rapport à soi that 
individuals both constitute and recognize themselves as subjects in reference to the 
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broader social context in which they live and act. They act in reference to a broader 
framework of intelligibility, which in framing the meaning, purpose, and value of 
those actions affects how the individual is formed as a subject. Kim Atkins points out 
that this also involves the discursive field: “For Foucault, forms of subjectivity are 
determined by the rationality that is embedded in the discursive practices of the times 
and the subject-positions they articulate. Subjectivity is a discursive formation.”347 The 
social and cultural embeddedness of this self-relation is important because it is what 
provides meaning to the kinds of subject/s at which individuals aim and the practices 
through which they achieve this aim. But it also has implications for how Foucault 
conceives of politics and political action. As I argue in Chapter Five, Foucault 
conceives the political field discursively; that is, while the field itself arises from and 
is delimited by the network of social-power relations, he conceives of political activity 
and engagement primarily in discursive terms.  
There is one final point to be noted at this stage. In rejecting the sovereign, 
founding subject, Foucault is also rejecting the idea that the subject is substantive. 
That is, although Foucault talks about ‘subjects’ he is not invoking the idea of a 
subject as a substantial, static or singular thing. He states clearly that the subject is 
“not a substance; it is a form and this form is not above all or always identical to 
itself.”348 What he means is that we are never just one kind of subject:  
You do not have towards yourself the same kind of relationships when 
you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes and votes or 
speaks up in a meeting, and when you try to fulfil your desires in a 
sexual relationship. There are no doubt some relationships and some 
interferences between these two different kinds of subject but we are 
not in the presence of the same kind of subject. In each case, we play, 
we establish with one’s self some different form of relationship.349 
Nor (and this is where the use of telos is liable to lead to misunderstanding) do we 
ever ‘become’ an ethical subject, in the sense that we do not ‘achieve’ or ‘complete’ 
the process of becoming subjects. We are incomplete and multiple: always in the 
process of becoming multiple subjects.    
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The fold of subjectivation: relations with others in the relation to self 
The reflexive relationship with oneself is necessarily and inextricably embedded 
within social relationships. In this section, using the work of Gilles Deleuze and Judith 
Butler, I argue that relations with others are partly constitutive of rapport à soi. This 
has important implications not only for how we understand Foucault’s ‘subject,’ as I 
argue here, but for his reformulation of the care of the self (as I argue in Chapter Four) 
and for the aesthetic aspects of his account of ethics (discussed in Chapter Five). Most 
significantly, it underpins the Foucaultian idea of the political, and accounts for how 
Foucault conceives our shared experience as subjects of power. 
The body-subject represents a point of intersection within networks of power 
relations, upon which forces are exerted and through which ‘the individual’ emerges. 
As such, the body-subject represents the nexus of a certain number of power relations 
that mirror (or as Deleuze would describe them, are diagrammatic of) the network of 
social relations in which that individual lives. As Deleuze notes, power “passes not so 
much through forms as through particular points which on each occasion mark the 
application of a force, the action or reaction of a force in relation to others.”350 For 
Deleuze ‘subjectivation’ – the process by which subjects are constituted – occurs 
through the folding-back of relations of force (of the ‘outside’). He writes, “It is as if 
the relations of the outside folded back to create a doubling, allow a relation to oneself 
to emerge, and constitute an inside which is hollowed out and develops its own unique 
dimension.”351 It is this folding-back of force relations that gives rise to the reflexive 
relation – the ‘fold’ – of rapport à soi. The fold establishes the ‘inside’ of the reflexive 
relation to self and the ‘outside’ of differential relations as mutually delimiting. 
According to Deleuze, “The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated 
by peristaltic movement, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are 
not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside.”352 This 
‘inside’ evokes the classical notion of interiority, as Deleuze suggests: “This is what 
the Greeks did: they folded force, even though it still remained force. They made it 
relate back to itself. Far from ignoring interiority, individuality, or subjectivity they 
invented the subject, but only as a derivative or the product of a ‘subjectivation.’”353  
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The reflexivity of the fold that Deleuze identifies as constitutive of rapport à 
soi is actually prefigured in Discipline and Punish, where the disciplinary individual 
emerges through the internalisation – the folding back – of the panoptic gaze.354 For 
Butler, the reflexivity characteristic of rapport à soi arises through the individual’s 
relation to ‘social norms’: “reflexivity emerges in the act of taking up a relation to 
moral codes. […] The subject forms itself in relation to a set of codes, prescriptions, or 
norms.”355 Or, as Colwell puts it, subjects arise as differential relations to themselves 
within a differential system of power relations.356 In this way Butler reads the ‘mode 
of subjection’ as the primary constitutive element of rapport à soi: as a primary 
relation through which the reflexive relation to self is established. The self-forming 
activities and practices of rapport à soi are conducted in tension with the 
subjectivising effects of the relation to these norms: “This work on the self, this act of 
delimiting, takes place within the context of a set of norms that precede and exceed the 
subject. These are invested with power and recalcitrance, setting the limits to what 
will be considered to be an intelligible formation of the subject within a given 
historical scheme of things.”357 Thus for Foucault, challenging these limits of 
intelligibility will be one of the primary aims of subjects’ political activity. Indeed, as 
I suggested above, the initial and primary mode of such activity is discursive, since the 
intelligibility of actions and behaviours are primarily characterised discursively.  
For both Deleuze and Butler, the external relations through which the reflexive 
relation arises are primary to the relation one has with oneself. For Deleuze “the inside 
will always be the doubling of the outside”:358 the differential relations of the outside 
are primary and this primacy cannot be reversed. For Butler, similarly, the relation to 
the norm is originary: it “inaugurates reflexivity.”359 In this way, rapport à soi is 
always constituted and delimited by relations with others. Foucault’s ethical subject, 
then, is in relation to others before being in relation to itself. Indeed, it is through the 
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concept of rapport à soi, that Foucault posits the subject or individual as essentially 
‘relational’ or ‘inter-subjective.’ In this way, the self-relation incorporates alterité 
(otherness). Hofmeyr notes that: “Every self-crafting nodal point [in the network of 
power relations] is in constant contact with the provisional alterity of heteronomous 
forces and with what Levinas might have called the ‘absolute’ alterity of other 
selves.”360 If the relation to self is formed through the folding-back of outside 
differential relations, then interiority is formed through the doubling or bending of the 
outside. Alterité is thus an essential constitutive element of interiority. 
Significantly, however, the ‘inside,’ while arising through the fold of force 
relations, is not determined by those forces; it is a ‘new dimension.’361 It is through 
this new dimension that rapport à soi enables work upon the self and self-constitution 
outside the bounds of, and even in resistance to, relations of power. “Foucault’s 
fundamental idea,” Deleuze argues, “is that of a dimension of subjectivity derived 
from power and knowledge without being dependent on them.”362 Similarly, Butler 
argues that “the norm does not produce the subject as its necessary effect, nor is the 
subject fully free to disregard the norm that inaugurates its reflexivity; one invariably 
struggles with conditions of one’s life that one could not have chosen.”363 It is this 
reflexive dimension of subjectivity that is deployed in practices of the self, and 
similarly against the subjectivising effects of disciplinary and other forms of power. 
The self-reflective and interpretative dimensions of rapport à soi link back to 
Foucault’s characterization of thought. Recalling Foucault’s description, thought is 
what enables one to “step back from this way of acting or reacting” and to present 
one’s conduct to oneself in order to “question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and 
its goals.”364 Thought is what enables one to reflect on one’s behaviour and conduct as 
a problem and is itself a practice of freedom.365 Practices are themselves inscribed by 
thought, as Foucault notes.366 Thought is thus an integral aspect of rapport à soi, in 
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that in order to form the sort of reflexive relation to self in reference and relation to 
one’s actions and behaviour, one must be, as it were, able to step back from those 
actions and the aim of those actions, in order to reflect upon them and so form oneself 
in a particular relation to them. In this way, thought and the critical relation to oneself 
that it engenders are essential to rapport à soi, which together form the basis of an 
elaboration of a critical relation to the world. It is the capacity to be critical that 
establishes this reflexive aspect of rapport à soi as a subjective dimension not 
determined by the conditions from which it emerges. 
Conclusion 
In this way, Foucault escapes critical interpretations that see his account of 
disciplinary power as leading to one of two opposing options.  The body is neither a 
bearer of values that pre-exist relations of power, not is the subject entirely 
determined. It is by reading the operation of relations of power in conjunction to the 
concept of rapport à soi that we can account for a body-subject that emerges within 
networks of power, yet which is not completely determined by them. The body-
subject, as we have seen, emerges within networks of power relations. Foucault’s 
account of rapport à soi supports a re-interpretation of docile bodies that supports the 
idea that disciplinary power presupposes subjective experience of its mechanisms. 
Most importantly, however, this reading of rapport à soi goes some way in explaining 
how it is that body-subjects’ skills and capacities can emerge within networks of 
power relations, yet not be entirely produced by those relations. 
Rapport à soi is essential to understanding how Foucault’s account of power as 
pervasive, de-identified from the state, and operating at all levels of social 
organisation is compatible with a relatively self-determining subject. Bodies are never 
just bodies: they are always body-subjects. The ‘point’ upon which power is exercised 
is always already a body-subject; the very efficacy of techniques of power depends on 
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subjective experience of those techniques. As we have seen, this is particularly the 
case in the operation of disciplinary power, which relies on the individual becoming 
an agent and instrument of their own subjection. 
In this way, Foucault’s account of rapport à soi contributes to a ‘fuller’ account 
of human subjectivity, but in a way that does not commit Foucault to an a priori 
account of the subject. The four constitutive elements of rapport à soi incorporate the 
interpretative and self-reflective dimensions that Patton identifies. The structure of 
rapport à soi captures the interpretive frameworks in which our actions are carried 
out, such that these frameworks are bound within the very constitution of the self.  
This account of rapport à soi has several significant implications, which I take 
up in the following chapters. First, the structural interdependence of rapport à soi with 
relations with others bears particularly on Foucault’s reformulation of the theme of the 
care for the self, which I address in the next chapter. The issue at stake in this chapter 
is whether Foucault’s account sufficiently acknowledges the ethical authority of ‘the 
Other.’ I suggest that the structural interrelation of the relation to self with relations to 
others casts new light over Foucault’s claim that care for the self must take precedence 
over care for others. Second, that the description of the operation of disciplinary 
power as ‘fixing’ subject-functions to the somatic singularity read in conjunction with 
rapport à soi may allow a certain conception of situational norms. This offers one 
avenue for reconciling Foucault’s occasional use of normative language with his 
explicit rejections of a priori normative values and universalist accounts of ethics. Of 
most significance for an ethic of power, however, is the way that rapport à soi forms 
the foundation of how Foucault conceives of the nature of political activity, 
particularly in enabling a situational and critical response to the world and to the 
discursive conditions of one’s own intelligibility.  
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Chapter Four: Ethical frameworks 
Introduction 
This chapter has two primary aims. First, to set out the ethical framework within 
which my later arguments about the ethical and political implications of Foucault’s 
project rest. Second, to address certain criticisms from Chapter One: namely, the 
broad claim that Foucault’s ethics is egoistic and too self-concerned. The chapter is 
divided into four sections. 
In the first two sections I examine the ethical implications of the account of 
rapport à soi developed in Chapter Three, read in conjunction with certain aspects of 
Foucault’s account of the ancient Greek notion of the care for the self [epimeleia 
heautou]. While the concept of rapport à soi does enable the articulation of a self-
constituting subject of power, the centrality of ‘the self’ to ethics implied by this 
concept places the value of this move into question. This problem is given more 
weight by a late interview in which Foucault appears to relegate other people to a 
secondary ethical status, placing the importance of care for oneself above care for 
others.  
In the first section I focus on the implications of rapport à soi for how we 
conceive of the nature of ethical relationships between individuals, and for Foucault’s 
idea of subjectivity more generally. Particularly, the relational nature of rapport à soi 
appears to imply a reasonably strong inter-subjectivity, which places in question 
Foucault’s views on ontological separation. Along these lines we can read the inter-
relational nature of rapport à soi to mean that in caring for oneself, one not only 
enables the capacity to care for others, but that one actually cares for others by virtue 
of caring for oneself. This reading is complicated when Foucault provides an 
apparently contradictory account of the care for the self. In light of this, I suggest that 
Foucault’s insistence on the imperative of care for oneself should thus be taken to 
indicate a ‘structural’ primacy of self over others. Yet this does not preclude the 
simultaneous interpretation that the self is made the primary focus of ethics. 
In the second section I turn to the broader ethical context of these questions, by 
considering Foucault’s account of the relationship between rapport à soi and care for 
  
 
122 
others from a broadly Levinasian perspective. In doing so, I address the Levinas-
inspired criticisms (introduced in part three of Chapter One) that see this argument as 
indicating a serious lack of ethical regard for others. I argue that rather than bearing 
upon the spirit of Foucault’s account of ethics, his idea that care for oneself must 
precede care for others is founded on the structural primacy of rapport à soi. As such, 
Foucault’s emphasis on the precedence of care for oneself over care for others does 
not indicate such a disregard, but rather a practical approach to the ethics of self-
constitution that recognizes that the capacity to care for others follows from proper 
care for oneself.  
In the third section, I consider whether the apparent absence of ethical 
universalism in Foucault’s account necessarily precludes a serious ethical orientation 
towards others. Foucault’s objections to ethical universalism are well known, based 
primarily on the idea that universalism necessarily commits individuals to a limited 
number of possible modes of being. In surveying his rejection of a universalist 
framework, I argue that Foucault’s descriptions of subjects of power do allow for a 
minimalist form of universalism, but which does not lead to the consequences 
Foucault found so problematic. Building on Christopher Cordner’s idea of a 
‘universalism of outlook,’ I suggest that rapport à soi can in fact form the foundation 
of such an outlook. Specifically, that the recognition of other people as subjects of, 
and as subject to, power forms the foundation of the minimalist universalism required 
for an ethic of power.  
Finally, I turn in the fourth section to the question of whether rapport à soi and 
the associated notion of ‘subject-positions’ can found a situationally-specific account 
of social norms. That is, social norms for behaviour are embedded within networks of 
power relations and corresponding subject positions in which a subject finds herself. It 
is a norm to the extent that there are certain expectations and rules for behaviour 
associated with a particular subject-position, which is defined relationally within a 
network of power relations. Drawing on Judith Butler’s analysis in Giving an Account 
of Oneself, and building on the analysis of rapport à soi in Chapter Three, I suggest 
that contrary to the apparent centrality of the self, Foucault’s account of the latter is 
founded partly on social norms, which save it from claims of egoism. 
Before turning to these appraisals, two points should be noted. First, the 
significance of the ancient Greek notion of the care of the self [epimeleia heautou] to 
Foucault’s broader project, particularly with regard to the arguments presented here.  
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This notion is one of the central themes of Foucault’s last works and lectures. As 
McGushin observes, ancient philosophy for Foucault can be ultimately comprehended 
as “a vast project of inventing, defining, elaborating, and practicing a complex ‘care 
of the self.’”367 Foucault turned to Antiquity for a possible mode of response to an 
empty ethic of the self: for an organizing theme that could re-institute meaning and 
ethical integrity to a culture of the self that has become marked and dragged down by 
individualism. As I argue in Chapter Five, his analyses of the care for the self form 
part of the more general project of offering a modern audience the groundwork 
required for developing a modern ethic of the self. But it is not presented as a given, 
pre-prepared answer to a modern problem. As I point out, Foucault emphasizes that 
we should not return to a theme such as the care for self as though returning to a path 
from which we have strayed; the idea of care for the self should be adapted to meet the 
specific needs of the modern world. He suggests, speaking of the care for the self, 
“Nothing is more foreign to me than the idea that philosophy strayed at a certain 
moment of time, and that it has forgotten something and that somewhere in her history 
there exists a principle, a basis that must be rediscovered.”368 Nevertheless, in the 
Hermeneutics lectures Foucault characterizes the phenomenon of care of the self in 
Antiquity as a “decisive moment” in the history of thought “that is still significant for 
our modern mode of being subjects.”369 It thus forms part of his genealogy of the 
modern Western subject, and shares the political stakes of this genealogy. Indeed, it is 
in its political implications that care for the self is still relevant and significant for a 
modern audience.  
Second, the relationship between the care of the self and the critical attitude.    
Foucault describes the care of the self as both an attitude – to care for something or be 
concerned with something – and an activity: “it [epimeleia heautou] describes a sort of 
work, an activity; it implies attention, knowledge, technique.”370 It is essentially a 
stance or mode of relation that one takes toward oneself, in relation to truth, in relation 
to techniques of power, and in relations to others. It is also an activity that 
encompasses a range of practices. Foucault describes it further: 
In short, with this notion of epimeleia heautou [care of the self] we 
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have a body of work defining a way of being, a standpoint, forms of 
reflection, and practices which make it an extremely important 
phenomenon not just in the history of representations, notions, or 
theories, but in the history of subjectivity itself or, if you like, in the 
history of practices of subjectivity.371 
From this passage it is clear that the theme of care for the self is part of Foucault’s 
genealogy of the subject. It is essentially concerned with the emergence of subjects. It 
refers to the work or techniques by which subjects are produced, and refers to 
overarching principles, discourses and formations of power-knowledge in a given 
society. By describing it in this way, the theme of care for the self appears to overlap 
with rapport à soi, especially in referring to a mode of being and to ‘work’ or 
‘practices.’ Yet the concept of rapport à soi, I suggested earlier, is primarily 
structural. It represents how Foucault thinks about the emergence and structure of 
‘subjects of power’ and thus of a situated subjectivity. In contrast, the care for the self 
is essentially an ‘ethos’: an attitude and mode of relation to the world. While it does 
incorporate a range of practices, these are governed by and cement the subject’s 
relation to the world. As Foucault describes it, the care for the self is a “theme of a 
general standpoint, of a certain way of considering things, of behaving in the world, 
undertaking actions, and having relations with other people.”372 Understood in this 
way, I suggest, the care for the self should be read within Foucault’s project as the 
overarching ethos that governs rapport à soi, and which gives further complexity and 
richness to the idea of a situated subjectivity. 
 Read in conjunction with his description of the critical attitude and related 
conception of thought, the practices of care for the self emerge as activities that 
cultivate the ‘right’ to question authority on its relation to truth. For example, Foucault 
argues that “The care for the self implies a certain way of attending to what we think 
and what takes place in our thought.”373 It implies reflection upon one’s place and role 
within the world and in relation to others. In characterising its role, Foucault evokes 
the Socratic gadfly, describing the precept of care for the self as “a sort of thorn which 
must be stuck in men’s flesh, driven into their existence, and which is a principle of 
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restlessness and movement, of continuous concern throughout life.”374 In this way, 
care for the self should be read not only as referring to the ethos and ethical practices 
that develop and transform one’s rapport à soi, but as part of how Foucault conceives 
the subject’s cultivation of their right to question the relationship between authority 
and truth.  
The politics of Foucault’s ethics 
At the end of Chapter Three I argued that his later account of rapport à soi enables 
Foucault to better articulate how individuals can be ‘produced’ by disciplinary power, 
but without leading to the conclusion that individuals are therefore entirely determined 
by power. Rapport à soi further allows Foucault to articulate a concept of subjectivity 
that strikes a balance between the subjectivation (assujettissement) of heteronomous 
exercises of power and the subject’s capacity for self-constitution. It is the ‘subjective 
dimension’ (to adopt Deleuze’s term) that founds the capacity for original and 
spontaneous responses to power. Yet, if we take a step back from this particular idea 
and consider it within Foucault’s account of ethics more broadly it does raise certain 
questions about the broader ethical, philosophical and political commitments of 
Foucault’s project. These are exemplified in the problem of Foucault’s apparent 
disregard for the status of other human beings as ends in themselves, and who are 
ethically significant and valuable. 
This problem arises in part from Foucault’s positing rapport à soi as the 
defining feature of ethics, as noted in Chapter Three. Recalling this definition, he 
suggests that ethics refers to the reflexive relationship with oneself whereby the 
subject constitutes herself as a subject of her own actions.375 Although this 
characterisation in itself is not particularly objectionable, it is in reading this definition 
in the context of the ‘care for the self’ that Foucault’s account begins to appear heavily 
weighted toward ‘the self.’ As such, the centrality that Foucault gives to this theme 
and to rapport à soi within his later work over-emphasises the importance of the 
‘self,’ and appears to lead to an egoistic, if not solipsistic, account of ‘ethics.’ 
This problem is compounded by a late interview, in which Foucault argues that: 
“One must not have the care for others precede the care for self. The care for self takes 
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moral precedence in the measure that the relationship to self takes ontological 
precedence.”376 Here Foucault indeed appears to place the self as the primary focus of 
ethics: the care for oneself must take priority over care for others. This ‘precedence’ 
can be understood in two ways. First, it could be taken to mean that care for oneself is 
primary, in the sense of importance or significance. Under this reading, the self would 
be the primary focus of ethics, where care for others is of secondary or subordinate 
importance. Second, it could be taken to mean that care for oneself is somehow a 
condition of care for others, whereby one must care of oneself in order to enable the 
capacity to care for others. Yet these two interpretations are by no means mutually 
opposed. Indeed, one might say that care for oneself is more important and that it 
enables the capacity to care for others.  
In addition, this claim appears initially inconsistent with the account of rapport 
à soi provided in Chapter Three. The latter, as we have seen, posits the reflexive 
relationship with oneself as arising out of originary relations with others. As such, 
these relations would seem to take ontological precedence. Furthermore, such a 
reading would suggest a far more relational ontology than Foucault’s claim to the 
ontological precedence of the relationship with oneself would otherwise suggest. 
Indeed, there are times when Foucault’s characterisation of the relation of care for 
others to care for oneself would appear to support a more relational ontology. For 
example, Foucault suggests that “Care for self is ethical in itself, but it implies 
complex relations with others, in the measure where this ethos of freedom is also a 
way of caring for others.”377 This does suggest that Foucault thinks there is a degree of 
confluence between care for self and care for others. That is, in undertaking the 
various activities and practices that constitute the care for the self, one cares for others 
at the same time. Such a reading actually turns on the inter-relational structure of 
rapport à soi. Because the originary relations of rapport à soi are folded into the 
latter, the activities of care that tend this reflexive relation at the same time tend these 
originary relations. Hofmeyr describes this usefully: 
[If] the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside, the 
constituent ‘parts’ – the self and what lies beyond the limits of the self 
– must be interrelated or arranged in such a way that they are in 
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contact. […] And thus by caring for myself, I necessarily also take 
responsibility for the other. The limits of the self are enlarged to make 
room for the other as other.378 
Under this reading of the Deleuzian fold, relations with others become a constituent 
part of my self-relation. Hofmeyr goes a step further and posits a strong inter-
subjective reading that blurs the ontological separation of human beings. Even if we 
do not go this far, through the inter-relational structure of rapport à soi care for others 
would not only be entailed by, but co-extensive with, the care that one takes for 
oneself. Nehamas too supports this reading, arguing that care of the self not only 
precedes but constitutes care for the other.379 Indeed, Foucault notes that “the one who 
cared for himself correctly found himself, by that very fact, in a measure to behave 
correctly in relationship to others and for others [my italics].”380 This not only implies 
a stronger inter-subjective reading of the concept of rapport à soi, but places in 
question Foucault’s views on ontological separation. Thus we can read the inter-
relational nature of rapport à soi to mean that in caring for oneself, one not only 
enables the capacity to care for others, but that one actually cares for others by virtue 
of caring for oneself. 
To further understand the implications of this point, it is helpful to consider how 
Foucault actually conceives of the operation of care for self – or askēsis more 
generally – in relation to rapport à soi. To explain this operation, I turn to Foucault’s 
account of writing as a technique of the self. Foucault thinks that a particular rapport à 
soi can be affected or ‘shaped’ by practices of the self. This ‘shaping,’ according to 
Foucault, involves the incorporation or assimilation of truths or principles as part of 
the subject. The practice of writing, for example, functions as askēsis, whereby certain 
truths, discourses, or principles are fashioned through writing into rational principles 
for action: writing is an “agent of the transformation of truth into ethos.”381 Both 
reading and writing operate as modes of ‘inscription’: the embodiment of the content 
of what is read and written. Through these activities, Foucault argues, the subject 
makes this content part of itself; it is the process of the “subjectivation of 
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discourse.”382 Foucault argues moreover that reading and writing thus shape the 
self.383 The subject’s rapport à soi is refined, structured or ‘shaped’ through the 
incorporation and assimilation – the subjectivation – of discourses or truths.  
Foucault poses this subjectivation as a process of unification that brings 
together and combines the disparate elements that make up the hupomnemata (these 
are account books, public registers, or individual notebooks – that can serve as ‘books 
of life’ and ‘guides for conduct’384) within the subject. Indeed, Foucault turns to the 
notion of ‘alimentation’ to explicate this process. The content of what is read and 
written, according to Foucault’s account, is ‘absorbed’ into the subject: 
The role of writing is to constitute, along with all that reading has 
constituted, a ‘body.’ […] And this body should be understood not as 
a body of doctrine but, rather—following an often-evoked metaphor 
of digestion—as the very body of the one who, by transcribing his 
readings, has appropriated them and made their truth his own: writing 
transforms the thing seen or heard ‘into tissue and blood.’ […] It 
becomes a principle of rational action in the writer himself.385 
Thus the truths, principles and discourses read and written about are incorporated and 
ultimately assimilated into the subject’s rapport à soi. While this supports the idea 
that the subjective dimension is ‘shaped’ or ‘cultivated’ by practices of the self, its 
consequences for the extent to which rapport à soi should be understood as indicating 
a relational ontology are not yet clear. I return to this point shortly. 
One of the consequences of this idea for Foucault is the idea that in 
incorporating principles of action into the very mode of being of the subject, through 
rapport à soi the subject is able to respond to a variety of situations and 
circumstances. (Here Foucault displays his preference for principles for action based 
on individual ethics rather than obedience to moral codes. I turn to this in later 
chapters.) As such, Foucault adopts the idea that practices of the self can enable the 
relationship with oneself to operate as a ‘guide’ or ‘manual’ for future behaviour. 
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Foucault’s use of ‘manual’ and ‘treatise’ is significant.386 To describe regimen as 
forming a ‘manual’ not only suggests a guide or set of instructions for behaviour, but 
that the very practices themselves ‘inscribe’ the subject in such a way as to inform 
future behaviour and practices.387 It is a matter of establishing such a strong 
relationship between the subject and truth to enable the subject, “when he had attained 
his finished form, to have at his disposal the true discourse that he should have and 
keep ready to hand and which he could say to himself as an aid when needed.”388 
Foucault points to ancient dietetic practices to make the same point. The value of the 
dietetic account for Foucault is that it establishes rapport à soi and the resulting ēthos 
as the foundation for ethical behaviour.389 The ‘rules’ of dietetics (the mode of 
subjection) are not universal or unchanging; they depend on the specific situation of 
an individual at a given time and in a given place; they respond to unique 
circumstances. In this way, Foucault conceives of dietetics in terms of a broader 
manual or guide for living. He states, for example, that: “Regimen should not be 
understood as a corpus of universal and uniform rules; it was more in the nature of a 
manual for reacting to situations in which one might find oneself, a treatise for 
adjusting one’s behaviour to fit the circumstances.”390 Foucault thus adopts the idea 
that techniques and practices of the self – regimen – effectively ‘embody’ their 
overarching principles, discourses and rationalities.  
It is in the idea that a rationality for behaviour can be incorporated into the 
subject that Foucault locates the link between the government of self and the 
government of others. In conceiving of how rulers should conduct themselves, 
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Foucault suggests that “It is in knowing how properly to conduct himself that he will 
be able to lead others properly. […] The rationality of the government of others is the 
same as the rationality of the government of oneself.”391 Indeed, Foucault emphasises 
this more inter-subjective reading – where one cares for others by virtue of caring for 
oneself – in aspects of his analyses of government. Much of his work in the last two 
years of lectures at the Collège de France is dedicated to explicating the idea that the 
government of others is inextricably bound to the government of oneself.392 
We here return to the question of what Foucault means when he suggests that 
care for oneself must precede care for others. As demonstrated above, there is 
reasonable evidence to suggest that rapport à soi should be seen as supporting an 
inter-subjective reading of ethics, and a more relational ontology than one would 
otherwise expect. Yet in claiming that the relationship with oneself must take 
‘ontological’ precedence, Foucault complicates this reading; it suggests that the self is 
ontologically distinct. Again, Foucault might be merely pointing to the fact of our 
ontological separation from others and to the subsequent fact that care for oneself 
takes a distinct form from care for others. Alternatively, it may be that he is pointing 
to the ontological necessity of caring for oneself before one can care for others.  
It is clear from the above that care for others and the care of the self are 
fundamentally linked. But this is not because human subjects are ontologically 
indistinct. What the account of the operation of dietetic and writing practices 
illustrates is that Foucault thinks that care for the self enables, or, is the condition of, 
care for others, in the sense that the practices of self cultivate the capacity to care for 
others. The alimentary model of writing practices shows that it is in forming a 
particular rapport à soi – and shaping the subjective dimension – that care for others 
becomes possible. As McGushin notes, “In Socratic thought, the care of the self was a 
preparatory work through which one established the proper rapport with oneself. This 
relationship to oneself was what gave one the capacity to take up the arts of living, to 
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understand their value, to be able to apply them properly.”393 In this way, the 
ontological separation of subjects is maintained while rapport à soi provides the 
foundation for a conception of ethical self-formation that cultivates the subject’s 
capacity to respond to various situations and to others according to her ēthos. 
This reading is thus inconsistent with Hofmeyr’s idea that rapport à soi marks a 
certain inter-subjectivity which entails care for others in the care one takes for oneself. 
Under this reading, as we have seen, practices of the self ‘shape’ rapport à soi in such 
a way as to redefine or affect the point of delimitation between the subject’s rapport à 
soi and her relations with others. While this explains the precedence that care for 
oneself must take, such a relational account is inconsistent with the ontological 
separation implied by Foucault’s statement. If subjects are ontologically distinct from 
one another, it seems difficult to argue that care for others is not only enabled by, but 
is constituted through, the care for self. 
However, this difficulty can be avoided by pointing out that the inter-relational 
nature of rapport à soi does not necessarily imply that individual subjects are 
ontologically indistinct. That is, that the reflexive relationship with oneself arises out 
of relations with others does not mean that such subjects are therefore not 
ontologically separated from one other. We could say both that we are distinct beings 
and that our rapport à soi is bound in relations with others. Under this reading, the 
precedence of care for self would be precisely because of our distinctness as beings: 
care for oneself would be required to take precedence because it cultivates the capacity 
to care for others. However, Cordner’s critical point remains; while caring for oneself 
enables one to care for others, and while this would explain Foucault’s insistence on 
the ontological precedence of care for oneself, there is no necessary link between the 
two. Care for others is enabled by care for oneself, but it is not guaranteed. One does 
not care for others by virtue of the care for self.  
In light of this, I suggest that Foucault’s insistence on the imperative of care for 
oneself should thus be taken to indicate a ‘structural’ primacy of self over others. All 
this means is that the capacity to care for others is conditional upon the care for self. 
Yet, this does not preclude the possible interpretation that this precedence also implies 
that the self is ethically more important than others. But what does this mean for 
Foucault’s idea that care for others and government of others is tied to how one cares 
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and governs oneself? In the next section I turn to the broader ethical context of these 
questions, by considering Foucault’s account of the relationship between rapport à soi 
and care for others from a broadly Levinasian perspective. 
Into the fold: alterity and difference 
As I have demonstrated above, the inter-relational nature of rapport à soi does not 
imply a similarly relational ontology; Foucault maintains the ontological distinctness 
of human beings. While I have shown that Foucault’s claim to the precedence of care 
for the self refers to a structural primacy – in the sense that the subjective dimension 
of rapport à soi must be cultivated in order to care for others – the question remains as 
to whether this also implies that the self is ethically more significant. That is, whether 
the practices, objectives and values of one’s own life and mode of being are more 
important than those of other people. Foucault has been criticised for precisely this 
point; his claim to precedence of care for oneself has been taken to signify an ethics 
overly pre-occupied with the self. Read in conjunction with his emphasis on the 
importance of aesthetic practices, moreover, it has been taken as representing a 
thoroughly egoistic ethics. (I discuss the political implications of Foucault’s emphasis 
on aesthetic practices in Chapter Five.) Before turning to the underlying philosophical 
position at stake in this discussion, I consider first the foundations of this critical 
reading. 
As already suggested above, the primary reason for this view is that an ethics 
founded on the concepts of rapport à soi and the care for the self is too ‘self-centred.’ 
Such an ethics fails to recognise the ethical primacy of other people. The problem with 
Foucault’s account then is not only the apparent prioritisation of care for self, but, 
given the explanation that this is merely a structural primacy, there is no sense in 
which care for other people is necessary. Thus it is not enough to say that the practices 
and activities of care for the self must take precedence because they cultivate the 
capacity to care for others. While it is clear that care for the self does not preclude care 
for others, as Cordner points out, and indeed while it may lead to care for others, the 
central problem with Foucault’s account is that care for the self does not appear to 
entail care for others.394 Moreover, in positing rapport à soi as the foundation of our 
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ethical responsiveness, care for others becomes one possible mode of response 
amongst many, rather than an example of “what is fundamental to ethics.”395 
This line of criticism tends to presuppose a Levinas-inspired ethical orientation 
toward others. For Emmanuel Levinas, it is the non-reciprocal responsibility that we 
bear for the Other that is at the heart of the ethical relationship. Ethics comes into play 
in the ‘calling into question’ of the Same brought about by the Other.396 From this 
perspective, Foucault’s account of care for others can only be genuine if it reflects a 
prior normative foundation that posits others at the centre and very raison d’etre of 
ethics. An account of ethical relationships between human beings must do more than 
guarantee that others will be cared for by virtue of the care for self. It must posit other 
people as the source of meaning to and the primary objective of ethical behaviour.397 
On this view, my consideration and responsibility towards other people must be the 
primary motivation of my actions, rather than a corollary outcome of them. 
This is not to say that rapport à soi completely fails to account for or to 
acknowledge others. Cordner’s point is that under Foucault’s account, care for others 
only comes into play through the primacy of one’s relation to self.398 This does not 
necessarily discount Foucault’s conception of rapport à soi from having any value for 
ethics; indeed Cordner thinks that rapport à soi goes some way in recognizing ‘the 
other’ as a source of meaning to our ethical behaviour.399 But it does not go far 
enough. The failure to posit other people as the primary source of meaning to ethics 
calls into question the extent to which the subject can be thought to be responsible to 
others. The criticisms levelled at Foucault in regard to his emphasis on aesthetic 
practices are framed precisely in this manner, suggesting that others become mere 
objects in the quest for self-stylization. But it is not only that Foucault’s account 
appears too ‘egocentric’ or ‘self-concerned’ to be adequately and truly ‘ethical.’ 
Without establishing the ethical primacy of the other, any sense in which the subject 
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very different in spirit – very different ethically.” (“Foucault, Ethics and the Other,” 6.) 
398 Cordner, “Foucault, Ethics and the Other,” 4-5. 
399 See Cordner, “Foucault, Ethics and the Other.” 
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might be responsible for and answerable to that other is undermined.400 Barry Smart 
goes as far as to say that Foucault fails to even consider the question of the moral 
responsibility of the subject.401 He argues that no attempt is made “to explore the non-
reciprocal relationship with the Other which is at the very heart of social life, the 
ethical significance of which is anterior to relation with the self.”402  
Finally, the relations with others implied by rapport à soi pose certain problems 
for the political aspects of Foucault’s project. In Chapter Three I adopted the 
Deleuzian model of the fold, complemented by Butler’s idea of originary relations to 
social norms, to explicate the concept of rapport à soi. Given the subsequent argument 
– that relations with others are a constitutive component of rapport à soi – there arises 
the issue of the possible threat that this fold poses to others. This is because in 
conceiving the reflexive fold in this way, others are posited as mere elements of the 
outside—as part of what is exterior to me. From a Levinasian perspective, this 
diminishes and even denies the alterity and difference of other people. For Levinas, 
the absolute alterity of the Other is distinguished from that which is other merely 
because it is external to and different to me. David Boothroyd poses this problem in 
Foucaultian terms when he asks how, given the Deleuzian reading of rapport à soi as 
constituted through the doubling of force relations, “this intensification, or, focus of 
force, avoids becoming a local force of domination over the Other.”403 This problem is 
important because it impacts the extent to which Foucault’s late work can be said to 
promote difference and diversity, which, considering his objections to discipline and 
normalization, is a significant objective in his later ideas about the activities of self-
constitution. 
Boothroyd’s response to this problem is to turn to the notion of ‘alimentation.’ 
This re-institutes the Levinasian distinction between exteriority and what is absolutely 
Other, which prevents rapport à soi from collapsing the other into the fold of the 
                                                     
400 Cordner argues that the meaning of ethics should be found “in the authoritative claim of the 
other upon us. Another human being as immediately claiming me in response – there is the 
source or moment of ethical authority.” (Ibid., 10.) He argues further that it is “the other as 
inviolably precious” that is at the heart of ethics” and further that: “The peremptory and 
compelling authority of the ethical is the authority of the other as wholly claiming us in 
inescapable response.” (“Foucault, Ethical Self-Concern and the Other,” 607.) 
401 Barry Smart, “Foucault, Levinas and the Subject of Responsibility,” 83. 
402 Ibid., 82. 
403 David Boothroyd, “Foucault’s Alimentary Philosophy: Care of the self and responsibility 
for the other,” in Man and World: an International Philosophical Review 29, no. 4 (1996), 369.  
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self.404 Rather than thinking about the practices of self-care and self-stylization in 
ways that see others as mere instruments and means – which are subsequently folded 
into my rapport à soi, thereby reducing them to part of my self-relation – Boothroyd 
suggests that these practices and the subsequent movement by which rapport à soi is 
established be thought as alimentary.405 On one hand, the folding of exteriority can 
then be thought as ‘sustaining’ or ‘supporting’ the self. (In Chapter Two I argued that 
Foucault’s characterization of power relations and government contain an implicit 
commitment to the ‘maintenance’ or ‘sustenance’ of the other as a free subject, and 
therefore to the practice of liberty as self-relation. This would be to support or hold up 
the other in their self-relation and practice of liberty, and to ensure this possibility is 
maintained.) On the other hand, if the alimentary process is weighted more to the side 
of nourishment, this characterization becomes problematic. As nourishment, 
alimentation tends toward the assimilation and destruction of alterité in the self-
relation.  
By adopting the Levinasian distinction between what is external to me – what is 
other – and what is absolutely Other, however, this potential problem with an 
alimentary characterization is circumvented. The danger lies in thinking of the Other 
merely in terms of their differential relation to me: if the practices of self-care and 
self-stylization can be shown to form part of the general field of exteriority, which 
Deleuze’s description of the folding of force relations would seem to allow, the 
absolute alterity of the Other would not be at risk.406 In order to avoid the reduction of 
the other’s alterity threatened by the fold, the formation of self (the self-relation) must 
occur within the order of the Same and thus independently of the Other.407 
Boothroyd’s argument is that the practices and activities of self-care and self-
                                                     
404 He argues that it is by “rethinking selfhood on the basis of the relationship between ‘praxis’ 
and ‘interiority’ in terms of alimentation that a self open to alterity becomes thinkable.” (Ibid., 
361.) In this Boothroyd is responding to Terry Eagleton’s claim that Foucault’s emphasis on 
praxis precludes the possibility of interiority. See Eagleton, “From the polis to 
postmodernism,” in The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 395. 
405 Alimentation, he suggests, serves as “a useful way of thinking of the general movement by 
which what is exterior is transformed into interiority.” (Boothroyd, “Foucault’s Alimentary 
Philosophy,” 375.) 
406 As Boothroyd notes: “[It] is precisely such a reflective, theoretical representation of the 
other person in terms of her/his positioning in the socio-political totality that presents the threat 
of ethical violence and leads to a reduction of the Other’s alterity to the level of what is merely 
exterior to the Same.” (Ibid.) 
407 Thus Boothroyd suggests that: “Levinas’ distinction serves, in his account, to distinguish 
between relations to others insofar as they figure in and are partly constitutive of my social 
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stylization occur in a different order than that in which the Other exists. In his view, 
“The self-fashioning praxis of Foucault’s subject takes place in another ontological 
order to that in which the self figures as part of the social world shared with others.”408 
That is, as prior to an encounter with the Other. There is no threat to the Other because 
rapport à soi is constituted through the folding of the outside, distinct from absolute 
alterity. They remain safe in their alterity, independent of the relations through which I 
constitute myself.409 This view thus posits rapport à soi as the primary formation of an 
interiority preceding the encounter with the Other, maintaining the absolute alterity of 
the Other as the foundation of ethics.410  
This would appear to go some way in defending Foucault’s claim that the care 
of the self precedes care for others. But this still leaves Foucault open to the charge 
that by placing care for others as secondary, or at least dependent, on the care of the 
self, the Other becomes commensurate with the Same, denying the Other any 
primordial ethical responsibility. For Foucault, however, both aesthetic activities and 
the practices of care for the self take place within the socio-political reality: they are 
embedded within the very manner in which we engage with each other on the social, 
ethical and political levels (which are not distinct anyway). While the reflexive 
relationship to self is first established through originary relations with others, the 
practices by which the subject constitutes and forms themselves as an ethical subject 
take place within the same order in which they exist with others. These are concrete 
practices situated within a specific social and cultural context and with reference to 
shared frameworks of meaning. It is on this basis that I can call upon others for 
assistance in my self-care and upon which others can call for my assistance. 
Returning to theme of alterity, Levinas’ work responds to the way in which 
Western philosophy tends to diminish the absolute alterity of other people.411 That is, 
                                                                                                                                            
world; my personal projects and life in general, and relations to other people as absolute others 
to whom I bear, according to Levinas, an infinite ethical obligation.” (Ibid., 376.) 
408 Ibid., 373. 
409 Rather than indicating a form of being, for Boothroyd the ‘aesthetics of existence’ is “an 
aesthetic subjectivity which is somehow primary, or prior to the ontological determination of 
the oneself.” (Ibid., 370.) 
410 Boothroyd argues: “[However] if care of the self is thought of as the practical formation of 
an interiority, an Inside which is not the product of an exterior social and political system, but 
rather reciprocal and coextensive with the Outside – along the lines of the Deleuzian 
Inside/Outside fold – then can we not perhaps see in this, the only possible basis for ethics, 
namely, that the other person is another oneself and thus wholly other than me?” (Ibid., 382.) 
411 See Colin Davis, Levinas: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 40. The notion 
of alterity is fundamental to Levinas’ account of the ethical. He undermines the usual 
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the habit of understanding and engaging with other people on the basis of the 
assumption of their commonality with me. Foucault actually shares this concern, 
although he expresses it in different terms. He calls into question the primacy of the 
self and subject as the condition of knowledge and the subsequent implication that the 
subject is the condition of our understanding of and engagement with others. For 
Levinas the problem is that the Other’s absolute alterity is denied because the primacy 
of the self reduces the Other to the level of the self (the Same). By reinstituting the 
primacy of the Other as the foundation of ethical interaction, we are able to challenge 
the egocentric attitude that sees other people “either as extensions of the self, or as 
alien objects to be manipulated for the advantage of the individual or social self.”412 
Of course, this latter view is precisely the charge that is often levelled at Foucault, and 
from a Levinasian perspective Foucault’s emphasis on rapport à soi and care for the 
self (especially in its precedence over care for others) would certainly appear 
vulnerable to such a charge. 
Yet while Foucault does explore ethical relationships with others, he does take a 
different approach than Levinas. He orientates his investigations in terms of the 
subject’s relationship with herself; it is in terms of this relationship that he analyses 
relations to other people and conceives of our responsibilities toward them. 
Nevertheless, it is the case that Foucault does not conceive of an a priori ethical 
commitment to others in the way of Levinas. From this perspective, responsibility and 
care for others must be based on a commitment to the other that precedes any relation 
to or care for the self.413 The very possibility of care for others (even as following care 
                                                                                                                                            
opposition between self and other, subject and object, stating that: “If the same would establish 
its identity by simple opposition to the other, it would already be a part of a totality 
encompassing the same and the other” (Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 
Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969], 38.) To 
define the self and other by reference to each other would, for Levinas, constitute a totality and 
therefore diminish the absolute alterity of the Other. To quote Levinas at length: “The 
metaphysical other is other with an alterity that is not formal, is not the simple reverse of 
identity, and is not formed out of resistance to the same, but is prior to every initiative, to all 
imperialism of the same. It is other with an alterity constitutive of the very content of the other. 
Other with an alterity that does not limit the same, for in limiting the same the other would not 
be rigorously other: by virtue of the common frontier the other, within the system, would yet be 
the same. The absolutely other is the Other.” (Ibid., 39.) 
412 John Wild, ‘Introduction’ to Totality and Infinity, 12. 
413 Smart argues that “It is only possible for care for self to encompass care for others if there is 
from the beginning, if there is already, a responsibility for the other. […] It is from the initial 
moral bearing of being, taking or assuming responsibility for the other that a particular ethical 
practice of caring for the self follows.” (“Foucault, Levinas and the Subject of Responsibility,” 
87). 
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for oneself) might be precluded by the lack of an a priori ethical responsibility for 
others.  
Does Foucault’s emphasis on rapport à soi and the precedence of care for the 
self necessarily preclude the subject from bearing responsibilities toward others? It is 
true that Foucault does not have any sense of a primordial responsibility to other 
human beings that pre-exists our ethical engagement with them. But does this preclude 
the possibility of responsibility altogether? I offer two points in defence. First, if we 
recall the claim noted in the previous section, Foucault states that “care for self takes 
moral precedence in the measure that the relationship to self takes ontological 
precedence [my italics].”414 What Foucault means is that one’s rapport à soi takes 
precedence over care for others. ‘Care’ is, as we have seen above, an attitude toward 
oneself, a manner of being, and an activity. Conceived like this, the care for the self 
presupposes a reflexive relationship with oneself. Care is a social practice that takes 
place within the socio-political domain and within concrete relationships with others. 
As such, the practices and activities of care assume a prior reflexive relationship with 
oneself. 
Recalling the analysis of rapport à soi at the end of Chapter Three, whereby it 
is through originary relations to others (in Butler’s words) and through the fold of 
force relations (in Deleuze’s words), Foucault’s emphasis on the precedence of care 
for oneself might be cast in a different light. While this does not go so far as to posit 
an originary and primary ethical responsibility for the other in a Levinasian sense, it 
goes some way in addressing the problem of whether care for oneself entails care for 
others. It is not a matter of demonstrating the link whereby caring for others is entailed 
by caring for oneself: it is a matter of understanding how Foucault conceives of the 
inter-relational nature of ethical practices. Care is neither a primordial ethical bearing 
toward others, nor representative of an a priori ethical commitment. Foucault’s 
examples and discussions are of concrete situations and dilemmas and in reference to 
the different subject-positions of those who must care for themselves. This is not to 
say that there is no genuine ethical spirit to Foucault’s ethics, but that this spirit is not 
derived from a conception of care as recognition of the absolute authority of the Other, 
nor from a conception of primordial responsibility.  
                                                     
414 Foucault, “The Ethic of Care,” 7. 
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Second, as I have already suggested above, care for oneself takes priority over 
care for others because it is the activities and thought in the practice of care for oneself 
that enables care for others. Much of Foucault’s analysis of the theme of the care for 
the self focuses on the way that it is a condition not only for caring for others – 
Foucault discusses at length the care that Socrates takes for himself in order to care 
not only for others, such as Alcibiades, but for the city itself – but for accessing the 
philosophical life and the condition upon which one can speak truth to power. I note in 
conclusion that the precedence of care for the self is structural: it has no bearing on 
the spirit of Foucault’s ethics. 
If Boothroyd does not miss the point in first defending Foucault from a critique 
posed in Levinasian terms, he certainly does by positing Foucault as a closet 
Levinasian. Foucault clearly did not conceive of other human beings or ethics in the 
way of Levinas. A conception of human beings as absolutely Other is too close to 
absolute conceptions of self and subject that Foucault clearly rejected. But this is not 
to say that Foucault does not respect alterity, nor that he sacrifices others at the altar of 
the self. For Foucault, the very meaning and significance of ethics as the relation of 
the self to itself is derived from its social situated-ness and from its structural 
dependence on relations with others. In my view, there is no different ontological 
order in which the relation to self is constituted. The subject is formed through the 
incorporation of relations with others into rapport à soi. There is a danger to others in 
this fold (though not in the Levinasian sense). That is why the exercise of power and 
the practice of liberty are problems for Foucault. The danger lies in the reciprocal 
effects that the exercise of power has both on me, through the kind of rapport à soi 
that is formed and as a subject of that action, and similarly on others. While external 
relations are originary and initially give rise to this reflexivity, it is the mode of being 
formed through my rapport à soi that will determine how I practice my liberty, and 
how I behave in relation to others.  
It is through its very embeddedness in social interaction that the care for self is 
meaningful. To return to the point made by Hofmeyr, it is the structural 
interdependence of self and other in rapport à soi that gives meaning to the idea of 
care of the self: it “derives its qualification as ethical practice […] from its social 
situatedness.”415 But what are the implications for the possibilities of difference and 
                                                     
415 Hofmeyr, “The Meta-physics of Foucault’s Ethics,” 119. 
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diversity? We should here recall Foucault’s earlier descriptions of disciplinary 
power. Disciple individualizes human beings, yet promotes and effects conformity and 
normalization. In positing individuals as objects of knowledge, disciplinary power 
organizes, homogenizes and ultimately produces subjects.416 It not only reduces 
alterity, but ties individuals to their identity. In contrast, then, Foucault’s later account 
of the self-constituting subject that resists the subjectivising effects of power promotes 
the reinstitution of alterity and difference. The practices of self-care and self-
stylization thus signify the opposite of a homogenizing power; enabling the self-
constitution of the subject in relation to others and in relation to the world. As 
Bernauer and Mahon argue, “His [Foucault’s] thought moved toward an ever-
expanding embrace of otherness, the condition for any community of moral action.”417 
Indeed, we can return here to Deleuze: 
And what can we ultimately say about our own contemporary modes 
and our modern relation to self? What are our four folds? ... The 
struggle for a modern subjectivity passes through a resistance to the 
two present forms of subjection, the one consisting of individualizing 
ourselves on the basis of constraints of power, the other of attracting 
each individual to a known and recognized identity, fixed once and 
for all. The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the 
right to difference, variation and metamorphosis.418 
For Foucault, as I argue further below, the struggle for a modern subjectivity (as 
Deleuze puts it) takes the form of a struggle against the ‘epistemological horizon,’ to 
use Butler’s phrase. It is to call into question given structures of meaning by which we 
understand ourselves and others as certain kinds of subjects. The practices that fall 
under the heading of care for the self for Foucault take a central role in this struggle. 
This is precisely because they cultivate the ‘subjective dimension’ and the critical 
attitude whereby subjects give themselves the right to question authority on its relation 
to truth. Before returning to this idea in Chapters Five and Six, I turn now to two other 
lines of enquiry regarding Foucault’s account of ethics. 
                                                     
416 For example, Foucault describes two effects of ‘examination’ as the constitution of the 
individual as a describable and analyzable object, capturing and recoding individual aptitudes, 
and the constitution of a comparative system that enables the measurement of individuals and 
groups against one another. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 190. 
417 James W. Bernauer and Michael Mahon, “The Ethics of Michel Foucault,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 155. 
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The problem of universality 
I argue in this section that Foucault’s description of rapport à soi – understood within 
the context of Foucault’s account of power relations – does provide the foundation for 
a minimalist idea of universality. The presence or otherwise of a form of universality 
is important because it is purported to be a precondition of a properly ethical attitude 
toward others.419 Part of the problem (which is explored further in Chapter Five) is the 
assumption that Foucault’s emphasis on the aesthetic necessarily precludes the 
possibility of ethical universality.420 After identifying what it is about ethical 
universality that Foucault finds problematic, I survey Christopher Cordner’s idea that 
a certain ‘universality of outlook’ might be compatible with Foucault’s ethics.   
Foucault appears to reject any idea that a meaningful ethics or morality is one 
that is universal. On the one hand, Foucault was suspicious of purportedly universal 
principles or concepts to which such a morality inevitably refers, particularly, of 
course, a conception of human nature. On the other hand, Foucault was suspicious of 
the operation of universality: particularly its resemblance to the operation of 
normalization. The subjection of individuals to a ‘universal’ ethic would, if based on a 
conception of ‘human essence,’ inevitably refer back to the power structures that 
produced it, and subject individuals to the same normalizing effects as disciplinary 
power. Foucault said in one interview that: “The search for a form of morality that 
would be acceptable to everyone―in the sense that everyone would have to submit to 
it―strikes me as catastrophic.”421 Such a form of morality would be catastrophic 
                                                                                                                                            
418 Deleuze, Foucault, 105-106. 
419 The important point at hand is that views such as Cordner’s presume that ethics must have 
some element of universality in order to be valid: “there is an important form of ethical 
universality, different from the conception Foucault opposes, that any decent ethics must 
acknowledge.” See Cordner, “Foucault and Ethical Universality,” 581. (Whether ethics must 
have some form of universality in order to be valid is, of course, an entirely different issue and 
is beyond the scope of the present discussion.) Cordner’s view is important because he 
proposes a form of universalism compatible with Foucault’s ethics, but which, he argues, does 
not have the consequences that Foucault opposes. The important difference between Cordner’s 
appeal to universality and the strong normative standards required by Habermas, Taylor and 
Fraser, is that Cordner’s conception does not involve a priori universal norms, nor a priori 
rejection of forms of power.  
420 Rainer Rochlitz, for example, observes that “What is nonetheless striking is that Foucault’s 
critical contributions – whether they take the form of writing or political practices – contain a 
normative content, even a virtually universalist normativity: referring to a requirement for the 
autonomy of the person and opposition to unjust suffering” (“The Aesthetics of Existence: 
Post-conventional Morality and the Theory of Power in Foucault,” in Michel Foucault: 
Philosopher, ed. T. Armstrong [Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992], 250).  
421 Foucault, “The Return of Morality,” 473. 
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because it limits individuals to the conception of human essence on which it is based. 
As Cordner observes, a universal ethics, in Foucault’s view, denies human difference: 
it is based on a historically and culturally situated idea of what human beings are and 
what they might become, governing individuals within these limits.422 If Foucault 
cannot entertain an a priori conception of human being or essence, then he cannot 
conceive of ethics as following, in the Humean tradition, from an understanding of the 
principles according to which human nature operates. 
Rather ethics follows from his conception of human beings as subjects of 
power. If a form of universalism is possible based upon this conception, it might avoid 
the consequences Foucault objected to. As Butler argues, “the problem is not 
universality as such but with an operation of universality that fails to be responsive to 
cultural particularity and fails to undergo a reformulation of itself in response to the 
social and cultural conditions it includes within its scope of applicability.”423 Based on 
a historically and culturally-specific conception of human being, such a form of 
universalism would then be responsive to this particularity. Let us first consider the 
form of ethical universality presented by Cordner. 
Cordner’s alternative derives its universality not from norms of behaviour, but 
from a certain attitude: a ‘universalism of outlook.’424 That is, a way of thinking about 
others that he thinks is missing from Foucault’s account of ethics. It is a form of 
universality that is ethically significant not because it is concerned with ‘what to do’ 
but with how one thinks about and recognizes others as ethically significant.425 While 
Cordner admits that this is compatible with Foucault’s account of ethics, he argues 
that there is nothing in Foucault’s account of rapport à soi that excludes orientations 
                                                     
422 In Cordner’s words, “The normalizing forces of disciplinary power shape the conviction 
that there is a shared human essence, and then operate to confine people in accordance with it. 
But there is no such essence. The search for a universal ethic is ‘catastrophic’ just because it 
seeks to impose an illusory sameness on the important reality of human difference. Foucault 
thinks that universal ethics is always predicated on an already-given conception of the range of 
human capacities, so that its application excludes all sorts of humanly important possibilities, 
including many that have yet to appear.” (“Foucault and Ethical Universality,” 580-581.) 
423 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 6. She goes on: “When a universal precept cannot, for 
social reasons, be appropriated or when—indeed, for social reasons—it must be refused, the 
universal precept itself becomes a site of contest, a theme and an object of democratic debate.” 
424 Cordner, “Foucault and Ethical Universality,” 585. 
425 According to Cordner, “ethical universalism is usually conceived […] as a matter of 
exceptionless norms of behaviour – of what actions are to be done, or forbidden, or permitted. 
[…] Recognition of this important kind of ethical universalism carries, that is to say, no 
commitment to ‘universal norms of behaviour.’ This form of universalism is engaged, instead, 
at the level of how others are acknowledged.” (Ibid., 585). 
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lacking this universal outlook.426 Before I address this specific claim, let me briefly 
outline what this outlook, according to Cordner, entails. 
This universal outlook, according to Cordner, is a way of thinking of others. It 
is the acknowledgement that all others share the same ‘ethical status’ as me: an 
equality derived from the recognition that all human beings share the same range of 
possibilities in capacity and feeling. As Cordner describes it, “What is at issue in this 
conception of universality is realizing a kind of equality with others – all others – 
which depends on seeing them under the aegis of certain fundamental possibilities of 
human meaning.”427 This form of universalism escapes the charge of normalization 
because the recognition of equality is protected by the underlying acknowledgement 
of the range of possibilities that Cordner suggests are ‘fundamental’ to ‘human 
being.’428 This sense of equality, Cordner argues, “is compatible with recognizing an 
indefinite variety of activities and cultural forms and patterns of behaviour, including 
many that have yet to appear.”429 This form of universal outlook, moreover, is 
necessary to the ethically sound acknowledgment of difference that is central to 
Foucault’s project.430 
Cordner holds that although Foucault’s account of rapport à soi – and his 
account of ethics more broadly – does not exclude ethical orientations that fail to 
recognize the ethical equality of others thus defined, Foucault’s account itself fails to 
include such recognition.431 In Chapter Two I pointed to the significance of Foucault’s 
                                                     
426 Ibid., 588. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Cordner states: “This sense of equality does not seek to impose a single set of norms of 
behaviour on people, or presuppose that human beings have a timelessly fixed range of human 
capacities.” (Ibid.) 
429 Ibid. It appears that this form of universalism is not open to the charge of normalisation 
because such universality does not dictate norms of behaviour. Yet it seems to assume that the 
behaviour that will follow from such a universal recognition, protected by the 
acknowledgement of shared human meaning, will somehow avoid the risks of normalization. 
That is, it will prevent me from wishing or forcing everyone to behave or be like me. 
430 Cordner notes: “Interpreters of Foucault have often supposed that once a universal moral 
code is rejected, all that is left is the importance of recognizing difference. […] I am saying, in 
effect, that difference can be taken seriously only when it is recognized as expressive of a 
certain kind of human significance, and this depends on its being seen under the aegis of those 
possibilities of human meaning I mentioned. That is to say, a certain universal background – 
although emphatically not one that seeks to straitjacket people in universal norms of behaviour 
– is a condition of an ethically robust and respectful acknowledgement of difference.” (Ibid., 
589.) 
431 As we saw earlier, Cordner points as an example to the apparently coincidental link between 
care for others and care of the self; the point of which appears to be that any care for others is 
not the result of such a universal ethical outlook, but corollary to the care one takes for oneself. 
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definition of power relations as conditional upon the recognition and maintenance of 
the other as a person who acts.432 This provides the starting point for thinking about 
the presence of a form of universal outlook in Foucault’s ethics. 
To get at the ethical significance of this recognition, however, we need to think 
about what Foucault means by ‘someone who acts.’ This is prima facie the ‘free 
subject’: someone who has a range of possibilities that gives rise to the potential for 
action. But it is also someone who has rapport à soi: a reflexive relation to self 
through which an individual understands themselves as a subject, and whereby their 
actions have meaning in reference to broader frameworks of interpretation. To 
recognize the other as a person who acts is to recognize them as someone with rapport 
à soi; it is to recognize not only that their actions are founded upon this relation, but 
that their actions – and my actions upon their actions – bear upon this relation. This is 
close to what Patton calls the ‘feeling of power.’ Given the reflexive interplay between 
an individual’s rapport à soi, their actions, and the actions of others upon them, the 
capacity to act and how an individual interprets or gives meaning to their actions 
affects the kind/s of subject/s they feel themselves to be. Thus when Foucault claims 
that power relations are articulated on the recognition and maintenance of acting 
others, this recognition is of the other as an ethical subject and as someone who has 
rapport à soi. 
Is this the sort of ‘acknowledgement’ that Cordner requires? While it is not 
opposed to the form of acknowledgement that he outlines, and indeed while it may 
meet some criteria, it does not have the kind of ‘protection’ that Cordner thinks the 
reference to ‘fundamental possibilities’ of human meaning provide. Foucault’s 
recognition of the other as an acting subject, however, does go some way in meeting 
the kind of universalist outlook that Cordner requires. Cordner, for example, describes 
this as: 
seeing another as occupying a certain space of possibilities within 
which alone he or she can be acknowledged as fully one’s fellow 
human being. To see another in this way involves seeing her, for 
example, as able to be humiliated in certain sorts of ways, as one 
whose life is capable of certain sorts of meaning and who is able to 
                                                     
432 See Chapters Two and Three of the current document. Cf. Foucault, “The Subject and 
Power,” 789. 
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understand her own life as having or lacking such meaning, as 
someone one could seriously wrong and who could occasion one’s 
serious remorse.433 
If, as I have argued, Foucault’s ‘recognition’ and ‘maintenance’ of the other includes 
the recognition of their rapport à soi, then this comes very close to such an 
acknowledgement. Foucault’s account clearly acknowledges others as occupying a 
‘space of possibilities’ and this is central to his very understanding of human 
interaction and freedom, although Foucault’s objections to humanism might preclude 
us from describing this acknowledgement in terms of ‘human being.’ Building on 
Patton’s idea of the ‘feeling of power’ discussed in Chapter Three, rapport à soi 
provides the conceptual framework for how we might think about the capacity to feel 
humiliation, or the capacity for self-understanding for example, internal to Foucault’s 
account. As I argue broadly in the remainder of the thesis, Foucault’s accounts of 
rapport à soi and care of the self do provide possible “ways of thinking our common 
humanity,”434 as Cordner puts it. Foucault’s acknowledgement consists in the 
recognition of others as subjects of power, as free subjects, and as subjects whose 
rapport à soi and care of the self is predicated on this freedom and power. 
The specificity of subject-positions: a normative possibility? 
In this section I argue that, following the minimalist form of universalism outlined 
above, the idea of subject-positions outlined in Chapter Three can be usefully 
employed to demonstrate that a kind of situational and social norm is necessary to and 
consistent with Foucault’s broader ethical project. To do this, I outline how rapport à 
soi is only coherent if interpreted within a broader ‘framework of recognition,’ to 
borrow Butler’s phrase, that gives meaning to the kinds of subject at which I aim 
(telos) and the practices through which I achieve this aim (ascetics). Second, I suggest 
that despite Foucault’s concerted efforts to move away from ethical universality, the 
coherence of his overall account rests in part on the relationship with the subject-
position/s from which an individual derives some of their norms and principles for 
behaviour. These do not, however, result in a command morality or the kind of 
universalism that Foucault rejected. Rather, I draw upon Foucault’s idea of ‘ethical 
distance,’ which describes the way in which individuals form a relation to the subject-
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position they occupy, in order to re-think how situational norms might be compatible 
with rapport à soi.  
By way of background, let me note the following observation regarding the 
apparent opposition of aesthetics to other ethical formations. Take, for example, the 
following statement by Foucault: “[And] if I have taken an interest in Antiquity, it is 
because, for a whole series of reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of 
rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. To this absence of a morality, one 
responds, or must respond, with an investigation which is that of an aesthetics of 
existence.”435 Critics of Foucault have tended to the view that an aesthetic ethics is 
mutually exclusive of other ethical forms; most notably ethical universalism outlined 
above and the kind of strong a priori normativity propounded by Habermas et. al. 
Cordner’s analysis, for example, implicitly presumes that Foucault posits ‘specificity’ 
in opposition to ‘universality,’ thus denying the possibility that Foucault might 
recognize ethical obligations as both unique or situation-specific and universalisable. 
Cordner’s take is that the emphasis on aesthetics is necessarily at odds with the 
possibility of universality. In taking this view critics have assumed that Foucault 
presents aesthetic ethics not only as the sole alternative to, but as incompatible with 
other forms. That is, that ethics so conceived must naturally exclude other ethical 
possibilities. Thus one of the aims of this section is to demonstrate how a particular 
conception of situationally-specific norms is compatible with the aesthetic aspects of 
Foucault’s ethics. 
Foucault’s concept of rapport à soi is only coherent if read as part of a broader 
ethical framework that includes some reference to a grid of intelligibility, which gives 
it scope, context and meaning. It is through this grid that the operation of social norms 
comes to bear upon rapport à soi. Foucault understands the domain of ethics to 
include the relations one has with others, and with the world, in addition to the 
relationship with oneself. As Bennett describes it, 
Ethics is for Foucault a matter of reflective heteronomy, of the 
recognition of one’s implication in and dependence upon a web of 
social relations within which there nevertheless remains room for the 
                                                                                                                                            
434 Ibid., 593. 
435 Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” 451. 
  147 
 
individual to carve out a space of distinction, self-direction, or 
‘liberty.’436 
This reflective heteronomy is captured in the four elements of rapport à soi, each in 
their own way referring to the social framework in which the relation to self is 
established. Building on the account of rapport à soi provided in Chapter Three, in 
which originary relations with others give rise to the reflexive relation to self, in this 
section I suggest that by understanding how the activities and aims of rapport à soi are 
embedded within the social sphere and rely upon common frameworks of 
interpretation, it becomes clear that some form of situational norms are necessary to 
the internal coherence of Foucault’s account. 
In his characterisation of rapport à soi, Foucault is attempting to describe the 
ways in which how we think about ourselves as certain kinds of people, as holding 
certain beliefs and values, and as belonging to a social group all have very real, 
constitutive effects on our subjectivity. It is an attempt to describe the reflexive aspect 
of ourselves through which we form ourselves as certain kinds of people in relation to 
others and in relation to the world. Foucault does not reject, moreover, the influence of 
prescriptive codes on individuals. Rather, the moral code forms an element of 
individual ethics, rather than its entirety. What Foucault refers to as the moral code 
acts as the poles of reference against which subjects are formed, or form themselves, 
and determine the modes of subjectivity that are legitimate or meaningful within a 
certain historical-social context. This is what Butler calls the ‘framework for 
recognition’; that is, the framework in relation to which subjects recognize and 
understand themselves, and in relation to which subjects might challenge and 
transform the norms underlying this framework.437 An individual’s rapport à soi is 
necessarily linked to the social norms that form part of this framework and which are 
associated, in part, with the subject-positions defined within a network of relations. 
Self-recognition – or what could be explained as the various kinds of subject that I 
might recognize or desire myself to be – is delimited by the social norms and context 
in which my self-constitution is carried out.  
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It is clear that the way Foucault imagines an individual as both recognizing and 
subjecting themselves to a particular goal, principle, or precept refers to the social and 
cultural context in which they live; such values – Foucault cites fidelity as an example 
– are only meaningful within a common sphere of interpretation. Foucault’s idea of 
the ethical telos is similarly embedded within its social and cultural context. The other 
folds of rapport à soi – the identification of the ethical substance, the mode of 
subjection and ethical work – through which a particular mode of being emerges are 
all social practices, carried out in relation to other people and referring to shared 
values. 
It is in terms of the ascetic practices of rapport à soi – ethical work – that 
Foucault is most explicit about this point. The activities or ascesis associated with 
rapport à soi are social practices; they take place within a specific social context, 
build upon or require new relationships with others, and they work towards an ideal 
form of subjectivity (telos) that has been formed within a web of relations and in 
reference to common frameworks of interpretation. For example,  
[T]hese practices [by which the subject constitutes herself in an active 
fashion] are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by 
himself. They are patterns that he finds in his culture and which are 
proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society 
and his social group.438 
Foucault is clear that far from being isolated and independent, the aesthetic practices 
of an individual’s rapport à soi reflect and are embedded within broader social 
practices. In the modern context we can look to exercise regimes and dieting practices 
as examples of ascetic practices derived from particular social groups and discourses. 
Patterns or models for practices might also be derived from the kinds of subject-
positions (roles) that an individual occupies – for example, their profession, role as a 
parent, as a student – with which certain standards of behaviour and practices are 
associated. 439 
                                                     
438 Foucault, “The Ethic of Care for the Self,” in The Final Foucault, 11. 
439 But as this passage makes clear, it is not the case that such practices are always voluntarily 
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models will contribute to the normalization of individuals. For Foucault, normative 
frameworks of behaviour are conceptually bound with ‘power.’ See, for example, The 
Government of Oneself and Others, 3. Foucault characterizes ‘normative frameworks of 
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What I am trying to get at here, specifically, is whether rapport à soi – and the 
conception of aesthetics more broadly – thus conceived might be compatible with a 
certain kind of situational-norm: that is, norms or principles for behaviour that are 
associated with specific, if not unique, situations. One way to approach this possibility 
is through the idea of subject-positions, as outlined in Chapter Three. They are the 
positions delimited by the convergence of relations of power, and articulated by 
associated discursive practices, in which the self-constituting activity of subjectivity 
occurs. These subject-positions might be usefully thought of in terms of socially or 
institutionally defined roles—positions which, delimited by the network of relations of 
which they form an axis, have a set of associated rights and duties organized around 
an institutionally or socially specified function.440 These rights and duties might be 
thought of as ‘role obligations’: “the sort of obligations we have (or take ourselves to 
have) as occupants of social roles: as citizens, family members, teachers and so 
forth.”441 Clearly Foucault would find the idea of ‘role obligations’ thus defined 
problematic for all sorts of reasons, not least because of the conceptual reliance on 
‘institutionally defined’ roles, and the assumption that the moral requirements of a 
particular role would be the same in all instances. I do not wish to push this point too 
far, suffice to say that Foucault does assume that different roles or functions in society 
carry with them particular responsibilities and obligations. For example, in Foucault’s 
analysis of Isocrates it is because Nicocles recognizes himself as the King – and 
therefore in a position of power – that he recognizes the imperative of moderation.442 
Cordner rightly points out that any king would recognize the same obligations; that the 
duties and obligations acknowledged as part of being this king could equally be 
acknowledged as entailed by any king.443 
                                                                                                                                            
behaviour for individuals’ as the concrete object of investigation for the axes of power. This is 
discussed further in Chapter Five. 
440 In this characterisation I draw upon Michael O. Hardimom’s paper “Role Obligations,” in 
The Journal of Philosophy Vl XCI, no. 7, (July 1994), which Cordner uses to define and 
contextualise ‘role obligations.’ Hardimom defines ‘role’ as referring to “constellations of 
institutionally specified rights and duties organized around an institutionally specified social 
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institutional role, whose content is fixed by the function of the role, and whose normative force 
flows from the role. To say that a role obligation ‘attaches to an institutional role’ is to say that 
it applies to an individual in her capacity as an occupant of that role: as a sister, as a citizen, or 
as a bus driver, for example.” (334-335) 
442 See Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 264-265. 
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The problem, however, is the extent to which Foucault thinks that such duties 
and obligations are binding. I have already outlined how rapport à soi interacts with 
such subject-positions (I will continue to use ‘subject-position’ to distinguish 
Foucault’s take on this idea from the stronger sense of ‘role obligation’ outlined 
above). As is the case with Nicocles, Foucault’s analyses do tend toward the 
acknowledgement that subject-positions entail certain duties and obligations, but this 
is clearly not the whole story. In Foucault’s analysis, Nicocles’ recognition of his 
responsibilities refers not only to his position as king, but to his rapport à soi. For 
Cordner, this is indicative of Foucault’s emphasis on an ‘aesthetics of existence’ as the 
sole, or at least primary, reason for Nicocles conducting himself in this way. What I 
am suggesting, however, is that subject-positions do entail situational norms for 
behaviour, but in a way that is compatible with Foucault’s emphasis on the role of 
rapport à soi.  
To get at what this might mean, let us turn for a moment to Foucault’s idea of 
‘ethical distance’ that he employs in his analysis of ancient Roman and Hellenistic 
philosophy. Here the care of the self puts one at a state of removal from the activities 
and functions one performs in social and political life. This removal – what Foucault 
calls ‘ethical distance’ – is the space of contemplation that is opened up by the activity 
of care between one’s rapport à soi and the roles and functions associated with one’s 
relationships with others. It is not to turn away from active social or political life, but 
to seek in rapport à soi the rationality and guidance for how to behave and to conduct 
oneself as an inhabitant of the world and a social citizen.444 Foucault writes: 
The relationship to self does not detach the individual from any form 
of activity in the realm of the city-state, the family or friendship; it 
opens up, rather, as Seneca said, an intervallum between those 
activities he exercises and what constitutes him as the subject of these 
activities; this ‘ethical distance’ is what enables him not to feel 
deprived of what will be taken from him by circumstances; it is what 
enables him to do no more than what is contained in the definition of 
the function.445 
                                                     
444 See the passage from Foucault’s unpublished dossier “Government of the self and others” 
quoted in Gros, “Course Context,” in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, pages 539-541. 
445 Ibid., 540. 
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In this way, Foucault conceives of a certain way of relating the social roles (with 
their associated functions, rights and responsibilities) one occupies back to rapport à 
soi in order to mediate one’s response. That is, rather than defining one’s mode of 
being (and rapport à soi) in response to the roles and responsibilities one has, one first 
establishes a relationship with oneself that forms the base of one’s response to those 
roles. Ethical distance involves:  
not trying to establish what you are on the basis of the system of 
rights and obligations which differentiate and situate you with regard 
to others, but rather questioning yourself about what you are in order 
to infer from this what it is fitting to do, either in general or in this or 
that circumstance, but ultimately according to the functions that you 
have to exercise.446 
What Foucault is getting at is the danger inherent in the subject’s identifying 
themselves too closely with their role, occupation or position of power. By focusing 
on the relationship with oneself, the subject ‘removes’ herself from that position, 
which enables the space to reflect upon her thought and behaviour and to form herself 
as “an ethical subject in the entire sphere of social, political, and civic activities.”447 
Foucault is also invoking the idea outlined earlier in this chapter about the way 
that the incorporation of principles and rationalities into the subject’s mode of being 
shapes their behaviour and response to future situations. It is really an account of how 
the individual should constitute themselves in relation to the world. But it also 
suggests the way in which Foucault’s account of rapport à soi, and ethics more 
broadly, is compatible with social norms. The significance of this idea of ethical 
distance is that it allows Foucault to articulate the way that the subject can have a 
measured and reflective response to these norms not founded in a command-obedience 
model of ethics. Foucault wants to distinguish between an unthinking exercise of pre-
determined social roles and reasoned and reflective execution of these roles as part of 
one’s rapport à soi.   
But Foucault also links the ideas of rapport à soi and ethical distance with the 
idea of a critical reflection upon one’s behaviour and actions specifically as they 
pertain to exercises of power and positions of authority. The relationship to self, 
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according to Foucault, “becomes the foundation of an ethos, which is not the 
alternative choice to political and civic activity; it offers rather the possibility of 
defining oneself outside of one’s function, role and prerogatives, and thereby of being 
able to exercise these in an adequate and rational way.”448 Of course, this follows from 
Foucault’s idea that rapport à soi cultivated through the care and government of 
oneself is a condition of the care and government of others. But if we take a step back 
for a moment, there is a broader point to be made. That is, rapport à soi and practices 
of the self do two inter-related things. First, they constitute a mode of response to 
relations and exercises of power. As McGushin points out, Foucault “conceptualises 
ancient philosophy in terms of practices of ethical subjectivization developed in order 
to respond to the intensification of relations of power and knowledge.449 Second, they 
constitute a mode of response to the recognition of the fact that subjects also exercise 
power over others. As such, Foucault’s analyses and adoption of the relationship with 
oneself is a response to the question of how we are to constitute ourselves and behave 
in relation to others, given the recognition of ourselves as powerful subjects. This is 
precisely why, as we see further in the next chapter, Foucault conceives of aesthetic 
practices of self-stylisation as political practices. He argues for example that the care 
for the self, rather than signifying a turning-away from active, public life “is much 
more concerned to define the principle of a relation to self that will make it possible to 
set the forms and conditions in which political action, participation in the offices of 
power, the exercise of a function, will be possible or not possible, acceptable or 
necessary.”450  
It can be seen that while the coherence of Foucault’s ethics does rest on the 
interplay of rapport à soi with a conception of social norms, Foucault accounts for 
how these norms – or the duties and obligations associated with a subject-position – 
might be mediated through a space of reflection opened up through the relation to self. 
Foucault’s ethics, then, operates at two levels: first, at the level of rapport à soi. This 
is founded in the originary relation to others that gives rise to the reflexivity of rapport 
à soi, as outlined earlier. This initial ethical response includes the recognition of the 
other as a subject of power and ethics. Second, the operation of ethics at the level of 
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social interaction and relations of power, and the level at which an individual 
responds to the duties or obligations they recognize as entailed by a certain subject-
position. This recognition is mediated, through Foucault’s idea of ethical distance, by 
rapport à soi. Foucault clearly does not think that individuals should form an 
individualistic and egoistic ‘ethics’ with disregard or indifference to those others with 
whom we share our lives. As such, aesthetics should be conceived as forming a 
creative and original response – and at a certain remove from – to the subject-positions 
that we occupy.  
Conclusion 
Foucault is often read as entirely averse to normative structures of any kind, even 
though he often uses terms and phrases with normative content. For Habermas et. al. 
this appears inconsistent with his rejection of normative frameworks of critical 
evaluation. Yet, as we have seen, a certain interpretation of situational norms is 
consistent with his ethical objectives. Indeed, Foucault’s emphasis on the social nature 
and embeddedness of rapport à soi in relations of power and social practices is only 
coherent if their dependence on social norms and shared frameworks of interpretation 
are recognised. Self-recognition – or what could be explained as the various kinds of 
subject that I might recognize or desire myself to be – is delimited by the social norms 
and context in which my self-constitution is carried out. In this way, Foucault does not 
want to entirely disassociate ethics from normative or command-obedience models. 
What he does want to do is re-institute a reflective and thoughtful foundation to how 
individuals respond to such norms, commands, and rules. As such, rapport à soi is 
compatible with a certain kind of situational-norm: that is, norms and rules for 
behaviour that are associated with specific, if not unique, situations.  
Foucault does think that different roles or functions in society carry with them 
particular responsibilities and obligations. However, the individual’s response to these 
norms of behaviour is mediated by the ethical distance enabled by rapport à soi. In 
this way, a balance is struck between the subject’s obligation to respond to their social 
roles, responsibilities and obligations according to the subject-position/s that they 
occupy, and the prevention of un-reflective obedience to a set of rules and commands. 
These do not, however, result in a command morality or the kind of universalism that 
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Foucault rejected. Foucault’s idea of ‘ethical distance’ read in conjunction with 
rapport à soi enables social norms to feature as part of Foucault’s broader ideas about 
the relationship between ethics, power and the social. The relationship with oneself 
enables a reflective and thoughtful response to one’s role and obligations. 
As we have seen, Foucault wants to avoid an account of ethics that imposes 
further restrictions and limitations on subjects’ self-understanding and modes of being. 
In this way, the adoption of a form of universalism that avoids these consequences 
may be compatible with Foucault’s philosophical and political commitments. Part of 
the problem, as Butler points out, is that ethical universalism usually conceived is 
unresponsive to cultural and social particularity. For some scholars, Foucault goes too 
far in the opposite direction; adopting an account of ethics that is so specific and 
particular to the individual that it fails to qualify as an ethics at all. His emphasis on 
aesthetic practices, moreover, appears to only emphasise its individualistic nature. As I 
noted above, some interpretations of this aesthetic aspect see it as precluding other 
ethical models, most notably universalism.  
The minimalist form of universalism (what Cordner refers to as a ‘universalism 
of outlook’) is found in the recognition that other people are subjects of and subject to 
power in a similar way to me. Foucault’s accounts of rapport à soi and care of the self 
do provide possible ‘ways of thinking our common humanity.’ This involves the 
recognition of the reflexive nature of human actions, which are both founded on and 
bear upon rapport à soi. It also involves the recognition of these actions as dependent 
upon a social framework of interpretation through which they are meaningful. What is 
particularly significant is that for Foucault this recognition of other people as both 
subject to power and capable of self-constitution is a condition of relations of power. 
In Chapter Six I push this point further in describing a relational conception of 
politics. In this way, we are able not only to identify a minimalist form of universalist 
recognition of others as subjects of power, but to extend this to a basic conception of 
‘relational right.’ 
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Chapter Five: Ethics, aesthetics, politics 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on what Foucault offers modern audiences. This represents, in a 
way, the culmination of Foucault’s critical and genealogical work into a groundwork 
for a politics of ourselves. In considering the motivation for Foucault’s turn to ancient 
practices of the self, I draw out what he thinks the latter offers in terms of both 
founding and elaborating this new politics. Of particular concern here is the role that 
aesthetic practices of self-stylisation play in this politics and in relation to Foucault’s 
reformulation of political power.  
In section one, I outline Foucault’s return to Antiquity and the search for a 
renewed ethic of the self. In Foucault’s view, modernity and Antiquity share a 
common problem: the practice of liberty. Broadly speaking this is the way in which 
subjects act, behave and conduct themselves, given the fact of their ‘freedom.’ It is in 
approaching this problem that Foucault thinks that ancient ethics might be useful; that 
in the modern decline of traditional moral foundations Antiquity could offer a means 
of grounding this liberty in an ethic of the self. Yet Foucault does not seek to re-
discover and re-institute ancient values into modernity; rather, ancient ethics 
represents a point of departure for a new politics of ourselves. Indeed, this follows the 
archaeo-genealogical recognition that our current modes of self-understanding are 
contingent upon the structures of power/knowledge specific to our own time. Ancient 
practices of the self, for Foucault, represent the starting point for re-conceiving 
political activity and the relationship of self-constitution to politics. 
In section two, I examine some of Foucault’s comments about his own role as 
an intellectual and philosopher, suggesting that these reflect – and indeed offer an 
insight into – certain ideas that Foucault thought we could adopt from the ancient 
world. On the one hand, he ties his own philosophical practice or ‘work’ to the 
aesthetic themes he finds in Antiquity, namely, the transformative and creative aspects 
of exercises of the self. On the other hand, Foucault sees that work as bearing a certain 
ethical-political function and responsibility in broader society. That is, Foucault 
suggests that in addition to cultivating their own critical capacity, intellectuals bear a 
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responsibility to help others question and challenge their own thought. The 
significance of this I argue is that Foucault therefore sees public intellectuals and 
philosophers as bearing a responsibility to help others cultivate their right to question 
authority on its relation to truth. Indeed, Foucault views himself as bearing such a 
responsibility.  
In turning in section three to the aesthetic aspects of Foucault’s ethics, I 
examine the ethical and political implications of aesthetic practices of self-sylisation. 
First, I point out the problems with the artistic analogy, suggesting that limiting the 
interpretation of aesthetic practices to the pursuit of a ‘beautiful life’ is misleading in 
terms of Foucault’s ethical and political objectives. Particularly, I suggest that over-
emphasising the Nietzschean element of these aesthetic practices misconstrues the 
objectives and consequences of Foucault’s account. In the fourth section I examine 
particularly the role of aesthetic practices in Foucault’s idea of politics. For some 
scholars, aesthetic practices are devoid of political relevance because of their apparent 
restriction to the private sphere. I argue, however, that Foucault restores to aesthetic 
activities a concern with the polis – as practices that, while they may appear to be 
carried out ‘in private’ nevertheless have political effects. In doing so, I call into 
question the relegation of aesthetic practices to the status of ‘private’ activities.  
 Finally, in section five I turn to Foucault’s discussion of dietetics, which is one 
example of the ancient practices of self that he suggests we adopt from Antiquity. In 
doing so, I consider some of the problems with this general idea, particularly in terms 
of their coherence with Foucault’s descriptions of disciplinary power. Further to this, I 
turn briefly to a particular critical perspective on Foucault’s thought from feminist 
philosophers, in order to assess the vulnerability of such practices to prevailing 
mechanisms of normalisation.  
Returning to Antiquity: possibilities for a modern ethic 
Foucault returns to Antiquity in order to adopt and adapt certain ethical ideas in 
response to the problem of how to give depth and meaning to a modern ethic of the 
self. It is a ‘return’ to Antiquity because ancient ethics provides a possible mode of 
response to a modern problem that nonetheless has its origins in Antiquity. In 
Foucault’s words: “To try to rethink the Greeks today consists not in valorizing Greek 
morality as the domain of morality par excellence which one would need for self-
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reflection, but in seeing to it that European thought can get started again on Greek 
thought as an experience given once and in regard to which one can be totally free.”451 
Although Foucault turns back to ancient ethics in response to the problems of modern 
ethics and politics, it nonetheless signals a movement toward something new: a new 
politics of ourselves, in which the foundation of political engagement lies in the 
relationship with oneself.  
For Foucault, the problem of developing a modern ethic of the self arises 
initially in response to the recognition that past ways of understanding ourselves and 
subsequent modes of being are not necessary. From the archaeo-genealogical 
revelation of conceptions of the self as correlative to historical technologies emerges 
the ethical and political imperative to overcome or change those technologies. It is not 
enough to recognise these conceptions as a form of limitation on what we might 
otherwise be, or how we might otherwise understand ourselves. This recognition is 
only the first step in establishing practices that will allow new forms of subjectivity to 
become possible. As Foucault suggests, “Maybe the problem is to change those 
technologies. And in this case, one of the main political problems would be nowadays, 
in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves.”452 It is thus clear that for 
Foucault founding an ethic of the self is a political project. A modern ethic of the self, 
Foucault argues, is necessary and ‘politically indispensable’: 
And in this series of undertakings to reconstitute an ethic of the self, 
in this series of more or less blocked and ossified efforts, and in the 
movement we now make to refer ourselves constantly to this ethic of 
the self without ever giving it any content, I think we may have to 
suspect that we find it impossible today to constitute an ethic of the 
self, even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and politically 
indispensable task, if it is true after all that there is no first or final 
point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one 
has to oneself.453 
As McGushin points out, the formation of an ethic of the self is an urgent political task 
because existing cultures of the self are already imbued with relations and techniques 
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of power.454 Foucault is responding in part to the failure of previous attempts at 
defining an ethic of the self to sufficiently address themselves to power. That is, 
attempts like those represented by Heidegger’s notion of ‘authenticity’ and 
Nietzsche’s aestheticism are insufficiently concerned with the production of the 
subject. As I detail further below, this is partly because practices of the self conceived 
in aesthetic terms are considered devoid of political significance. In Foucault’s view, 
modern attempts to found a culture or ethic of the self have failed on several levels: 
not only in their lack of political context, but in the lack of meaning and content 
provided to discourses about the self. The idea of a culture of the self, moreover, has 
become undermined by perceptions of egoism and narcissism. Foucault points to such 
phrases as ‘being oneself’ and ‘freeing oneself’ as examples of ethical ideals lacking 
any real meaning.455 Although the ‘relationship to oneself’ may be the ‘point of 
resistance’ to power, it remains to be constituted as an ethic.  
Coinciding with the problem of an empty culture of the self, for Foucault, is the 
absence of a meaningful ethical foundation left by both waning interest in religion and 
resistance to state and legal intervention in private life. Foucault thus draws a parallel 
between his contemporary situation and ancient Greek ethics, which he characterizes 
as concerned more with constituting ethics as an aesthetics of existence than as 
involved with religious problems or with social and legal systems.456 Foucault notes, 
for example, that the intensification of individual sexual ethics in the first and second 
centuries responded to the waning influence of social and political frameworks in 
which individuals lived.457 Foucault questions: 
Well, I wonder if our problem nowadays is not, in a way, similar to 
this one, since most of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in 
religion, nor do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, 
personal, private life. Recent liberation movements suffer from the 
fact that they cannot find any principle on which to base the 
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elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find 
any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific 
knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, 
and so on.458 
Obviously Foucault rejects scientific and psychoanalytic discourses about the self as 
bases for ethics, partly because an ethics based on science risks becoming a mode of 
normalization. As Jon Simons observes, the modern mode of subjection founded on a 
science-based ethics “conflates moral standards with scientific norms, so that our 
ethics are defined by scientific truth.”459 If science involves a particular interplay of 
power-knowledge, such an ethics would perpetuate this arrangement, folding it into 
the very formation of subjects. But Foucault also thinks that we need to move away 
from – and are already moving away from – the conception that ‘morality’ or ‘ethics’ 
ultimately involves obedience to a set of rules.460 Thus Foucault returns to Antiquity in 
the search for a renewed ethic of the self, and more importantly, for a different 
‘model’ of what a contemporary ethic might be. That is, for an ethic centred on 
individual ethical development, sensitive to the situational and inter-relational nature 
of subject-formation. Foucault thus considers his own analyses as groundwork, or 
perhaps preparatory work, re-presenting ancient techniques and practices of the self to 
a modern audience. 
But, as already suggested above, Foucault’s analyses of the theme of care of the 
self in Antiquity, supported by an account of rapport à soi, do not constitute an 
‘answer’ to a modern problem.461 Despite his rejection of the characterization of his 
own work as looking for an ‘answer,’ Foucault obviously thought that ancient 
philosophy has something meaningful and useful to offer modernity. Foucault’s friend 
Paul Veyne observes that “Foucault’s affinity with ancient morality is reduced to the 
modern reappearance of a single card in a completely new hand: the card of the self 
working on the self, an aestheticization of the subject, in two very different moralities 
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and two very different societies.”462 Deleuze also makes the point that the return to 
Antiquity constitutes a search for a solution to a modern problem. It is not the case 
that Foucault returned to the Greeks because the interiority of the fold disappeared 
under the ‘unfolding’ effects of power and knowledge.463 That is, it is not because 
modern technologies of power preclude a relationship with oneself.  Deleuze goes on: 
What must be stated, then, is that subjectivation, the relation to 
oneself, continues to create itself, but by transforming itself and 
changing its nature to the point where the Greek mode is a distant 
memory. Recuperated by power-relations and relations of knowledge, 
the relation to oneself is continually reborn, elsewhere and 
otherwise.464 
Foucault looks to Antiquity for a model of how we might go about establishing new 
relationships with ourselves. He proposes certain ideas about how individuals might 
elaborate their own ethics – founded on the concepts of rapport à soi and care of the 
self – but only insofar as he offers his own observations and ideas upon which 
individuals might choose to model their own ethics. Paul Veyne suggests that it is 
Foucault’s description of an aesthetics of the self that would have the most resonance 
with modern individuals: “the self, taking itself as a work to be accomplished, could 
sustain an ethics that is no longer supported by either tradition or reason; as an artist of 
itself, the self would enjoy that autonomy that modernity can no longer do without.”465 
But aesthetics, like ancient ethics more generally, is not a ready-formulated model: it 
requires reflection and adaptation. 
What would it mean to adopt, reflect upon and then adapt ancient ideas of ethics 
for the present age? Foucault begins with a contemporary question: “I set out from a 
problem expressed in the terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. 
Genealogy means that I begin my analysis from a question posed in the present.”466 
For Foucault this concerns how we are to behave and how we are to live, given not 
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463 See Deleuze, Foucault, 103. He goes on: “There will always be a relation to oneself which 
resist codes and power; the relation to oneself is even one of the origins of these points of 
resistance.” 
464 Ibid., 104. 
465 Veyne, “The Final Foucault and His Ethics,” 7. 
  161 
only the contemporary waning of moral codes and prohibitions, but in response to the 
political imperative of resistance in the relation to oneself: “the problem of an ethics as 
a form to be given to one’s behaviour and life has arisen once more.”467  
For Foucault it is a matter of identifying both the similarities and the differences 
between ancient and modern morality. His approach to ancient texts is “to examine 
both the difference that keeps us at a remove from a way of thinking in which we 
recognize the origin of our own, and the proximity that remains in spite of that 
distance which we never cease to explore.”468 In response to a question about the 
differences between modern and ancient practices of the self, Foucault responds:  
From a strictly philosophical point of view, the morality of Greek 
Antiquity and contemporary morality have nothing in common. On 
the other hand, if you take them for what they prescribe, intimate and 
advise, they are extraordinarily close. It’s the proximity and the 
difference that we must bring to light and, through their interplay, we 
must show how the same advice given by the ancient morality can 
work differently in the style of contemporary morality.469 
Perhaps this is the task for Foucault’s readers: to take the reformulations that Foucault 
offers us and think through how they might apply to our own life. There are studies 
that have begun this task, applying Foucault’s analyses of ancient ethics in the fields 
of sport studies and feminist philosophy, to name a few.470   
Even Pierre Hadot, who ultimately criticizes Foucault’s representation of the 
function of ancient spiritual exercises, acknowledges the possibility of adopting 
certain practices for use in modernity.471 He suggests that it is possible to abstract 
certain ideas or themes from their historical context: 
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Personally, I believe firmly – albeit perhaps naively – that it is 
possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos) – most of the 
ancients did not hold this to be possible – but as a practitioner of the 
ever-fragile exercise of wisdom…I think modern man can practice the 
spiritual exercises of Antiquity, at the same time separating them from 
the philosophical or mythic discourse which came along with them.472 
As already suggested, Foucault not only investigates ancient ideas about ethics and the 
care of the self, but adopts these ideas as themes for his own philosophical work. He 
attempts to abstract these ideas or principles from their specific historical and 
philosophical context in order to use them as a foundation from which to extrapolate a 
‘new’ ethics. Hadot acknowledges this point: “His description of the practices of the 
self – like, moreover, my description of spiritual exercises – is not merely an historical 
study, but rather a tacit attempt to offer contemporary mankind a model for life, which 
Foucault calls an ‘aesthetics of existence.’”473 
Foucault’s ethics – taking this in its broad sense, including the genealogy of 
subjects, investigations into techniques of the self, rapport à soi and the care of the 
self – is not prescriptive.474 Foucault was not a moralizer. Paul Veyne notes that 
Foucault never sought to justify his own opinions or impose them upon others, 
emphasizing that his stances – and the actions that flowed from these – were personal 
choices.475 Rather, Foucault’s investigations into ethics constitute a possible 
groundwork for individual ethical development in the face of the modern rejection of 
traditional (Western) moral foundations. It is a form of stepping-stone: “People have 
to build their own ethics, taking as a point of departure the historical analysis, 
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sociological analysis, and so on that one can provide for them. […] All this 
prescriptive network has to be elaborated and transformed by people themselves.”476 
Foucault thought that individuals are ultimately responsible for their own ethical self-
formation. His philosophical investigations simply provide both a theoretical and 
practical framework to guide individuals in their respective relations to self.  
Foucault’s work moreover can itself be considered as a form of philosophical 
‘manual’ for ethical elaboration; a guide to constituting a relation with oneself, given 
the aim or desire for a particular way of life or way of being. We might look to 
Foucault’s description of the ancient texts that formed the objects of his analysis for 
the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality:  
‘practical’ texts, which are themselves objects of a ‘practice’ in that 
they were designed to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested out, 
and they were intended to constitute the eventual framework of 
everyday conduct. These texts thus served as functional devices that 
would enable individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over 
and give shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects; in 
short, their function was ‘etho-poetic,’ to transpose a word found in 
Plutarch.477 
Indeed, Edward F. McGushin suggests that we “read Foucault’s work as a sort of 
manual to the art of living philosophically.”478 Rather than a prescriptive, rule-bound 
approach to ethics, this manual would be more in the order of the hupomnemata.479 
McGushin points out that in taking philosophical texts – both ancient texts and 
Foucault’s own offerings – in this way, the act of reading and reflecting becomes a 
practice of the self: an activity of rapport à soi. Foucault’s insight in turning to ancient 
texts as a starting point for founding a new ethics is that “philosophical texts 
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themselves can be appropriated as techniques, practical manuals, models, theories of 
care of the self—the activity of reading and thinking about these as such is already a 
practice of care, a conversion of regard toward oneself.”480 Moreover, Foucault offered 
his own experience of the transformational potential of philosophical work or exercise 
as part of this model.481 
But there are questions as to the viability of this approach. The first question is 
about the extent to which an ethic adopted from Antiquity can really be relevant and 
practical for modern audiences. Paul Rabinow observes for example that “Ancient 
Greek society was characterized by essential inequalities and nonreciprocities that 
moderns can only find intolerable.”482 This is precisely one of the criticisms levelled at 
Foucault in terms of his interest in the idea of self-mastery.483 But as Rabinow goes on 
to suggest, “what [Foucault] identifies in the ancient world is a problematic, a way of 
thinking about ethical issues, and a form of practice—askesis—integrally linked to 
that thought.”484 Foucault himself states that “The whole Greek experience can be 
taken up again in nearly the same way by taking into account each time the differences 
of context and by indicating the part of this experience that one can perhaps save and 
the part that one can on the contrary abandon.”485 But which experiences should we 
save, and which ones should we abandon? Who decides what should and should not 
be saved? There is an element of inconsistency in Foucault’s idea that individuals 
should be responsible for their own ethical development (and that the foundation of 
this development lies in the model of an ancient ethic of the self) and the assumption 
that most people will rely upon intellectuals and philosophers to conduct the necessary 
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groundwork that makes development possible. This would seem to undermine the 
possibility of breaking free of given frameworks of understanding and interpretation. I 
return to this problem below. 
For Foucault at least it is the problem of the practice of liberty that forms the 
core of our shared experience with Antiquity. According to Foucault’s analysis, the 
Greeks founded the practice of their liberty in the relationship with the self, grounded 
by the imperative of care for the self. His search for a renewed ethic of the self is 
similarly guided; he looks to Antiquity for a mode of behaviour – an ethos – and a 
mode of being; a way of practicing freedom. In the context of his broader project, the 
practice of liberty bears a political imperative because liberty is irrecoverably bound 
with power. It is politically significant for two reasons. First, that from a relation of 
freedom, relations of power can emerge. He states: “Liberation opens up new 
relationships of power, which have to be controlled by practices of liberty.”486 By 
positing ‘liberty’ as a source of emergence of relations of power, he is able to suggest 
that activities which change the form of this liberty have flow-on effects for the form 
of relations that arise from it. This leads to the second point, which is that practices of 
liberty minimise domination. Foucault states explicitly in one of his final interviews 
that it is the ethic and practice of the self that minimizes domination in relations of 
power.487  
In this way, Foucault links liberty with the ethic of the self. Indeed, he states 
that “Liberty is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberate form 
assumed by liberty.”488 It seems that the field of possibilities delimited by a given 
relation is the condition of an ethic of the self. What does Foucault mean by 
‘ontological condition’? He means, on the one hand, that as freedom is a condition of 
relations of power, and it is relations that are constitutive of rapport à soi, without 
liberty the reflexive relation to oneself could not arise. On the other hand he means 
that without liberty as such, there is no question of ethics; without a conception of 
liberty as the opportunity to act in a variety of ways, there is no question of an ethics 
that grounds action and makes it meaningful. As noted in Chapter Two, Foucault’s 
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idea of liberty is distinctly different than usually conceived under liberalism, even if 
it can be defined nominally as a ‘field of possibilities.’489 
As a consequence it may seem that the justification of political authority and 
law – and of the exercise of power more generally – required by the various liberal 
views of freedom loses its political and moral imperative. Indeed, the apparent loss of 
a meaningful foundation on which to require such a justification of ‘power’ is a point 
upon which Foucault has been roundly criticised, as I outlined in Chapter One. Yet the 
fact that Foucault rejects these traditional ways of thinking about liberty does not itself 
entail the consequence that such questions as the basis of the justification of power 
become meaningless. Indeed, his location in Antiquity of the common problem of the 
practice of liberty indicates the alternative direction of Foucault’s thought about this 
problem. For Foucault, the problem of power is bound precisely within the practice of 
liberty.  
Foucault posits the practice of liberty as directly concerned with morality and 
the ethic of the self. He questions, “what is morality, if not the practice of liberty, the 
deliberate practice of liberty?”490 But what does Foucault mean by the practice of 
liberty? He means both how one constitutes oneself as an ethical subject through 
rapport à soi and how one constitutes oneself in relation to others.491 It implies a 
manner of bearing toward others. ‘Practice’ also implies the activities or exercises that 
an individual carries out as part of their rapport à soi and as part of the management 
of this liberty. In this way it also evokes the aesthetic aspect of Foucault’s ethic of the 
self; that is, aesthetic self-stylisation as a practice of freedom. (I examine the political 
implications of this idea in detail below.) To further explicate the meaning of the 
practice of liberty, let us turn to Foucault’s analysis of the problem as he sees it in 
Antiquity. 
He considers the practice of liberty to be the central problem of ancient ethics, 
to which the precept of care for the self responds. Foucault states:  
[I]n order to behave properly, in order to practice freedom properly, it 
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was necessary to care for self, both in order to know one’s self […] 
and to improve one’s self, to surpass one’s self, to master the appetites 
that risk engulfing you. Individual liberty was very important to the 
Greeks […] not to be a slave (of another city, of those who surround 
you, of those who govern you, of one’s own passions) was an 
absolutely fundamental theme: the concern for liberty was a basic and 
constant problem.492 
From this passage we can identify two aspects to the relationship between care of the 
self and liberty as a problem. On the one hand, liberty is a problem because one needs 
to ‘behave properly’; that is, given a field of possibilities, one needs to be able to act 
appropriately. Foucault thus positions the ‘knowledge,’ ‘improvement,’ ‘surpassing,’ 
and ‘mastery’ of one’s self as the preconditions of proper behaviour. The care for 
one’s self, then, is required in order to meet these preconditions. On the other hand, 
liberty is a problem because it requires maintenance; one does not want to become a 
‘slave’ and so lose one’s liberty. The care for the self, then, is also required in order to 
prevent enslavement. Care for the self is thus required to both manage and protect 
one’s liberty.  
However, while the ancient problem of the practice of liberty certainly resonates 
with Foucault, the extent to which Foucault adopts it for modernity needs to be 
evaluated within the context of his broader work. The problem with this idea of the 
practice of liberty so described is that it appears to place Foucault closer to traditional 
liberal ideas of autonomy. It appears as a state or possession of the individual, which 
can be lost or damaged, and needs to be protected not only against others but against 
one’s own desires and will.  
Of greater significance, I suggest, is the sense in which an individual’s liberty 
gives rise to the problem of behaviour in relation to others. On the one hand, one’s 
behaviour is a problem because how one comports oneself reflects one’s ethics or care 
for self: “Ethos was the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject’s mode 
of being and a certain manner of acting visible to others.”493 Behaviour or 
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comportment is the “concrete expression of liberty.”494 Thus an individual’s 
comportment signifies to others the kind of relationship they have to themselves that 
enables them to practice or express their liberty in this way. According to Foucault, 
“One’s ethos was seen by his dress, by his bearing, by his gait, by the poise with 
which he reacts to events, etc. […] The man who has a good ethos, who can be 
admitted and held up as an example, he is a person who practices freedom in a certain 
manner.”495 On the other hand, the problematisation of behaviour in relation to others 
recognises that an individual’s practice of liberty affects others. Foucault suggests 
that, “in the case of the free man, I think that the assumption of all this morality was 
that the one who cared for himself correctly found himself, by that very fact, in a 
measure to behave correctly in relationship to others and for others.”496 That is, the 
way that one exercise or practices one’s liberty (through care for self) is 
simultaneously a manner of bearing toward others. Thus Foucault formulates the care 
of the self as an imperative and precept that arises from the fact of individual liberty: 
“I am not saying that ethics is the care for self, but that in Antiquity, ethics, as a 
deliberate practice of liberty has turned about this basic imperative: ‘Care for 
yourself.’”497 This goes some way in explaining the role that Foucault envisages for 
the theme of care for oneself in the modern world.  
In linking liberty as the political domain of action delimited by relations 
between subjects with relations of power, Foucault thus posits the ‘practice’ of liberty 
as a key idea in the relationship between power, ethics, and politics. The practice of 
liberty refers to the manifestation of this relationally-defined field, which is politically 
important because it affects the very relation from which it arises. As such, the relation 
of politics to ethics becomes clearer: the ethos founded on rapport à soi is the primary 
point of reference for political participation and activity. I return to this point below.  
Transformative work: the personal ethics and public role of the intellectual 
Foucault is open and explicit about what he thinks the role of the public intellectual 
should be, and thinks that this role is intimately tied to intellectual’s own mode of 
being. At the heart of this role, I argue, is the imperative to confront authority on its 
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relation to truth. The condition of this confrontation lies, like the possibility of self-
transformation opened up through intellectual endeavour, in the detachment from 
oneself enabled by thought and the critical attitude. This characterisation of the 
personal ethics and public role of the intellectual provides an insight into how 
Foucault thought that he should practice his own liberty. He saw his intellectual 
endeavours as presenting an opportunity for self-development and transformation (and 
in the extreme self-effacement) and his public role as bearing a certain responsibility 
in relation to power and politics. These present an example of Foucault’s practice of 
the very ethics he proposed.  
Foucault sees philosophy as grounded within exercise and activity. Recalling 
his characterisation of thought, we can see how philosophical activity is founded in the 
movement of thought: in the detachment from oneself that enables the possibility of 
thinking differently. As such, philosophy should be less concerned with establishing 
first principles or absolutes from which we might establish systems of knowledge or 
extrapolate a morality than with the cultivation of that which opens up the possibility 
of thinking ‘otherwise than one thinks.’ Foucault asks: “what is philosophy today—
philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear 
on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know how and to what 
extent it may be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already 
known?”498 Philosophical activity is precisely the critical work of calling into question 
what is ‘known’ and the conditions that appear to give rise to this knowledge. This is 
precisely the underlying work of Foucault’s archaeo-genealogy. 
But the importance and implications of this way of conceiving philosophical 
activity are not limited to the academic sphere. Foucault places its ethical significance 
in its effects on the mode of being of the philosopher. The practice of philosophy in 
Foucault’s view constitutes an exercise of self: an activity one undertakes through 
which one’s rapport à soi and mode of being are altered. Philosophical activity is an 
exercise of oneself in the activity of thought through which one can transform oneself. 
Foucault thus describes philosophical activity as an ‘essay’ or ‘test’: 
The ‘essay’—which should be understood as the assay or test by 
which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the 
simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication—
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is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that 
philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e. an ‘ascesis,’ askēsis, 
an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought.499 
This passage also points to the broader way in which Foucault thinks about ‘exercise’; 
his use of ‘assay’ and ‘essay’ captures elements of the practices and techniques of the 
self that Foucault found in Antiquity, such as examination and analysis, the effort or 
attempt to accomplish something, and to trial or test. 
Indeed, philosophical activity as a form of ascesis is illustrated perfectly in 
Foucault’s own philosophical and intellectual life. He casts his own work not in 
academic terms, but in aesthetic ones: “You see, I hate to say it, but it’s true that I am 
not really a good academic. For me, intellectual work is related to what you could call 
‘aestheticism,’ meaning transforming yourself. […] I am not interested in the 
academic status of what I am doing because my problem is my own 
transformation.”500 In this way, the activities underlying Foucault’s investigations – 
such as reading, discussion, writing, and reflection – can be characterised as 
techniques of the self, similar to the ancient exercises of self that are a central focus of 
his late work. Foucault thus posits self-transformation as an imperative bound within 
the very purpose of academic enquiry: “This transformation of one’s self by one’s 
own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why 
should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting?”501 Yet the 
transformative aspects of this ‘work’ are not limited to the purely aesthetic. He 
emphasises elsewhere that this work is guided by a ‘concern for truth.’ Rather, it is 
more a thoughtful and considered cultivation of rapport à soi. Foucault states: “I 
would like it [intellectual work] to be an elaboration of self by self, a studious 
transformation, a slow, arduous process of change, guided by a constant concern for 
truth.”502 As such, this elaboration should be read within the broader context of the 
imperative that each individual should have to maintain a critical relation to self. 
Recalling the philosophical legacy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty Foucault describes the 
essential, philosophical task: 
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Never consent to be completely comfortable with your own 
certainties. Never let them sleep, but never believe either that a new 
fact will be enough to reverse them. Never imagine that one can 
change them like arbitrary axioms. Remember that, in order to give 
them an indispensable mobility, one must see far, but also close-up 
and right around oneself.503  
Evoking the characterisation of thought noted in Chapter Two, he further poses 
intellectual work as a mode of ‘overcoming’ the self, in the sense of a distance or 
detachment from oneself: it is to “make oneself permanently capable of detaching 
oneself from oneself.”504 As we have seen, it is the capacity to call into question one’s 
own beliefs, attitudes and behaviour that enables the right and the capacity to adopt 
the critical attitude. What these passages further emphasise is that the cultivation of a 
‘discomfort’ with regard to one’s certainties, in conjunction with the aesthetic work of 
self-stylisation, are both conditions of maintaining a critical relation to oneself. These 
are therefore conditions of establishing a critical attitude toward modes of power and 
arts of government.  
Yet the implications of philosophical activity are not limited to their effects on 
the philosopher’s mode of being. This capacity for detachment – both from oneself 
and from one’s thought – is also posited as the condition for the philosopher and 
intellectual’s public role. “This work of altering one’s own thought and that of others,” 
Foucault states, “seems to me to be the intellectual’s raison d’être.”505 In this way, he 
is placing on intellectuals the responsibility to assist other people in detaching 
themselves from their thought, in order to then challenge their own assumptions, 
prejudices and dependencies. It is the philosopher’s self-detachment – manifested in 
the challenge and alteration of their own thought – that enables the challenge of the 
thought of others. The performance of the public role of the intellectual is conditioned 
upon the detachment brought about by thought as aesthetic practice. Foucault’s views 
on his own and his contemporaries’ roles reflects his characterisation of the role of the 
philosopher in regard to politics in Antiquity. For Foucault intellectual work functions 
as a form of Socratic challenge to seemingly given facts, ways of thinking, and modes 
of reasoning. In this way, the capacity to detach oneself from one’s thought is the 
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condition for the ability – and, given Foucault’s claim that Socrates must have a 
certain self-relation in order to qualify him as a basanos (that is, a touchstone for 
measuring the ‘truth’ of individuals’ self-relations), the authority – to conduct this 
challenge.506 
Returning to the more overtly political aspects of this discussion, we should 
here recall that the political enterprise of the critical attitude is precisely to question 
authority on its relation to truth, whereby one poses the possibility of disrupting 
established orders of knowledge, epistemological frameworks, and their corollary 
structures of power. Foucault is therefore positioning the philosopher and intellectual 
as adopting a critical attitude in regard to formal structures and institutions of power. 
But there are questions as to the meaning and efficacy of this conceptualisation in real 
political terms. This is even more so the case considering Foucault’s view of the 
responsibility of intellectuals to represent and act on behalf of others, as I noted above. 
Taken within Foucault’s broader project, moreover, the political stakes of this critical 
attitude are founded in its ability to resist forms of subjection and government, and 
thereby to open up new forms of subjectivity. Foucault insists that: 
[T]he task of philosophy as a critical analysis of our world is 
something which is more and more important. Maybe the most certain 
of all philosophical problems is the problem of the present time, and 
of what we are, in this very moment. Maybe the target nowadays is 
not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. […] We have 
to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind 
of individuality which has been imposed upon us for several 
centuries.507 
Here Foucault appears to equivocate on what exactly the aims and political stakes of 
his own work (and the role of the philosopher or intellectual more generally) are. On 
one hand, he wants to promote new forms of subjectivity, which imply a definitive, 
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positive idea of a future political agenda, yet on the other hand thinks that this 
promotion is founded in the ‘refusal’ of given forms. While this in itself may not be 
particularly problematic, read in conjunction with the idea of the critical attitude, it is 
liable to lead to the conclusion that Foucault’s politics is overly dominated by a mere 
refusal of the status quo. Indeed, this is one of the points for which Foucault is 
criticised: he seems too often to criticise a given theory or state of affairs without 
offering a viable alternative for how things should be. As I have already noted, the 
critical attitude is founded in the refusal to be governed like that. Yet in the passage 
noted above as elsewhere Foucault wants to promote new forms of subjectivity, to 
promote possibilities for being other than one is. The question, then, is to what extent 
do Foucault’s views on the role of the philosopher and intellectual, and on the 
relationship between philosophy and politics more generally, support this latter 
political objective?  
His view of the relationship between philosophy and politics aligns more 
closely with the idea of refusal. Foucault states: 
[T]he relations between philosophy and politics are not to be sought in 
the possible ability of philosophy to tell the truth about the best way 
to exercise power. After all, it is for politics itself to know and define 
the best ways of exercising power. It is not for philosophy to tell the 
truth about this […] It is not for philosophy to tell power what to do, 
but it has to exist as truth-telling in a certain relation to political 
action; nothing more, nothing less.508 
From this passage it is clear that Foucault does not think that the role of the 
philosopher is to advise on how governments should exercise their power. While this 
is in keeping with his tendency to avoid committing to particular political ideologies 
in his published works and interviews, it is less consistent with his personal political 
activism.509 In any case, what this demonstrates is that Foucault does not see his role 
as a public intellectual to tell those in power what they should or should not do, or 
more importantly, what qualifies as a legitimate exercise of power. Rather, what is 
made clear in this passage is how closely Foucault aligns the intellectual role with the 
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idea of the critical attitude. It is precisely to speak truth to power. This is to call to 
account the implicit assumptions, implications and consequences of political actions. 
It is to speak the truth about political actions from without the discursive framework in 
which they are carried out and legitimised. It is to call into question the discourses 
surrounding and legitimising political actions. It is finally to question the validity of a 
given discourse and the actions it purports to legitimise. Foucault’s approach is to 
describe how things are – whether it is about the operation of disciplinary power, the 
state of hospitals and prisons – to speak the truth in relation to political action. 
Philosophy, Foucault notes, “does not tell the truth of political action, it does not tell 
the truth for political action, it tells the truth in relation to political action, in relation to 
the practice of politics, in relation to the political personage. And this is what I call a 
recurrent, permanent, and fundamental feature of the relationship of philosophy to 
politics.”510  
Yet there are times when Foucault appears to promote a more active form of 
engagement. It is not that the nature of the engagement is different – he still 
characterises it principally in terms of critique – but the objectives of this engagement 
are different. In this case it appears that the intellectual’s public responsibility lies in 
disrupting congealed arrangements of power in order to give rise to the potential for 
political and institutional change. It is through the alteration of thought that such 
change – what Foucault calls ‘deep transformation’ – is achieved. Foucault observes 
that, “the work of deep transformation can only be carried out in a free atmosphere, 
one constantly agitated by a permanent criticism.”511 This is where the work of the 
intellectual comes to the fore: to agitate through critique.512 Socrates, by contrast, 
criticises and challenges Athenians in their assumptions and modes of discourse, yet 
ultimately demonstrates respect for the laws of Athens in submitting to the 
Assembly’s verdict. (Foucault notes that in the Crito Socrates posits the city’s laws as 
the agent of care [epimeleia] for its citizens, whereby he refuses to undermine them by 
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escaping.513) Foucault, however, explicitly seeks to challenge institutional 
arrangements of power, primarily by calling into question the foundations upon which 
their claims to legitimacy and authority rest. Thus Foucault asserts: “A critique is not a 
matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on 
what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes 
of thought the practices that we accept rest.”514 To critique in this sense is to point out 
the modes of thought underlying people’s behaviour and actions: to call to account the 
unacknowledged assumptions, prejudices, and the implicit values and beliefs in modes 
of discourse and ways of thinking that are given (and accepted) as authoritative, 
objective, or true. While criticism might then be thought of as preparatory work, this 
does not do justice to its imperative power. Critique forces transformation: “as soon as 
one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes 
both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible.”515 Out of criticism arises not only 
the imperative to think differently, but to do things differently.  
Thus for Foucault critique founded on thought is indispensable to real political, 
governmental and institutional change. The possibility of reform turns upon the 
movement from critique to transformation. But what is reform? For Foucault it is the 
expression of a new arrangement of power relations.516 It is the result of political-
governmental transformation. In this realm criticism disrupts the modes of thought and 
political discourses that support a particular arrangement of power, its associated 
organizations, and established ways of doing things. Foucault emphasizes that, “If at 
the base there has not been the work of thought upon itself and if, in fact, modes of 
thought, that is to say modes of action, have not been altered, whatever the project for 
reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behaviour and 
institutions that will always be the same.”517 This point deserves reiteration: political 
and institutional change that does not have at its base the challenge and alteration of 
thinking cannot give rise to real reform. As Foucault argues, “A transformation that 
remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of 
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adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a 
superficial transformation.”518 
In this way, Foucault ties the critical function of the work of the intellectual to 
the possibility of government founded in a critical approach. As such, Foucault 
proposes a different model for the relationship between governments (or the governor) 
and the governed. What is significant is that the work of thought in itself is not 
enough; that is, governments cannot rely upon their own capacity for critical thought; 
this work must be carried out in conjunction with intellectuals.519 In one interview, 
following the election of Socialist President François Mitterrand in 1981, he poses the 
possibility of ‘working with’ government as an alternative to the conventional model 
of obedience. It is an interesting idea because Foucault poses the possibility of 
intellectuals working with governments to improve their capacity for reflective and 
critical thinking, yet considers this as neither compromising intellectuals’ capacity to 
criticize or challenge that government, nor their capacity for resistance. “To work with 
a government,” Foucault suggests, “implies neither subjection nor total acceptance. 
One may work with it and yet be restive.”520 
Contrary to claims that Foucault lacks political pragmatism, this presents 
instead a viable model for the relationship between intellectuals and government. It is 
a model that combines the philosopher’s recalcitrance in pointing out the assumptions 
and limitations of other people’s thoughts, attitudes and beliefs, while committing to 
the transformation of those thoughts, attitudes and beliefs. It is not merely a matter of 
transgressing the limits imposed by given discourses and epistemic frames, nor of 
merely tearing down the governing frameworks and institutions of one’s life. Indeed, 
as I have begun to suggest, and as I argue further below, the way that Foucault’s 
formulates political activity (particularly in aesthetic terms) relies on the continuing 
existence of at least parts of those frameworks and institutions in order to make those 
activities meaningful. It is to strike a balance between the recognition of the 
contingency of such frameworks and institutions that make transgression possible, yet 
maintaining one’s relation and reference to those frameworks which make one’s 
                                                     
518 Ibid., 155. 
519 See Foucault, “The Concern for Truth,” 266-267. Foucault was making this point in 
reference to the strain in French-Polish relations under Communism following the Second 
World War, but as a general point it is consistent with Foucault’s political and philosophical 
views more generally. 
520 Foucault, “Practicing Criticism,” 154. 
  177 
actions meaningful. As I point out in Chapter Six, this gives rise to a certain critical 
problem: namely, that such a dependence on those frameworks, institutions, norms 
and so forth appears to undermine the critical capacity of such activities. It is 
sufficient to note here, however, that the aesthetic terms within which Foucault 
describes and conceives his own intellectual work, and public responsibility, are not 
averse to a certain political pragmatism. Indeed, Foucault clearly has a strong sense of 
the responsibility that intellectuals bear toward the societies in which they live. Before 
turning to the problems with the critical attitude, I examine first the political 
implications of Foucault’s emphasis on aesthetic practices.  
Ethics and aesthetics 
In Chapter Four I argued that Foucault turns to ancient ethics in order to begin the 
politically indispensable task of constituting an ethic of the self. His subsequent 
recourse to the aesthetic has sparked diverging appraisals of its implications for his 
broader account of ethics and its underlying political objectives. There are two 
significant themes requiring examination. The first issue in this regard is the status that 
others are given within an aesthetic framework: are others relegated to the status of 
inert instruments to be used in my self-stylisation? Or might aesthetics constitute an 
original way of conceiving of my ethical responsiveness to others? The second issue is 
whether – and if so, the extent to which – aesthetics can be thought in terms of 
politics. That is, whether aesthetic practices can constitute political activity, or, at the 
very least, whether they contain the possibility of having effects beyond the apparently 
‘private’ realm in which they are carried out.  
Foucault’s desire to place aesthetics at the heart of his philosophical response to 
the problems of modernity is, of course, inspired by Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, 
Foucault turns to the idea of aesthetic self-formation because it presents the possibility 
of creating the values and principles that fall vacant under the critique of modernity. 
Nietzsche, after sweeping aside both the Kantian legacy of the categorical imperative 
and the idea that right action follows inner moral feeling, avers that “We, however, 
want to become those we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, 
who give themselves laws, who create themselves.”521 The problem, as MacIntyre 
describes it in After Virtue, is “how to construct in an entirely original way, how to 
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invent a new table of what is good and a law, a problem which arises for each 
individual.”522 On first appearance Foucault’s project – to give style and content to a 
contemporary ethic of the self – seems close to that of Nietzsche. But we must not get 
carried away by over-emphasizing the Nietzschean elements in Foucault’s idea of the 
aesthetic: while Foucault does explicitly locate his view as close to Nietzsche (and 
certainly closer to Nietzsche than Sartre), the content of this aesthetics is derived more 
from ancient ethics.523 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche proclaims that “One thing is 
needful.— To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by 
those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them 
into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even 
weaknesses delight the eye.”524 For Nietzsche the project of self-creation and 
stylization is less concerned with the betterment of one’s character than with 
smoothing out the bumps and flaws. 
For Foucault the aim of constituting a ‘beautiful life’ is less concerned with 
artistic self-creation than with the care of the self. This is not to deny Foucault’s use 
of artistic analogies: he does suggest how our ethical self-formation might be likened 
to the process of creating a work of art. For example, Foucault suggests that “One can 
comport oneself towards oneself in the role of technician, of a craftsman, of an artist, 
who from time to time stops working, examines what he is doing, reminds himself of 
the rules of his art, and compares these rules with what he has achieved thus far.”525 In 
this way Foucault takes up the sense in which rapport à soi involves work upon the 
self, which he describes as a form of asceticism: “the self-forming activity (pratique 
de soi) or l’ascétism—asceticism in a very broad sense.”526 Yet the artistic analogy 
should not be taken too far.  
Artistic self-creation is for Foucault only a part of the aesthetics of existence 
that he adopts from Antiquity. Elsewhere he describes ascetic practices as “an exercise 
of self upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform one’s self and to attain a 
certain mode of being.”527 In The Use of Pleasure, furthermore, Foucault describes the 
‘arts of existence’ of ancient Greco-Roman culture as “those intentional and voluntary 
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actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to 
transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their 
life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria.”528 Here aesthetic activity is not the creation of the self, as such, but the 
transformation of the self. As Butler notes, aesthetic self-creation refers to the 
delimiting of those parts of the self that form the object of aesthetic work: not the 
primary creation of the self ex nihilo.529 Keeping in mind the four folds of rapport à 
soi, aesthetic or ascetic work is only one aspect of the relationship with oneself which 
emerges from originary relations with others, not through aesthetic activity. As a work 
of art one’s life does have elements of the aesthetic in the way that Nietzsche 
conceives it, but for Foucault this is not the whole story.   
He does not go as far as Nietzsche: Foucault does not attempt to create a 
completely new ‘table of good.’ For Foucault aesthetic activities take place within the 
context of an individual’s position in society. While they do – and these are the terms 
in which an ethic of the self is politically indispensable – seek to challenge and to 
transform the individual’s relation to structures of power-knowledge, aesthetic 
activities are nevertheless conducted within the discursive and epistemological 
frameworks of a given society. Recalling Butler’s description of the social norms that 
‘precede and exceed’ the subject, it is clear that Foucault’s aestheticization of the 
subject takes place in relation to existing tables of good. Such self-creation, then, is 
always in tension with these already-existing norms; it is the constant ‘agonism,’ to 
use Foucault’s terminology, between the subjectivising effects of such codes and 
norms and the subject’s efforts to constitute herself. 
For many commentators, Foucault’s turn to the aesthetic is a source of 
consternation, cementing his position as only concerned with an ethic of the self 
because it promotes the exercise of power and the maintenance of asymmetrical 
relationships. Under this reading Foucault’s appropriation of an aesthetic model 
subordinates ‘ethics’ to the pursuit of a ‘beautiful life’—where ‘beauty’ is understood 
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in its superficial, sensual sense, which Bennett describes usefully as “the province of 
a reactive, undisciplined sensuality.”530 In this view, she suggests, the possibility of a 
‘cultivated’ aesthetic response is obscured, whereby Foucault’s aesthetics appears as 
an unconditioned self centered concern for one’s own stylization. The practices and 
techniques of the self of which the aestheticization of the subject is a partial result are 
“presented as merely ‘aesthetic’—that is, concerning a pleasing, sensuous, and 
superficial style or appearance—rather than seriously ‘ethical.’”531 From this 
perspective Foucault’s idea of the aesthetic would appear much closer to Nietzsche. 
The aesthetic model becomes the primary framework through which individuals 
encounter and interact with each other. Richard Wolin, for example, observes that:  
[O]nce an aesthetic outlook becomes the sole determinant of life, its 
insensitivity to other values ultimately translates into an insensitivity 
to other persons qua ends in themselves. They are viewed as the 
pliable objects of aesthetic fashioning, raw materials to be integrated 
into a grandiose aesthetic spectacle that is not of their own making.532 
He comments further that Foucault’s ethics “favors either an attitude of narcissistic 
self-absorption or one of outwardly directed, aggressive self-aggrandizement. In 
neither case is there a discernable trace of human solidarity, mutuality, or fellow-
feeling.”533 For Wolin the characterisation of ethics as aesthetic is tantamount to 
egoism, where relations to others are only meaningful insofar as they are instrumental 
in an individual’s aesthetic pursuit. 
Furthermore, the charge goes, Foucault not only relegates the ethical status of 
the other – whose primacy is assumed to be at the heart of any meaningful ethics – to a 
secondary position after the self, but restricts the very availability of such an ethical 
model to those with the (economic, political, cultural and social) means to place this 
pursuit at the centre of their existence. Rainer Rochlitz, for example, argues that the 
aesthetic project presented in Foucault’s ethics “is a project for privileged minorities, 
liberated from all functions in the material reproduction of society, who can use all 
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their strength to perfect the refinement of their lifestyle.”534 Foucault however 
anticipates this criticism when he points out that in the ancient context the care for the 
self was limited to privileged citizens. He observes that the care of the self as an art of 
living in the first and second centuries was limited to “the social groups, very limited 
in number, that were bearers of culture and for whose members a techne tou biou 
could have a meaning and a reality.”535 Nevertheless, this problem cannot be easily put 
aside. If we approach this problem by considering the states or conditions that 
prevented the rest of society from accessing the care of the self, which for Foucault is 
principally that these individuals had no liberty – and therefore their liberty was not 
conceived as a problem which required a response – then we can see that the modern 
context would share similar problems. We may well point to Foucault’s disclaimers 
about his adoption of ancient ideas and suggest that he would have wanted the 
aesthetic ideal to be available to all ‘free subjects.’ But the political reality is that it is 
not, and many people would not meet the criteria by which to be considered ‘free 
subjects’ anyway.  
Part of the problem of Foucault’s use of an aesthetic model is that it leads to 
misunderstandings about the aim of his broader idea of ethics and the means of 
achieving this aim. In the former case, it is assumed that aesthetics takes as its sole 
aim the production and attainment of a ‘beautiful life.’ This is partly founded on the 
idea that aesthetics eclipses all other concerns, and the assumption – which is not well 
founded – that a beautiful life necessarily disadvantages others. But why couldn’t a 
beautiful life include beautiful relationships with others? Why, moreover, must the 
characterisation of an ethic of the self in aesthetic terms necessarily signify a shift 
toward an egoistic ethic of the self that signifies a turning-away from, an indifference 
to, worldly problems? Doesn’t this offer a rather one-dimensional view of what such 
an ethic might be?  
In this analysis I draw upon Jane Bennett’s discussion of the two key 
contributions that aesthetic terms can make in characterizing such an ethic. First, that 
the analogous use of aesthetic terms to characterize techniques of the self emphasizes 
the creative nature of subjectivation and the fabricated nature of subjects; they are 
likened to “things worked and reworked in ways never free from the mark or force of 
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prior embodiments, intentions, or accidents.”536 Aesthetic terms do not only describe 
the ways in which the ethical formation of the subject is analogous to creating a work 
of art, they capture the interplay of these processes with the broader processes of 
subjectivation—the way that existing structures of power-knowledge both affect and 
effect the subject.  
Second, this analogy invites a different way of conceptualizing both the nature 
of ethical response and, further, the very recognition of the ethical scene. Bennett 
describes the latter: “insofar as ‘art’ is thought to call for a special mode of perception, 
that is, an attention to things as sensuous ensembles (scenes, songs, stories, dances), an 
artistic representation of ethics may reveal with special force its structural or network 
character.”537 This is especially useful in approaching the way in which the elements 
of Foucault’s ethics are embedded within the social sphere – like many practices of the 
self – and indeed are even coextensive with other aspects of social interaction. It is 
useful, moreover, in approaching ethics as integrating (or concerned with the 
interaction of) different elements of Foucault’s conception of the social. This is 
particularly the case with the interplay of rapport à soi with social relations, and the 
role of aesthetic practices in response to governmental technologies and political 
power.  
For Bennett, the aesthetic forms a necessary and meaningful part of ethics: what 
she calls the ‘aesthetic sensibility’ is a condition for the possibility of enacting ethical 
ideals.538 This sensibility is “the quality or character of sensuous experience, a 
character that is culturally encoded and temperamentally delimited, but also educable 
(to some degree) through careful techniques of the self.”539 As a disciplined and 
mediated form of sensuousness turned outward, the aesthetic sensibility is concerned 
with the capacity for a certain mode of response: “For as a form of askesis, a 
sensibility establishes the range of possibility in perception, enactment, and 
responsiveness to others.”540 This re-focuses our attention on aesthetic activities as a 
part of Foucault’s idea of ethical and ascetic practices: as techniques of the self. 
Indeed we can think of aesthetic activities as developing the capacity for a certain 
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mode of ethical response to others in much the same way as the care of the self 
enables care for others.  
Contrary to the critical views outlined above, aesthetic practices do not subsume 
others as mere means in the pursuit of the beautiful life. This implies that ethics 
conceived partly in aesthetic terms cannot be complementary; that one person’s 
aesthetic practices will necessarily be antagonistic or harmful to another’s. It suggests, 
moreover, that any participation of others in my aesthetic practices will be as ‘pliable 
objects’: that is, without self-determination in their participation, easily manipulated to 
my will, and necessarily without investment in the outcome of this practice. Others are 
not manipulated or taken advantage of through my aestheticization. There is little in 
Foucault’s descriptions of practices of the self to suggest that the one whose assistance 
is claimed is diminished by and through this claim. Such a reading ignores the deeply 
social and interconnected nature of Foucault’s ideas of ethics and the subject; it also 
ignores the safeguard provided by the structural condition of Foucault’s ‘free subject’: 
that recalcitrance is always possible.  
Furthermore, it is the possibility of antagonism that opens up within aesthetic 
practices both the possibility of reciprocity and a platform for politics. William 
Connolly frames this reciprocal possibility in political terms, suggesting that it 
indicates a relationship of ‘agonistic respect’ between individuals. Connolly defines 
this as “a social relation of respect for the opponent against whom you define yourself 
even while you resist its imperatives and strive to delimit its spaces of hegemony.”541 
While the techniques of the self represent the opportunity for moving beyond imposed 
limitations, and thus towards ‘otherness,’ the self-imposed delimitation from others 
that this represents does not necessarily result in a complete agonism: the challenge 
inherent in the transformation of the self is not necessarily a removal of oneself from 
others. Connolly argues that the antagonism bound up in resistance “can be translated 
into something closer to agonistic respect in some cases, as each party comes to 
appreciate the extent to which its self-definition is bound up with the other and the 
degree to which the comparative projections of both are contestable.”542 Connolly 
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emphasizes that this is merely an invitation to a reciprocal, albeit agonistic, respect 
which may be refused; but at the very least it opens up the potential for reciprocal 
acknowledgement of the contingency of the moral or ethical models to which each 
adhere. In Connolly’s words:  
In this way, space for politics can be opened through a degree of 
reciprocity amid contestation; new possibilities for the negotiation of 
difference are created by identifying traces in the other of the 
sensibility one identifies in oneself and locating in the self elements of 
the sensibility attributed to the other. An element of care is built into 
contestation and of contestation into care.543 
It is precisely because aesthetic activity cannot be carried out in isolation that the 
political dimension becomes apparent.  
For Foucault the creation of values occurs (understood partly as developing an 
ethic of the self) in tension with the values and social norms of the society in which an 
individual lives; part of the aesthetic challenge is to establish a mode of being in 
relation to others and the world. Aesthetic practices are, in this sense, worldly. What is 
significant about this aspect of Foucault’s ethics is the way that aesthetic practices 
ground an individual’s ethical response – both to others and more generally to the 
problem of liberty – in their unique position within the world. Bernauer and Mahon 
describe how this offers a meaningful alternative to other ethical models:  
The notion of stylization does remove ethics from the quest for 
universal standards of behaviour that legislate conformity and 
normalization, reducing men and women to a mode of existence in 
accordance with a least common denominator. It focuses upon the 
dimension of human freedom distinctive of an individual’s place or 
role in life [my italics].544 
But this is not an unproblematic move. Indeed Foucault saw in the ancient notion of an 
aesthetics of existence a tension between an ostensively individual stylization and the 
desire for a form of universality. In identifying three different domains of stylization – 
one’s rapport à soi, one’s conduct, and one’s relations with others – Foucault points 
out that “Antiquity never stopped asking if it were possible to define a style common 
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to these different domains of conduct.”545 He considered the search for a ‘common 
style’ to be a significant problem: “They were stymied right away by what seems to 
me to be the point of contradiction of ancient morality: between on the one hand this 
obstinate search for a certain style of existence and, on the other, the effort to make it 
common to everyone.”546 It is clear then that if Foucault was proposing ‘aesthetics’ as 
a viable model for ethics in modernity, he would not think that it should be ‘common 
to everyone.’547 But this does not end inevitably in the kind of aesthetic egoism that 
critics such as Wolin claim. As demonstrated above, aesthetics enables a genuine 
responsiveness to others; but it also has certain political implications, as I argue 
below.  
Moreover, in characterising ethics as a purely aesthetic task in the Nietzschean 
sense (where the aim of ethics is nothing other than to make one’s life superficially 
beautiful, and where one creates for oneself one’s own table of good) aesthetic activity 
is posited as completely divorced from day-to-day life.548 As such aesthetic practices 
are divorced from social, cultural and political concerns. For Rochlitz, Foucault’s 
move to the aesthetic signals the end of his concern with the operation of and 
resistance to power: “the point is to reflect on a new way of conducting one’s life, on 
the use which one makes of pleasure and on the care which one takes of oneself, in a 
way which is unrelated to any norm or social control, but has the sole purpose of 
leading a beautiful life.”549 It is this view that leads to criticism about the perceived 
lack of political dimension to an ethic of the self conceived partly in aesthetic terms. 
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Aesthetics and politics 
Probably the most significant question when evaluating the purpose and implications 
of the aesthetic to an ethic of power is whether, or to what extent, aesthetic activity is 
concerned with the political. That is, whether the creative task of self-formation has 
effects and implications beyond the apparently ‘private’ sphere in which it is carried 
out. Critics of Foucault’s recourse to the aesthetic tend to presuppose a more or less 
strong distinction between the public and private spheres: aesthetic practices are seen 
as essentially private activities and thus lack any political potential.  
Richard Rorty, who does not find the project of self-creation to be in itself 
problematic, thinks that it is nevertheless ultimately incommensurable with political 
ideals such as human solidarity.550 What is interesting about Rorty’s view is that he 
seems to think that while creative activity is not necessarily limited to the private 
realm (and Rorty does promote a strong distinction between the public and private), it 
certainly ought to be. Indeed Rorty suggests that we “Privatize the Nietschean-
Sartrean-Foucauldian attempt at authenticity and purity, in order to prevent yourself 
from slipping into a political attitude which will lead you to think that there is some 
social goal more important that avoiding cruelty.”551 Alexander Nehamas thus 
summarizes Rorty’s view: “Private projects of self-creation have no direct 
implications (in fact, they have no implications at all, in his view) for public projects 
directed at changing how people live.”552 Rorty’s point is that self-creation should 
remain a private practice precisely because of our interrelation and interdependence 
with others; aesthetic activities fail on political grounds because it is assumed that 
self-creation does not, by definition, have the interests of others – Rorty is particularly 
concerned with the liberal ideal of minimizing cruelty – at its heart. 553 
One of the reasons that Rorty gives for the opposition of aesthetics to politics is 
that private self-creation with the ideal of autonomy cannot be embodied in traditional 
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liberal, public institutions.554 This is partly because the apparently egoistic and 
narcissistic values underpinning aesthetics cannot be reconciled with liberal values. 
But it is also because such individualistic values cannot be universalised in order to 
form institutionally guaranteed rights. He argues, therefore, that “Ironist theorists like 
Hegel, Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault seem to me invaluable in our attempt to form 
a private self-image, but pretty much useless when it comes to politics.”555 Gutting, 
too, thinks that some of the appeal for Foucault in aesthetics is that it renders ethics an 
‘essentially private enterprise.’556 Yet even though he reads aesthetic practices as 
essentially private, Gutting does not think that this precludes the possibility that 
political activity can form part of a beautiful life.557 
Overly influenced by Nietzsche, and ignoring its ancient foundations, such 
views overlook the political possibilities of Foucault’s idea of aesthetic activity.558 But 
this is why Foucault’s idea of aesthetic ethics is so promising: Foucault returns to 
aesthetic activities, and to an ethic of the self more broadly, the political dimensions 
that previous modern attempts including Nietzsche’s lacked. Indeed, while 
Nietzsche’s self-creation is not directly political, this is not because aesthetic activities 
have no bearing upon others: “Nietzsche is perfectly aware that in making something 
out of oneself, even if one tries to do so in the most private of terms, one also changes 
(if one writes books that get to be read) what many others will think and do as well. 
And what others do, which determines what they are, will also determine much else 
besides.”559 The whole of Foucault’s account of rapport à soi as the foundation of an 
                                                     
554 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 65. In Rorty’s words: “The sort of autonomy 
which self-creating ironists like Nietzsche, Derrida, or Foucault seek is not the sort of thing 
that could ever be embodied in social institutions. Autonomy is not something which all human 
beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them. It is 
something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a 
few actually do. The desire to be autonomous is not relevant to the liberal’s desire to avoid 
cruelty and pain – a desire which Foucault shared, even thought he was unwilling to express it 
in those terms.” 
555 Ibid., 83. 
556 Gary Gutting, Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 144. 
557 Ibid., 145. Gutting points to Foucault’s own political activism on behalf of marginalized 
persons and groups. 
558 Bennett, “How is It, Then,” 655. Bennett points out that critiques of Foucault’s 
aestheticization of ethics not only presuppose, without discussion, certain ideas of the aesthetic 
which are then brought to Foucault’s account, but tend to presuppose a certain commitment to 
the value of a code morality over one with an aesthetic element. She writes, “their arguments 
are based on the underargued presumption that if one does not endorse a ‘command’ ethics one 
has no ethics at all. Only a code-centred model can ensure a care for others.” (Ibid., 667.) 
559 Nehamas, “Nietzsche, modernity, aestheticism,” 238. 
  
 
188 
ethic of the self, including its emphasis on aesthetic or ascetic practices, is founded 
on the idea that individuals’ respective modes of being (and the various activities and 
practices that transform these modes) bear upon each other. As Nehamas argues, 
“What we take ourselves to be is essentially connected to how we propose to treat one 
another: The public and the private intermix and philosophy, for better or worse, often 
has political implications.”560 Thus the ways we understand ourselves, form ourselves 
and relate to ourselves forms the basis of our interaction with and treatment of others. 
Their embeddedness within common frameworks of interpretation and existing 
moral structures renders aesthetic self-formation vulnerable to the influence and 
direction of subjectivation (assujettissement). The moral code, not to mention the 
social and formal institutions and laws with reference to which an individual 
constitutes their rapport à soi limit creative activity that would negatively affect 
others.561 We can recall here Bennett’s point that ethics is a matter of reflective 
heteronomy that requires individuals to carve out a space within which their self-
forming activity is carried out. Gutting puts it a slightly different way: “Such an 
aesthetics derives from an individual’s distinctive taste, so that the ethical formation it 
guides allows for an existence that avoids the full force of social power structures by 
finding a location within the interstices of these structures where the individual as 
such can flourish.”562 For Foucault, re-constituting an ethic of the self includes re-
establishing aesthetic activities as ethically and politically important. Gutting frames 
this point in even stronger terms, arguing that Foucault might well conceive the 
project of self-creation and self-perfection as a universal human good.563 Under this 
reading Foucault would not only conceive of political activity as part of making his 
own life beautiful, but that this political activity would itself promote the possibility 
that others might have the same opportunity. In this view, the liberal ideal of 
promoting difference and individual flourishing would be reasonably healthy. In this 
view, aesthetic ethics would be consistent with, or at the very least not averse to, the 
liberal project of loosening institutional grips over marginalized individuals. 
Modern liberalism is certainly not averse to a certain idea of self-creation. There 
is the sentiment in Mill that self-elaboration and self-perfection, as long as it does not 
bear negatively upon others, actually has positive implications for human beings as a 
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whole: that the totality of individuals will itself be improved by the individual 
development and perfection of each.564 Indeed, Mill makes the following point, which 
seems to echo in Foucault (even if he would not admit it): “In proportion to the 
development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and 
is therefore capable of being more valuable to others.”565 This captures one of the 
central ethical and political sentiments of Foucault’s return to Antiquity: one cares for 
oneself in order to properly care for others. 
On one hand, then, there is the idea that aesthetic practices are by definition 
‘private’ activities. As such, they are practiced within the private realm and have little 
or no bearing on the public, political realm. On the other hand is the idea that aesthetic 
practices can have implications for politics. But for scholars such as Rorty, this is 
precisely why aesthetic activities should be confined to the private sphere. Assuming 
an ultimately egoistic account of aesthetics, the latter is viewed as incommensurable 
with ‘common’ human values which are thought to be the purview of the political 
sphere, and which are captured in public institutions. However, an evaluation of the 
implications of Foucault’s idea of aesthetic activities for politics must take greater 
heed of Foucault’s broader ideas about political power. Before turning to this point, 
however, I investigate whether aesthetic activities really do offer meaningful 
alternatives for political action and resistance. 
The critical and political potential of practices of the self 
To enable modern individuals to develop different subjectivities and modes of being is 
the most important philosophical and political objective of Foucault’s work. He 
worked from the premise that to constitute oneself in relation to the prevailing 
discourses and power formations of one’s time is the cornerstone of political activity. 
Rather than seeking to justify this view, Foucault focuses instead on the conditions of 
this self-constitution and on the various forms that it may take. Central to these is the 
idea that self-constitution as a form of resistance involves (although is not limited to) 
taking a ‘critical attitude.’ As I noted in Chapter Two, for Foucault the origins of this 
critical attitude lie in the refusal of the arts of government of the sixteenth century. In 
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our own time the first problem is to refuse the models and definitions of ‘power’ that 
have since permeated philosophical and political thought. This means rejecting too the 
ideas of ‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ to which we have turned in order to call into 
question given exercises and formations of power.  
But in rejecting these ideas, Foucault does not do away with the idea of the 
critical attitude. Indeed, it forms the key to understanding Foucault’s reformulation of 
the idea of ‘resistance.’ If the critical attitude embodies the refusal to be governed like 
that, then resistance is the actualisation of this refusal in activities that counter the 
mechanisms and techniques of a given governmental rationality. The problem is not, 
as I have made clear, one of identifying the universal norms or a priori concepts from 
which a transcendent critique might be made possible. It lies instead in locating the 
foundations from which such a critical stance can be adopted. Thus before examining 
the critical attitude in more detail, more needs to be said about the capacity for the 
aesthetic practices of self-stylisation to found this stance.  
The political force of techniques of the self arises from the fact that self-
constitution often occurs in tension with prevailing mechanisms of subjectivation 
[assujettissement]. Foucault adopts the model of ancient practices – for example, those 
involved in dietetics – with a view to giving content to a modern ethic of the self. Such 
practices are supposed to offer examples of how past and existing modes of 
subjectivity can be challenged and transformed. As such, these practices and 
techniques are only meaningful insofar as they are conceptually consistent with 
Foucault’s broader ideas about ‘power.’ But they must also offer concrete ideas for 
how these ideas can be adopted and re-deployed in modern society. 
Foucault’s analysis of dietetics in The Use of Pleasure has especially resonated 
with modern audiences, and feminist philosophers in particular. This is because it 
provides a unique point of analysis for the operation of disciplining and normalising 
mechanisms of power in modern societies. In addition, these analyses contribute to a 
re-reading of Foucault’s account of docile bodies, as discussed in Chapters One and 
Two. In this way it is especially useful in illustrating how Foucault’s later texts are 
thematically consistent with the work on power.  
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In The Use of Pleasure Foucault characterizes ancient dietetics as one of three 
arts of conducting the self.566 In contrast to our contemporary understanding of 
dieting, which is primarily concerned with diet (alimentation) and weight-loss, ancient 
dietetics encompassed not only alimentary concerns, but other somatic (such as 
physical exercise and sexual activity) and environmental (such as weather) factors. In 
Foucault’s view it “characterized the way in which one managed one’s existence.”567 
As such, it forms an aspect of the stylization of one’s life (bios) and the aesthetics of 
existence.568 Dietetics can therefore be described as one possible mode – 
encompassing a range of activities or practices – of rapport à soi (which in its ancient 
context connotes a broader concern for the body than limited to the regulation of 
alimentation). Dietetics delimits the body as the general ethical material (which is 
divided into more specific focal sites) of concern and denotes a specific reason for that 
concern (for example, the desire to maintain bodily health, to develop muscle, to meet 
ideals of beauty and gender). It encompasses a range of activities that work upon the 
body, bringing it to reflect the principle or ideal underlying that concern and at the 
same time forming a particular kind of subject that refers to both the principle and the 
broader context in which the relation to self is established. 
As I noted in Chapter Four, dietetic practices operate in a similar way to other 
practices of the self, inscribing in the subject certain principles for behaviour which, in 
contrast to a universal rule-based ethics, prepares the subject to face a multitude of 
situations. As we have seen, the value of this idea is that it allows Foucault to 
articulate how the subject’s rapport à soi can act as the primary point of reference for 
ethics. Techniques of the self enable the subjectivation of discourse. The activities of 
the dietetic regimen inscribe the individual with the potential and capacities to face 
other situations.569 Like Foucault’s analysis of ancient hupomnemata and the activities 
of self-writing, dietetic practices effectively ‘embody’ the principles and rules that 
overarch those activities. This brings into question again the idea that such techniques 
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of the self shape the subjective dimension. Here my concern is more with the 
implications of this idea for the political possibilities of Foucault’s ethics. 
That the subjective dimension – or ‘capacity’ – can be shaped by techniques of 
the self presents both political possibilities and theoretical problems. This 
contradiction arises primarily in the idea that the subjective dimension can be 
cultivated and deployed to contradictory ends. On one hand, such practices may 
provide the subject with positive opportunities for self-constitution and control, and 
ultimately be deployed in resisting regimes of power. On the other hand, this 
dimension and the skills these capacities develop may be captured and manipulated by 
mechanisms of power, effectively becoming instruments in the subjection and 
normalisation of individuals. As feminist scholars (in particular) have argued, some 
aesthetic practices – those of dietetic regimen being the prime example – may appear 
to present the potential for developing skills or capacities that can be used to resist 
power, yet contribute to the very disciplining and subjection of individuals.  
As such, Foucault’s analysis of dietetic regimen does not appear to move very 
far beyond the account of docile bodies in Discipline and Punish. As Heyes points out, 
the minute, habitual and overt activities of modern dieting practices are very similar to 
Foucault’s concept of the ‘disciplines.’ These are the methods of meticulous control 
that ensure the subjection of the body’s forces and impose upon them a “relation of 
docility-utility.”570 The activities involved in dieting – and beauty regimes more 
broadly – point to the ever more pervasive, minute hold over women’s (and men’s) 
bodies. This is ever more effective because it is women (and men) who adopt 
responsibility for the rationalisation and performance of those activities. Under this 
reading, any purportedly ‘positive’ aspects of the self-discipline essential to dieting 
and beauty regimes mask the operation and ever deepening embodiment of 
disciplinary and normalising mechanisms.  
As Bartky points out however, the story is more complicated than this: 
“Whatever its ultimate effect, discipline can provide the individual upon whom it is 
imposed with a sense of mastery as well as a secure sense of identity. There is a 
certain contradiction here: While its imposition may promote a larger 
disempowerment, discipline may bring with it a certain development of a person’s 
                                                     
570 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 137. 
  193 
powers.”571 It is in the apparent paradox between an individual’s increased self-
determination and the corollary increase in self-discipline that “pockets of resistance” 
might arise.572 But it is also the discourses surrounding various forms of practices of 
the self that are vulnerable to manipulation. Within the context of dieting, for example, 
such practices are carried out in reference to (sometimes competing) discourses about 
health, nutrition, beauty and ideal forms of subjectivity. The point that feminist 
scholars such as Heyes have made is that what are effectively disciplinary techniques 
that normalise individuals are legitimised through such discourses under the aegis of 
‘self-care.’573 
The issue at stake in this analysis is whether, and if so to what extent, 
techniques of the self can really be said to enable resistance against power. That is, 
although techniques of the self can and do produce docile bodies, Foucault’s account 
of ancient practices must be pressed further to show that such processes also extend 
bodies’ skills and capacities, often in a positive way. The problem, as outlined in 
Chapters One and Three, is that these objectives are often seen to be contradictory and 
therefore incompatible. What should be noted, however, is that the possible co-opting 
of techniques of the self does not preclude their political potential. The paradox, as 
Bartky observes, is that the self-discipline required by dieting practices can actually 
foster positive capacities that can be used toward genuine self-care. Indeed, Heyes 
suggests that disciplinary practices enacted under the aegis of care of the self might 
simultaneously cultivate docile bodies and constitute practices of freedom.574 What 
should be pointed out is that to take the view that dieting regimes are necessarily 
subjecting and repressive implies taking the subsequent view that such regimes 
therefore need only to be rejected. This is in turn to think that the only politically 
meaningful choice lies in liberating oneself from those regimes.575 Thus we return to 
the familiar problem of locating external sources of resistance to these regimes. 
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Yet this does not address the question about whether techniques of the self are 
necessarily political. Indeed, the political value of practices that fall under the heading 
of ‘self-care’ – especially those associated with practices involved in dieting and 
beauty regimes – might be considered questionable, not least because they are 
traditionally ‘feminine’ and ‘private’ activities. But this is precisely the sort of idea 
that Foucault’s work should be used to dispel. Views that see such practices as 
belonging to the realm of the ‘private,’ and therefore as politically irrelevant, do more 
damage than any apparently negative implications that arise from characterising these 
practices in public and political terms. Moreover the practices of aesthetic self-
stylisation or self-care can in fact enable greater political and civic participation. As 
McGushin notes, dietetics is one possible field of action concerned with self-mastery 
that enables participation in political life and the government of others.576 Similarly, 
Heyes argues that: “Care of the self is not an indulgence or a distraction from the 
affairs of the polis, but rather a necessary condition of effective citizenship and 
relationships. We owe it to ourselves and others to constitute ourselves as ethical 
agents through asketic practices.”577 
The key lies in understanding the political potential of such techniques not in 
their practice as such, but in the possibility of exercising these techniques in such a 
way that they challenge the discursive and epistemological frameworks in which they 
are carried out. Heyes notes for example that her own experience of dieting techniques 
“embodied the paradox that Foucault highlighted so well: that normalizing 
disciplinary practices are also enabling of new skills and capacities that may exceed 
the framing of the original activity.”578 What is both theoretically and politically 
significant about this analysis is that the subject can participate in such practices in a 
critical way. The subject can adopt a critical relation to the ideals, assumptions and 
discourses that gave them their initial meaning and purpose. Indeed this may mean no 
more than becoming aware of the contingency of these discursive and epistemological 
                                                                                                                                            
practical training it embodies. We are thus not well placed to understand in turn how those 
capacities and skills are co-opted back into the service of weight loss, instead of offering a way 
to care for the self that might constitute a form of freedom.” (Ibid.,67) 
576 McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis, 35. 
577 Heyes, Self-Transformations, 80. 
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conditions. But this is precisely what Foucault sets out to do. In the end, there is only 
so much someone with Foucault’s philosophical commitments can offer modern 
audiences. If he is unwilling to prescribe certain actions and behaviour, or to make 
judgements about what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ arrangements of power relations, 
then he is limited to showing the ways in which our assumptions, practices, and ways 
of understanding ourselves hinge upon specific discourses and épistémès. What is 
useful about Foucault’s adoption of ancient practices of the self is that his analysis 
presents a starting point for analysing modern practices, thereby enabling a critical 
analysis of their underlying ‘universals.’ In this way, techniques of the self that are 
critically practiced enable one avenue of calling into question the very epistemological  
frameworks and discourses that frame one’s life and subjectivity. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, Foucault turns to ancient practices of the self in order to found the 
groundwork for a new politics. The idea of an ethic and politics of the self for 
Foucault represents the only meaningful response to the contingency of our modes of 
self-understanding revealed through his genealogy of the subject. What he wants out 
of ancient practices is both a model and a point of departure for how we might found 
and elaborate that politics. Indeed, the possibility of self-constitution for Foucault 
plays a central role in his very idea of politics and the political field. 
In his description of the ‘assay’ of philosophical ascesis, Foucault links 
intellectual enquiry with both aesthetic self-transformation and the ‘right’ to question 
authority characteristic of the ethical attitude. Indeed, this linkage gives further insight 
into what Foucault thinks this ‘right’ entails. It appears initially as a capacity that is 
enabled and cultivated through the reflection and questioning of one’s own thought: as 
simply the capacity for critical thinking. Particularly, it requires a calling into question 
of one’s own thought and beliefs by questioning their dependence upon broader 
discourses and epistemological frameworks. As we see in Chapter Six, however, this 
is also a relational right: a right that emerges from the fact of being in relation to (or, 
put another way, as being subject to) given technologies and power. Foucault thinks 
that public intellectuals or philosophers bear a particular responsibility to help others 
cultivate that critical capacity. Foucault views himself as bearing such a responsibility, 
which helps to understand the role that his work is supposed to serve. It is precisely to 
assist individuals by conducting the groundwork that will enable them to think 
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differently. Moreover, he sees them as bearing a public responsibility to question 
governments and institutions on their claims to truth.  
Significantly, these descriptions of the public duties of philosophy contribute 
not only to our understanding of how Foucault conceived his own project, but how he 
conceived of ‘resistance’ and the critique of power more broadly. In pointing out that 
philosophy should not seek to prescribe the operation of power or technologies of 
government, Foucault provides a rejoinder to those critics who accuse him of failing to 
offer a real alternative view of the future.579 He sees his own role and responsibility 
not to prescribe or even provide a possible alternative model of society; it is, rather, 
precisely to call into question the relationship between authority and truth. In this way, 
the initial aim of the critical attitude is to thereby open up interstices between authority 
and its discourses in which alternative discourses and subjective practices might be 
carried out. Moreover, it is through this idea of refusing given discourses, 
epistemological structures and forms of government that resistance should be 
understood. (I return to this in Chapter Six.) 
In examining the political implications of Foucault’s emphasis on aesthetic 
practices, I argued that the latter present a challenge to the usual alignment between 
the public and political spheres. As I argue further in the next chapter, this is 
complemented by ‘relations of power’ and corollary de-identification of political 
power from the state. The political field needs to be re-conceived as extending 
throughout the social field, wherever power relations come into play. In this way, 
aesthetic practices are by definition political, since they are involved in the subject’s 
self-constitution which occurs as part of the very constitution of the political field 
itself. (Foucault thus restores to aesthetic activities a concern with the polis, which in 
turn requires the de-emphasis on their Nietzschean elements.) As such, the political 
field presupposed by the ‘ethic of power’ presented here extends to include these 
aesthetic practices. More needs to be said, however, about how such a political field is 
to be understood. Not only does the description of self-stylisation as a political activity 
disrupt the traditional alignment of the political with the public, Foucault’s 
characterisation of power relations as coextensive with everyday social relations 
complicates the idea that political power is restricted to the public, political domain. 
This is not to say that there is no distinction between the public and private (this is a 
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significant ethical and political problem in itself, but which is beyond the scope of 
the discussion presented here), but that according to Foucault’s analyses, the political 
pervades both sides of this apparent division. 
Finally, I noted the complexity and inherent contradiction in the idea that the 
subjective dimension can be cultivated as a source of resistance to exercises of power. 
As feminist scholars have pointed out, this dimension can be developed under the 
aegis of care for the self or co-opted toward disciplining or normalising ends. This 
contradiction cannot be resolved. Indeed, resolving it would undermine Foucault’s 
attempt to provide a more balanced account of the interaction between self-
constituting practices and subjectivation [assujettissement].  
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Chapter Six: A politics of refusal? 
Introduction 
To enable modern individuals to develop different subjectivities and modes of being is 
the most important philosophical and political objective of Foucault’s work. Indeed, 
he works from the premise that to constitute oneself in relation to the prevailing 
discourses and power formations of one’s time is the cornerstone of political activity. 
In this final chapter I take this as my point of departure for examining the central 
facets of a Foucaultian politics. I describe a relational account of politics, according to 
which the concepts of ‘freedom,’ ‘right’ and ‘resistance’ are meaningful by virtue of 
their place within Foucault’s idea of ‘relations of power.’ It is divided into three 
sections. 
The first section describes the idea of a relational politics. This responds in part 
to the disassociation of political power that results from the analytics of 
governmentality. That latter, as we have seen, views governmental power (the shaping 
or determination of a person’s behaviour or actions, broadly put) as a widespread 
social phenomenon. As a consequence, I have argued (especially when read in 
conjunction with Foucault’s account of relations of power), standard ways of 
understanding politics and the political field need to be reconceived. A relational 
politics, I suggest, responds to this need. The potential for the political field emerges 
contemporaneously and co-extensively with power relations. As such, in line with my 
arguments in Chapter Four, this further disrupts the idea that ‘private’ activities and 
practices should not, or cannot, enter into the political field. Indeed, the coherency of 
Foucault’s account depends on the abandonment of the correlation between the public 
and political domains. 
In developing an alternative approach to politics, I point to the discursive field 
as the primary site of political contestation. Discourse, I suggest, marks the site of 
interplay between the epistemological frameworks and structures of power of a given 
society. This is essential to understanding the operation and significance of the critical 
attitude, since it is irruptions in the discursive field that open the interstices within 
which individuals can promote new forms of subjectivity. In doing so, I return briefly 
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to Arendt’s concept of power in order to clarify the role of discourse as a condition of 
politics. Finally, I point to the way in which the relational nature of politics enables 
Foucault to conceive of a concept of ‘right’ that remains consistent with his broader 
project and philosophical commitments. 
In section two, I turn to Foucault’s analyses of parrēsia, and examine the role of 
‘frank discourse’ in regards to politics. While the theme of parrēsia is central to 
Foucault’s final two years of lectures at the Collège de France, my aim is not to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of this theme as it appears in these lectures. Rather, 
I focus on the political implications of this theme by drawing out its conceptual 
relationship with the critical attitude. Specifically, I argue that in its political form, 
parrēsia should be understood as the actualisation of the critical attitude. That is, 
truthful discourse manifests the right to question authority on its relation to truth. 
As we have seen, for Foucault the subject emerges as a constitutive element of 
the political field. If we understand the subject as a discursive phenomenon that 
emerges contemporaneously with relations of power and freedom, we can see how the 
subject’s self-constituting practices are intimately connected with the critical work 
involved in challenging the given discourses and epistemological frames that govern 
subjects’ self-understanding. Toward this end I examine in further detail the idea of 
the critical attitude and its relationship with aesthetic practices. Indeed, I introduced 
this point in Chapter Four, where I pointed to the way that even those practices 
vulnerable to normalisation can be practiced in a critical way. It is only by 
understanding the relationship between aesthetic self-formation and the critical 
attitude that the latter can be saved from an otherwise incontrovertible problem 
identified by Judith Butler. That is, that in questioning the epistemological and 
authoritarian foundations of supposed ‘true discourses,’ parrēsia requires the subject 
to suspend precisely that critical relation that the subject sought to adopt. The 
significance of this point lies not only in its consequences for the internal coherency of 
Foucault’s work, but in its consequences for Foucault’s critical and political 
contributions more broadly. This is because it speaks to the capacity to stand within 
the discourses of a given culture (and to draw upon its concepts, language, and 
traditions), and yet to call into question the very conditions of the emergence of this 
thought and critical stance. 
Finally, I conclude the chapter by returning to the idea of ‘resistance.’ In 
understanding what Foucault means by ‘resistance,’ I argue that we should look to his 
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account of the ‘critical attitude’—the right to qualified refusal of given forms of 
government. This is not to say that resistance to power is limited to this refusal, but 
that the latter founds resistance. While it may still fail to meet certain normative 
criteria as presented in Chapter One, the idea of refusal as the founding form of 
resistance allows a meaningful conception of the latter that remains coherent with 
Foucault’s broader project. This contributes to the ethic of power a concept of 
resistance not dependent on a priori normative frameworks, and which is instead 
based on the subject’s rapport à soi. 
A relational politics? Rights and the political field 
As discussed in Chapter Two, Foucault’s analysis of governmentality de-couples 
political power from the state. As such, Foucault’s work disrupts the traditional 
distinction between the public and private spheres normally assumed by the statist 
model. The analytics of governmentality recognizes that the private sphere does not 
demarcate a space free from state and government intervention, but rather that this 
space is itself delimited by state regulation and invested by state power.580 As Lemke 
points out, the analytics of governmentality “conceives of the state as an instrument 
and effect of political strategies that define the external borders between the public 
and the private and the state and civil society.”581 In revealing ‘civil society’ and ‘the 
state’ as primarily discursive phenomena Foucault requires us to re-think the 
conditions of political activity.  
This has two related consequences for the broader picture of politics at issue 
here. First, as noted in Chapter Two, by bringing these ideas into question, Foucault 
wants to halt any recourse to ‘civil society’ as a common source of resistance based on 
its apparent opposition to the state. Civil society, he argues, “is not an historical-
natural given which functions in some way as both the foundation of and source of 
opposition to the state and political institutions.”582 Second, it signifies the need for a 
complete overhaul of the traditional division between the private and public spheres, 
and the latter’s correlation with the politics. In turn, this requires a re-formulation of 
the very idea of political action and activity. This is because concepts such as the state 
and civil society have set the discursive frameworks and conditions within which 
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political activity is understood and made meaningful. The forms of knowledge and 
types of power peculiar to specific governmental institutions “constitute the 
parameters of our political thought and action.”583 By placing the conceptual 
foundation of these institutions in question, Foucault opens the possibility for 
alternative conceptions of political action. As Behrent notes, Foucault shifts from a 
theoretical anti-statism involving the claim that the state be abandoned as the model 
for understanding power to the belief that the state should cease to be the primary 
focus of political engagement.584 
In contrast, then, what would a relational approach to politics entail? Initially 
we should understand politics to be founded on power relations. In de-coupling 
political power from the state, and by undermining the very concept of the state itself, 
Foucault effectively disrupts the traditional division between the public and private 
spheres. The political field becomes co-extensive with the social field, and politics 
emerges wherever power is exercised. Considering the ubiquity of power under 
Foucault’s account, politics becomes a much broader and widespread idea, requiring a 
re-thinking of the nature of political activity.  
Aesthetic activities thereby become fundamentally linked to Foucault’s idea of 
politics. This is because, as I have already argued, subjects emerge as part of the 
network of power relations and therefore as part of the very field of politics. If 
relations of power demarcate the extension of the political field, Foucault’s account of 
the subject as founded on rapport à soi is posited as a constitutive element of the 
political field itself. Recalling the account provided in Chapter Three, the subject 
emerges within networks of power relations. The reflexive relationship with self arises 
through the ‘folding-back’ of these originary relations (to make use of Deleuze and 
Butler’s descriptions). The activities and practices that engage or modify rapport à soi 
(and the subjective dimension that emerges) are by default political. At the very least 
they have political implications because they form a constitutive element of the 
political field itself. As such, these activities provide a point of entry for thinking 
about alternative models for political engagement. 
In identifying the political field so closely with relations of power, however, 
Foucault runs the risk of ‘de-politicising’ power. That is, in positing power relations as 
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a necessary and irreducible feature of everyday social relations, Foucault risks 
diminishing the political significance of exercises of power. Furthermore Foucault 
might be accused – as Rorty does – of undermining politics for even suggesting that 
aesthetic activities have political implications. For Rorty, as we have seen, this is 
problematic because the values he ascribes to aesthetics cannot be reflected in liberal 
institutions. Part of the danger lies in extending apparently private and individualistic 
values into the public domain, which would give them political (and moral) legitimacy 
that diminishes otherwise ‘real’ political issues. If everything is political, political 
activity would seem to lose its critical and ethical force. As I pointed out at the end of 
Chapter Five, this view tends toward the idea that conceiving aesthetic activities as 
part of the political field undermines politics, rather than seeing it as enriching our 
understanding of politics. 
In response to Rorty at least we can point out that Foucault would not think that 
our ethics should be founded in such liberal institutions. Indeed, it is clear that 
Foucault does not think that we should simply include aesthetic practices of self-
stylisation as part of standing conceptions of political activity. What the analytics of 
governmentality contributes is an avenue by which to re-conceive purportedly 
mundane and non-political practices and forms of subjectivation as important objects 
for political analysis.585 (Casting the purportedly private, feminine activities associated 
with dieting and beauty in explicitly political terms is a prime example.) Ancient 
ethics and aesthetic practices for Foucault represent the pivotal point around which to 
re-think the relationship between ethics and politics. By placing rapport à soi at the 
centre of his idea of ethics, Foucault thereby places the relationship with oneself and 
its associated practices as inextricably concerned with politics. Beginning with a 
critical ontology of the modern subject, Foucault encourages us to adopt a critical 
relation to given frameworks of interpretation, and thus to recognise that given forms 
of self-understanding are products of historical technologies of power.  
To get at that what this means, let us turn first to the relationship between 
discourse and subjectivation [assujettissement]. In “The Order of Discourse,” 
Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, he describes discourse in terms 
of its exclusory effects; that is, the way that the production of discourse is manipulated 
and deployed as a mechanism of power, in order to exclude and render silent 
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alternative discourses.586 His Birth of the Clinic and History of Madness had already 
demonstrated Foucault’s concern with the ways in which various historical formations 
of power have used discourse in this way. Discourses, for Foucault, represent the way 
that thought is organised so as to produce certain categories of understanding. The 
History of Madness showed how the history of madness – whether conceived in legal, 
medical or social terms – is itself a construct, determined as part of a particular 
discourse and particular structure of power. Discourses are, as Jean Khalfa puts it in 
his introduction to this text, “historical constructions of meaning.”587 As such, they 
represent the particular historical arrangements of power that determine intelligibility 
and experience. 
In this way, Foucault had already laid the groundwork for his later descriptions 
of discourse as a site of contestation. In “The Order of Discourse,” he argues that 
“discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but 
is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is 
to be seized.”588 The point that Foucault is making is that it is not enough to see 
discourse as merely representative or symptomatic of a particular historical formation 
of power; discourses feed into and support these formations. It is precisely because of 
the way that they can support or disrupt formations of power – whether they are 
institutions, political parties, social movements and so forth – that discourse is itself 
invested with force. 
Central to a Foucaultian politics, I argue, should be the idea that the discursive 
field marks the site of interplay between the epistemological frameworks and the 
networks of power of a given society. Put another way, discourse mediates between 
epistemologies and structures of power. As such, discourse is itself a site of 
contestation. It marks a “strategic field [un champ stratégique].”589 Foucault describes 
discourse further as both a site and instrument of confrontation.590 Under this reading, 
it is at the level of discourse that politics and political activity occurs. It is at the level 
of discourse that epistemological structures come under fire. Yet, if discourse is “a 
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weapon of power, of control, of subjection [assujettissement],”591 then it can also be 
used as a countervailing force. Discourse is therefore simultaneously a site and 
instrument of resistance. In this way, political activity should be defined primarily in 
discursive terms. Foucault clearly posits discourse as the primary site of political 
contestation. It is within this framework, then, that parrēsia and the critical attitude 
take on such political significance, as we see further below. 
Before moving on it is worth considering this discursive aspect of politics in 
light of Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘disclosure.’ In The Human Condition, as we 
have seen, Arendt defines ‘power’ as collective action which both emerges within and 
constitutes the political realm that arises when people are in community with one 
another. The possibility of this community or ‘togetherness,’ however, turns upon 
what Arendt refers to as disclosure: the revelation of the individual identity and 
uniqueness of each person within that community.592 Significantly, it is the qualities of 
speech and action that enable this disclosure. “This revelatory quality of speech and 
action,” Arendt notes, “comes to the fore when people are with others and neither for 
nor against them—that is, in sheer human togetherness.”593 Speech and action are the 
modes by which men qua men appear to each other in their unique distinctness.594 For 
Arendt, speech is particularly significant because it is what gives meaning to human 
action (in Arendt’s specific use of the term). That is, ‘deed’ is only disclosed as 
‘action’ by ‘the word,’ and action “becomes relevant only through the actor, 
announcing what he does, has done, and intends to do.”595 What should be noted here 
is that speech is thus a condition of possibility of community, and therefore of the 
possibility of power.  
Despite the differences between Foucault and Arendt’s concepts of power, they 
both view speech or discourse as conditions of politics. For Foucault, discourse forms 
a primary site and instrument of political activity. As we have seen, in association with 
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structures of power and epistemic frames, discourse also sets the terms by which 
actions, behaviour and experience are meaningful, including the terms of their 
political relevance. If we look to the specific forms of discourse that Foucault 
emphasises – most notably parrēsia and dialogue – it appears that the relationships 
underlying these forms of discourse set certain conditions by which speech is 
meaningful. Moreover, Foucault conceives of a certain ‘revelation’ of the subject – 
meaning the revelation of their rapport à soi and their relation to truth – as a condition 
of the relation between subjects whereby speech can be deployed to political ends.596 
Yet despite these initial similarities, the roles of discourse or speech in Foucault and 
Arendt’s respective accounts of power and politics are different. For Arendt, speech is 
a condition of community, which is then a condition of power. For Foucault, however, 
the discursive field emerges co-extensively with structures of power and associated 
epistemic frames. While Foucault has the cursory idea that parrēsia ‘reveals’ subjects 
to one another, which consequently gives rise to the possibility of a certain space for 
politics and ethics, this is not a central, nor well-developed, idea. What is useful in 
comparing these accounts is the way that the differences in the roles of discourse or 
speech correlate to differences in their respective ideas about the nature of power. 
Particularly, the importance of the revelatory aspect of speech for the possibility of 
community, and therefore the power of collective action, points to Arendt’s more 
favourable view of consensual models of politics. While Foucault does not completely 
reject the importance or possibility of consensual models of political engagement, he 
does not think that consensuality should be an organising principle in the analysis of 
the phenomena of power relations.597 
Returning to the idea of a relational politics, the characterisation of politics in 
relational terms offers an alternative means of founding meaningful notions of ‘right’ 
and ‘resistance.’ In Chapter Two I pointed out how a relational idea of freedom 
addresses Foucault’s otherwise problematic use of freedom as a field of possible 
actions. Similarly, a relational account of politics appears to enable the invocation of 
‘rights’ while avoiding the internal inconsistencies that might otherwise arise 
(particularly in relation to Foucault’s rejection of humanist conceptions of right). The 
emphasis on relationality, as we have seen, arises partly from Foucault’s displacement 
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of the concepts of state and sovereignty as the defining features of political power. 
Consistent with this anti-statism, Foucault thinks that the institutional power to define 
relationships, behaviour and values according to law limits the possibility of multi-
various relationships between human beings. He observes that “we live in a legal, 
social, and institutional world where the only relations possible are extremely few, 
extremely simplified, and extremely poor.”598 This is one manifestation of the more 
general problem of how the state and its institutions (not to mention religious and 
social institutions) define the limits and content of the private sphere. He argues 
furthermore that “We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably 
impoverished. Society and the institutions which frame it have limited the possibility 
of relationships because a rich relational world would be very complex to manage.”599 
In contrast to critics who would have us believe that Foucault’s philosophy turns on an 
egoistic, if not solipsistic, approach to ethics and to politics, the fact of human 
relationality is in fact an underlying and explicit part of Foucault’s concept of the 
social. Indeed, in moving away from a statist model of power toward power relations, 
Foucault poses the possibility of a richer and more complex account of human 
relationships.  
Of particular significance here is that Foucault thinks that a richer account of 
relationships would enable an alternative account of human rights. These would be 
dislocated from state and legal institutions and associated instead with relations 
between subjects. As such, they are de-identified from law: “a right, in its real effects, 
is much more linked to attitudes and patterns of behaviour than to legal formations.”600 
Foucault’s point is that it is not enough for a new ‘right’ (he is referring particularly to 
gay rights and marriage equality) to be recognised and legitimised institutionally, 
where all this recognition means that this right must fit itself into existing moulds for 
behaviour and relationships. Rather, Foucault’s account requires that rights be 
conceived both independent from statist, legal, and formalised social institutions and 
without recourse to universalist conceptions of human being. In any case, it is clear 
that Foucault by no means dismisses the concept of ‘rights’ in its entirety, as scholars 
such as Habermas and Fraser have pointed out. Recalling this point from Chapter One, 
Foucault is often accused of invoking concepts of right, resistance and freedom 
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without admitting to the requisite normative framework that would make them 
meaningful. In conceiving rights in relational terms, however, Foucault would appear 
to escape from this charge. This model of right is very different from its meaning in 
liberal political theory – particularly in its de-identification from the individual – and 
appears far from an ethical universalism. Foucault instead conceives of rights as 
emerging from human relationships. As I argue further below, Foucault begins from 
the fact that human beings exist in relation to one another and then from the idea that 
these relations can be characterised in terms of power. He extrapolates from this the 
possibility of a relational conception of rights that recognises our common experience 
of being subjects of power. I return to this point shortly. 
Thus Foucault does not dismiss then the concept of ‘rights,’ nor their key role in 
political and social change. Yet his model of right is fundamentally different from its 
usual meaning in modern liberal democracies, and from the idea of inalienable 
individual rights that some critics would have him adopt. Foucault avers: “Rather than 
arguing that rights are fundamental and natural to the individual, we should try to 
imagine and create a new relational right that permits all possible types of relations to 
exist and not be prevented, blocked, or annulled by impoverished relational 
institutions.”601 Of critical importance for his broader project, a ‘relational right’ 
would thus emerge within a given society or network of power relations. As such, this 
concept of right is not founded a given concept of human nature, nor on fixed ideas of 
what is ‘normal.’602 By positing a relationally defined concept of right, moreover, 
Foucault undermines the usual underlying structure of how rights are conceived; that 
is, the protection or delimiting of morally legitimatised action or space of action. As 
Lemke observes, in referring to a relational right, Foucault focuses more on shared or 
common experiences, whereby rights are conceived in more positive terms as the 
possibility of establishing a new form of life.603 (The concept of relational rights is 
thereby linked to the idea of aesthetic practices, as we see further below.) In this way 
the idea of relational rights is linked further with rapport à soi and the differential 
relations from which subjects emerge. Or as Lemke puts it, Foucault’s idea of right is 
founded on difference, not identity.604  
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Foucault’s notion of right appears in even stronger terms in the following 
passage: 
There exists an international citizenry that has its rights, that has its 
duties, and that is committed to rise up against every abuse of power, 
no matter who the author, no matter who the victims. After all, we are 
all ruled, and as such, we are in solidarity. […] Men’s misfortune 
must never be the silent remnant of politics. It is the basis of an 
absolute right to rise up and address those who hold the power.605 
We can see in this idea of rights not only an increasing emphasis on the concept of 
relationality itself, but the foundation of a common right to resistance. Two forms of 
relation can be identified here. First, the relation between subjects that places them in 
‘solidarity.’ This, I suggest, is best described in terms of the relations between human 
beings as subjects of power. This includes the sense in which they are in relation by 
the fact of each subject’s rapport à soi, which arise out of originary relations. Second, 
the relation denoted by assujettissement—the sense in which each subject is in relation 
to the dominant, heteronomous forces of subjectivation. ‘Solidarity’ thus refers to the 
common experience of ‘being ruled’: of assujettissement.  
Yet given Foucault’s various critiques of humanism, such a strong claim to an 
‘absolute right’ is curious. Although it goes some way in addressing the apparent lack 
of concern Foucault feels for the experiences of oppression and power, it complicates 
the idea of ‘relational’ rights. For one thing, Foucault’s claim that a right to resist 
power is ‘absolute’ appears to undermine its relational nature, and appears inconsistent 
with Foucault’s aversion to ethical universality. Even if such a shift would make 
Foucault more acceptable within certain schools of ethics, it would undermine the idea 
of a relational politics as suggested here.  
Furthermore Foucault’s characterisation of this right as one opposed to ‘those 
who hold the power’ appears inconsistent with his view that power cannot be held, let 
alone possessed by one side over and against another. Of course, the context of this 
passage might mitigate these criticisms, as this was made within a public context 
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rather than an academic one. Foucault certainly defends his right to make use of 
certain terms, regardless of their being subject to critical appraisal. Nevertheless, in 
describing solidarity in this way, Foucault opens himself to a charge that has been 
frequently levelled at certain tenets of feminism. The problem with making an address 
to power on the basis of an apparent shared experience of ‘being ruled,’ is that one 
runs the risk of homogenising a range of experiences of oppression and subjectivation.  
Foucault’s claim to human solidarity is nevertheless intriguing. Indeed it even 
appears to place him just a little closer to Arendt on the issue of a consensual model of 
power.606 But what is especially significant about this passage is what it might say 
about the possibility of a Foucaultian notion of common humanity, through the idea of 
human solidarity. This at first appears to be in stark contrast to the dismissal of human 
nature and ‘man’ outlined Chapters Two and Three. (Although as noted in those 
chapters, this was more a rejection of a certain philosophical idea of the subject as the 
epistemological condition of objective knowledge.) Both the claims to human 
solidarity and to absolute rights appear to have recourse to a universal conception of 
human nature. 
But this apparent contradiction between a claim to ‘absolute’ rights and 
Foucault’s problem with universality arises partly out of a misunderstanding of the 
role of such rights within Foucault’s thought. The idea that rights are inherently 
universal is usually aligned with the related view that the concepts of human nature 
with which these rights are linked are also universal. Foucault rejects universality on 
both fronts. Yet his claim to relational rights is compatible with the minimalist form of 
universality I outlined in Chapter Four. That is, a form of universality which responds 
to the particularity of Foucault’s account of an historically and culturally-specific 
conception of human being. Along a slightly different line, Patton argues that by 
understanding rights as “historical and contingent features of particular forms of social 
life,” the apparent contradiction between the universality implied by a claim to rights 
and Foucault’s explicit rejection of ethical universality can be resolved.607 Similarly, 
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Lemke suggests that this tension “disappears once we understand rights as integral 
parts of and contingent features of power relations, as delimited and defined by social 
institutions and collective life forms.”608 Indeed the concept of relationally defined 
rights presents certain critical advantages. Positing rights as relationally defined 
renders them specifically historical phenomena. As such, as Lemke and Patton note, 
different rights may emerge, transform, or fade as power relations change.609 This 
lends to political and critical theory a greater capacity for flexibility and 
responsiveness to social and cultural changes.  
It is precisely in the idea of relationality, and the corollary idea of relational 
rights, that this possibility is founded. As Paul Veyne suggests, “Without being too 
insistent about it, he ended up with a general conception of the human condition, the 
freedom with which it could react to things, and also its finite nature.”610 This is best 
understood through the idea of a relational politics. As I have demonstrated, there are 
three key features to this account. First, the potential for the political field to emerge 
extends throughout the social sphere, co-extensive with power relations. In this way, 
Foucault disrupts the usual alignment between the public and political spheres. 
Second, discourse constitutes the primary site and instrument of political contestation. 
Thus while power relations delineate the extension of the political field, it is at the 
level of discourse that political activity occurs. Third, the relational nature of the 
political field establishes the foundation of an alternative conception of ‘rights’ 
compatible with Foucault’s broader project. What needs to be pressed further is the 
relation of discourse to the subject’s self-constitution, and how it is that the practices 
defined and made meaningful by given discourses are simultaneously able to pose a 
challenge to the latter. 
The politics of the critical attitude 
The geneo-critical aspect of Foucault’s work, as I have presented it here, has two 
overarching objectives. First, to conduct the preliminary genealogical analyses 
required to reveal the historical specificity of the epistemological and discursive 
frameworks through which we understand ourselves as subjects. Second, to give 
critical impetus to ‘the work of freedom.’ Together, these objectives can be seen as 
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two facets of the same project: to conceive political activity as work (transformative, 
creative, or emancipatory) carried out upon oneself through a critically practiced 
challenge to these frameworks of understanding. My purpose here is to evaluate the 
success of this project. In order to achieve this, I turn first to the linkages between the 
critical attitude and Foucault’s analyses of parrēsia, which demonstrate the extent to 
which political activity should be conceived in discursive terms. Subsequently I return 
briefly to aesthetic practices in order to explicate the political role of the critical 
attitude. Before turning to these points, I note very briefly the key elements of the idea 
of critique against which Foucault juxtaposes his own account.  
Before returning to Foucault’s own idea of the critical attitude, we should recall 
momentarily the account of critique that he rejected (referred to briefly in Chapter 
Two). As Lemke notes, the idea of critique Foucault questions in “The Order of 
Discourse” is linked with the juridico-discursive model of power, best characterised 
by the requirement of a priori, rational standards of evaluation.611 As such, it takes on 
the negative, repressive character of the juridico-discursive model. It is structured by 
an asymmetrical relation of power, where those conducting the critique assume a 
knowledge and an authority which sets them apart from its object. In this way, the 
relation characteristic of critique actually mirrors the structure of juridico-discursive 
power. Like the latter, it is seen to operate over and against its object. As Lemke notes, 
it is this opposition that opens the “fundamental distance between the practice of 
critique and its object that allows for the critical stance.”612 More broadly, the 
structure, conditions, and limits of critique are themselves already delimited and 
defined by a given historical technology of power. Within the context of Foucault’s 
analysis of liberalism, this idea of critique fails again because it is posed as a 
transcendent, objective form of social and political analysis, yet the norms on which it 
is predicated – such as ‘civil society’ and ‘freedom’ – are part of the liberal 
technology of government.  
Yet this poses the question, as noted in Chapter Two, about the real critical and 
political possibilities of Foucault’s alternative: if critique must be conducted from 
within the framework it seeks to place in question, how can its integrity be 
guaranteed? As we have seen, Foucault hesitates at using a normative framework of 
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evaluation. On one hand, his critical trademark is to place in question the naturalness 
and universality of given norms, values and concepts by drawing out their socio-
historical conditions. The archaeo-genealogical aspect of this approach is to reveal 
how particular discursive practices engender specific rules for how concepts and 
theories are formed. As Jean Khalfa observes at the end of his introduction to The 
History of Madness, much of Foucault’s later work is concerned with the question of 
explaining how it is possible for thought to “explain the freedom within which it 
operates.”613 Khalfa’s point, however, is that in studying the history of systems of 
thought, thought must examine the conditions of its own emergence, which precludes 
the possibility of detaching itself from those conditions. Yet Foucault relies on being 
able to deploy the norms, values and concepts of a given society as part of the very 
critical framework through which to investigate that society. In this way, as Lemke 
points out, “norms themselves are part of the historical field under investigation and 
not outside it; they are less the measure or starting point than an object of analysis and 
the outcome of a conflict.”614 Norms are “constituted in struggles, are a part of them 
and a stake in them.”615 For some scholars, as noted earlier, this not only precludes the 
possibility of transcendent critique, it thereby undermines its political potential for 
conceiving new forms of subjectivity.616  
Indeed, the critical attitude is supposed to present the next step in developing 
and crystallising the political possibilities of the archaeo-genealogical revelation. It is 
supposed to present the means of deploying these revelations to confront, if not 
undermine, the historical conditions of particular subjectivities. As we have seen, the 
initial form of this confrontation is placing into question the relation of authority to 
truth, the impetus for which stems from the desire to not be governed like that. That is, 
questioning the authority claimed by those who purport to have access to ‘the truth,’ 
or, conversely, by questioning claims to knowledge on the basis of authority. If, as I 
have argued it should be, the political field is characterised primarily in discursive 
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terms, critique would appear as the primary form of political activity. To fully 
understand this point, we should turn to Foucault’s formulation of parrēsia. This is 
because the use of parrēsia signifies the adoption of an attitude of critique in regard to 
the overarching discourses to which the subject speaks. 
Indeed it is the function of parrēsia that Foucault wants to re-introduce into 
politics. Truthful discourse causes a rupture in the given discursive field: it both 
presents a challenge to a given discourse and threatens the power arrangement with 
which the discursive field is aligned. He describes this rupture as the “necessary, 
indispensable, and fragile caesura that true discourse cannot fail to introduce into a 
democracy which both makes this discourse possible and constantly threatens it.”617 
Foucault expressly states the need for the critical function of parrēsia in our own time; 
he poses the caesura introduced by true discourse as a necessary intervention in the 
usual ways of conceiving the operation of power and the nature of political action.618 
Indeed, in conceiving parrēsia as an essential element of the latter, Foucault thinks 
that we can re-introduce to modern politics certain ideas about the practice of the 
political game lost in a shift to ‘the political’ over ‘politics.’ These are, Foucault 
suggests, the idea of the political game as “a field of experience with its rules and 
normativity, of the political game as experience inasmuch as it is indexed to truth-
telling and involves a certain relationship to oneself and to others.”619 As I have 
already argued, Foucault wants to introduce the self-constitution of the subject 
(through the concepts of rapport à soi and its associated fields of experience) as a 
significant and constitutive part of the political field itself. 
To get at one aspect of what Foucault might mean here, we can look to the 
relationships he thinks are characteristic of dialogue and polemics. Most importantly, 
Foucault posits the possibility of a form of critique as a ‘right’ of the discursive field 
more generally. In accounting for his dislike of polemics, Foucault describes the ideal 
discursive relationship as one where the speaker and interlocutor are each bound by 
certain rules. Certain discursive conditions emerge in the relationship delimited by 
speaker and interlocutor: “In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of 
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reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the 
discussion.”620 In dialogue, the person who answers questions posed to her is bound to 
the total content of her speech, and is committed to being questioned by the other 
person.621 To ask questions is itself a right, according to Foucault’s account. This is 
where the right to critique emerges: “The person asking the questions is merely 
exercising the right that has been given to him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a 
contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point 
out faulty reasoning, and so on.”622 In entering the dialogue, each participant implicitly 
agrees to these conditions, and to maintain the rights of the other person. Foucault 
states: “each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the 
other person and by the accepted form of the dialogue.”623 Significantly, Foucault 
poses the conditions of such dialogue as part of a broader ethical concern: “a whole 
morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for truth and the relation to 
the other.”624  
If we turn for a moment to parrēsia, we can see that the use of the latter 
similarly has certain relational conditions. Parrēsia requires that the subject first 
provide an account of their relation to truth, signified by the degree of congruence 
between their bios and logos.625 Similarly, the interlocutor discloses the relationship 
between her bios and logos by giving an account of herself.626 Indeed, Foucault argues 
that the relationship between the speaker and interlocutor is itself a condition of 
parrēsia, and which is put at risk through the speaker’s use of truthful discourse.627 As 
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friendship which made this discourse of truth possible.” (Ibid., 11-12.) In the case of the 
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such, this relationship structures the field within which true discourse is spoken, and 
the conditions upon which it is meaningful. Taken within the context of the political 
field outlined above, the role of the discursive relationship in Foucault’s thinking 
about ethics and politics becomes clear. If political activity occurs at the level of 
discourse, the terms by which discursive relationships are set will determine in part the 
limits of political activity.628 
In contrast to his ideal view of dialogue we can turn then to his problem with 
polemics. In Foucault’s view the polemicist assumes a position of authority, certain of 
the truth and legitimacy of their view.629 As such, they see an interlocutor not as a 
‘partner in truth,’ but as an adversary; the relationship itself is adversarial.630 Thus the 
discursive game is not defined by dialogue, nor by a common search for truth, but by 
the polemicist’s exclusion of the other person from the very possibility of dialogue. 
The objective, Foucault argues, is “to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has 
been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy 
that his adversary is by definition denied.”631 It is precisely in the realm of politics that 
Foucault thinks that polemics is most dangerous.632 The structure of polemics is 
essentially exclusory. Moreover, polemics marks a way of acting that precludes the 
possibility of new ideas, not to mention the possibility of the disruption or reversal of 
structures of power.633 Perhaps the most significant point that emerges from this 
analysis is that in discarding polemics as the primary mode of political discourse, 
Foucault wants precisely to undermine its exclusory nature. But he does not do this by 
assuming a homogenised ‘we.’ Indeed, it is in the tendency of polemic discourse to 
assume a homogenised and authoritative ‘we’ that its exclusory nature lies. Rather, 
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Foucault argues that any sense of a collective community or ‘we’ should emerge only 
as a result of specific problematizations.634 
To further understand the extent to which the critical attitude takes a discursive 
form we should look to the similarities between the critical attitude and parrēsia. 
There are two points that should be noted. First, Foucault describes both parrēsia and 
critique as marking a mode of relation to the world. He states: “Parrēsia is not a skill; 
it is something which is harder to define. It is a stance, a way of being which is akin to 
virtue, a mode of action.”635 We have already seen how the critical attitude is a 
particular way of relating to the world, the adoption of a stance or position of critique. 
But Foucault also describes critique as “akin to virtue.”636 Considering Foucault’s 
views on traditional forms of morality, ‘virtue’ cannot be taken to refer to moral 
excellence, nor to a human quality or attribute. Rather, taking into account the sense of 
‘stance’ or ‘attitude’ that parrēsia and critique share, ‘virtue’ should be understood as 
referring to a mode of relation. As Butler suggests, “virtue is not only a way of 
complying with or conforming to preestablished norms. It is, more radically, a critical 
relation to those norms, one which for Foucault, takes shape as a specific stylization of 
morality.”637 In this way, the operation of critique and parrēsia are bound with the 
subject’s rapport à soi. This is only emphasised by the similarity in description of 
parrēsia and critique as modes of relating to the world. Parrēsia is both a ‘stance’ and 
‘way of being.’ It thus suggests both the adoption of an attitude or relation taken in 
regards to existing discourses, and a particular mode of rapport à soi. Similarly, the 
critical attitude is precisely that: a stance or attitude of critique taken toward given 
regimes of power and arts of government. 
The second point is that Foucault characterises both parrēsia and critique as 
relations that introduce ‘otherness’ into the epistemological field. He says of critique: 
“[it] only exists in relation to something other than itself: it is an instrument, a means 
for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be, it oversees a domain it 
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would want to police and is unable to regulate.”638 By taking an attitude of critique, 
whether it is in relation to specific forms of government, or to the underlying 
arrangements of power-knowledge, the subject opens up a space or possibility for 
something else. There is however no sense of what that might be. Similarly, Foucault 
describes parrēsia as “an irruptive truth-telling which creates a fracture and opens up 
the risk: a possibility, a field of dangers, or at any rate, an undefined eventuality.”639 
True discourse introduces a caesura into the discursive field. But there is no sense in 
which this caesura carries with it an alternative discourse; like critique it merely 
enables the possibility of something else. Moreover the manuscript of Foucault’s final 
lecture notes: “there is no establishment of the truth without an essential position of 
otherness; the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other 
world and the other life (l’autre monde et de la vie autre).”640 As we see further below, 
this introduction of an ‘otherness’ or ‘other world’ speaks to one of the central 
political aims of Foucault’s accounts of parrēsia and critique.641  
Parrēsia thus appears as an actualisation of the critical attitude. Foucault 
conceives of true discourse as introducing a caesura into the field of existing 
discourses. As discourses are the visible elements of épistémès, a break in the 
discursive field signifies as an irruption in the underlying epistemological frame. 
Indeed the critical force of parrēsia is that it exposes the limits of a given 
epistemological field. Parrēsia signifies a “limit-situation.”642 Truthful discourse 
exposes these limits by bringing into sharp relief the interdependence of given 
discourses and epistemics with arts of government. This is because, as Foucault sees 
it, these structure the discursive field in which ‘the truth’ is spoken, positing the 
conditions of speech, its limits and even the questions it seeks to answer. This is partly 
why Foucault finds rhetoric and polemics so problematic. Polemics, as we have 
already seen, precludes the possibility of critique, because the polemicist denies the 
interlocutor the right to question on the basis of her own authority. Similarly, rhetoric 
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imposes on the interlocutor a “bond of power.”643  Thus by introducing a caesura into 
this field, the space for alternative discourses emerges. In parrēsia, according to 
Foucault, “the irruption of true discourse determines an open situation, or rather opens 
the situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely, not known.”644 I return to 
this point shortly. 
This account of the operation of the critical attitude in reference to parrēsia is 
not without certain problems. Particularly, the conditions of parrēsia risk undermining 
its critical potential. As we have seen, parrēsia requires that the subject and 
interlocutor each provide to the other an account of their relation to truth. Foucault 
also argues that the relationship between the speaker and interlocutor is itself a 
condition of parrēsia. As such, this relationship structures the field within which true 
discourse is spoken, and the conditions by which it is meaningful. Moreover, the 
ability of each subject to disclose their rapport à soi turns upon a shared framework of 
intelligibility. In this way, this disclosure and the parrēsia that it enables implicitly 
accept the terms set by this framework. This complicates the relationship between 
parrēsia and critique: ‘the truth’ will be determined by the norms and modes of 
rationality that emerge within a given historical framework of intelligibility.645 When 
the subject seeks to ‘speak the truth,’ she conforms to a ‘criterion of truth’ and accepts 
it as binding.646 In this way, both disclosing one’s rapport à soi and using parrēsia 
bestow a certain legitimacy upon the very norms and rationalities to which the critical 
attitude was to be adopted. Butler points out that accepting a criterion of truth as 
binding is to assume that the forms of rationality within which one lives are 
unquestionable.647 She argues therefore that “telling the truth about oneself comes at a 
price, and the price of that telling is the suspension of a critical relation to the truth 
regime in which one lives.”648 Indeed, the question of ethical interaction between 
subjects is problematised by an account in which that very encounter between subjects 
is mediated by the external framework by which they recognize and are intelligible to 
each other.649 While I disagree with Butler that suspending the critical relation 
                                                     
643 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 14. 
644 Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 62. 
645 See Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 121. 
646 Ibid. 
647 Ibid. 
648 Ibid., 121-122. 
649 Butler also points out that some instances of recognition, or failures in recognition, call into 
question, if not signify a rupture in, the framework of intelligibility. Thus, she states, “It will 
not do, then, to collapse the notion of the other into the sociality of norms and claim that the 
  219 
signifies the unquestionability of the forms of rationality within which one lives, 
Butler is right to point out that the conditions of the use of parrēsia complicate, if not 
preclude, the critical capacity of this relation. I return to this point below.  
While the mere possibility of an unimagined future – of an ‘other world’ – 
would for Foucaultians be full of promise, for those in the Habermasian camp it tends 
more toward a political and critical failure. This is because an unimagined future fails 
to suggest what should be done in order to make the world better, let alone a coherent 
political program. From this perspective, Foucault’s project is consistent with the 
more general failure of critical theory to offer a definite future path. While the 
operation of critique enables us to gain the critical perspective required to call in to 
question given foundations and institutions, none of these critical activities tell us in 
what direction we should move, or whether they are even achieving their intended 
goals.650 But for Foucault, the sense of possibility associated with the critical attitude 
lies precisely with its inability to predict or be limited to a definite future. Foucault 
himself emphasises that “the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a pre-
established political outlook and do not tend toward the realisation of some definite 
political project.”651 Rather, he views his project as opening up concrete and general 
problems that “approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the 
diagonal.”652 The value of the notion of the critical attitude is that it opens incalculable 
possibilities and an undefined space for self-creation. This is precisely what Foucault 
refers to as the ‘undefined work of freedom.’ Indeed, if such work resulted in a 
program for action, with defined, normatively justified goals, this would be the critical 
and political failure.  
 To judge the success or failure of Foucault’s critical project by the contribution 
it makes to a prescriptive political agenda is to miss the point entirely.653 Foucault’s 
contribution is to present the possibility of new forms of life and being, by pointing 
out the way in which the critical project of challenging the relationship between 
epistemologies and structures of power can be conceived in ethical terms. The critical 
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attitude questions the relation of authority to truth in order to challenge the 
epistemological frame to which it has recourse, and which it subsequently reinforces. 
As Butler asks: “What is the relation of knowledge to power that our epistemological 
certainties turn out to support a way of structuring the world that forecloses alternative 
possibilities of ordering?”654 In this way, Foucault’s later work continues to pose the 
questions of The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things, but re-frames 
the archaeo-genealogical approach to these questions through a genealogy of the 
modern subject. The subject is inserted into the field under question as both part of the 
discursive field under question and as the orienting point of analysis.  
The critical attitude (through parrēsia) creates the ‘epistemological space’ 
within which alternative forms of being can be pursued. Put another way, by calling 
into question the relation of authority to truth, the subject opens up interstices between 
given discourses, structures of power and epistemic frames. These interstices enable 
the potential for alternative means of ordering the world, and thereby the possibility of 
understanding ourselves in innumerable and unforseen ways. The operation of the 
critical attitude is therefore fundamentally linked to the practices of self-formation—to 
aesthetic activities.655 As Butler notes, “this exposure of the limit of the 
epistemological field is linked with the practice of virtue, as if virtue is counter to 
regulation and order, as if virtue is thus found in the risking of established order.”656 
As we have already seen, Butler understands Foucault’s reference to virtue to mean 
that the critical relation takes form as a “specific stylisation of morality.”657 What this 
means is that the adoption of a critical relation to the world (whether to a specific 
discourse or technology of government) forms part of the subject’s rapport à soi. This 
becomes clearer if we recall from Chapter Three Butler’s point that rapport à soi is 
established in relation to the social norms that set the limits of the intelligible 
formation of subjects. In this way, the subjective dimension that emerges as an 
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undefined and undetermined result of the practices that enable this formation can 
challenge, if not subvert, those limits of intelligibility.658 
The critical attitude thereby links the challenge of a given discourse with the de-
subjugation of the subject. As already suggested, the adoption of the critical attitude 
opens up the interstices within which alternative forms of life and being become 
possible, precisely because new forms of discourse become possible. That is, the 
critical attitude enables new ways of ordering and understanding the world. As Butler 
argues, “If the desubjugation of the subject emerges at the moment in which the 
episteme constituted through rationalization exposes its limit, then desubjugation 
marks precisely the fragility and transformability of the epistemics of power.”659 In 
this way, the self-constituting and aesthetic practices of the subject’s rapport à soi that 
enable de-subjugation – that is, the opposite of assujettissement – expose the 
contingency and vulnerability of structures of power and the epistemological frames to 
which they relate.  
Foucault’s attempt to expose the limits of our discourses and frameworks of 
understanding, from which an unimagined future might emerge, is not the theoretical 
risk-taking that some would have us believe. As Butler argues, “One asks about the 
limits of ways of knowing because one has already run up against a crisis within the 
epistemological field in which one lives [my italics].”660 From Foucault’s perspective, 
the whole emphasis on self-creation or self-transformation as a form of critique of 
these governing norms is precisely because subjects cannot recognize themselves, or 
see reflected in those norms the kinds of subjectivity to which they aspire. Yet 
Foucault fails, as Butler points out, to account for the possibility that such a critical 
stance might be motivated by the desire to recognize someone else, or to enable them 
to recognize me.661 Yet the function of the critical attitude is the same: even though 
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Foucault does not appear to recognise this motivation, this does not preclude the 
possibility that critique might enable recognition of others. The critical attitude opens 
up interstices between the discourses, epistemic frames and structures of power within 
which subjects can experiment with alternative modes of being. 
Resisting power: ethics and the critical attitude 
In this final section, I return to the question of resistance. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
Foucault’s account of power relations locates the very possibility of resistance within 
networks of power relations. Yet when Foucault states: “Where there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power,”662 he is presenting a challenge to think about power 
and freedom in a different way. In a way, I have argued, that is different to the 
interpretations of these concepts assumed by the critical positions outlined in the first 
and second parts of Chapter One. These implied that by inscribing the potential for 
resistance within networks of power, Foucault precludes the possibility of a 
transcendent or a priori normative critique, thereby rendering ‘resistance’ 
meaningless. As I have demonstrated, however, Foucault’s broader account is only 
coherent and meaningful if the concepts of power, freedom and resistance are 
understood as constitutive components of a broader idea about the social.  
The possibility of resistance, as we have seen, is inscribed within relations of 
power. Foucault means several things by this. He means that the potential for a range 
of possible behaviours and responses is a defining condition of relations of power. But 
this is not just the possibility of any action, however small. It is the possibility of 
acting in such a way that the relation can be altered. This is what opposes relations of 
power to states of domination. The latter are ‘congealed’ relations, where an 
asymmetrical relation of power has become fixed, incontrovertible.  
Yet, while we can easily get at the idea that the possibility of resistance is 
inscribed within relations of power, it is more difficult to understand how this 
possibility is manifested. That is, what exactly is resistance? As we have seen, 
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Foucault rejects the idea that resistance equates to violence, or necessarily bound 
within other physical forms. In “The Subject and Power,” he notes that while violence 
may be an instrument of power, it constitutes neither its principle nor its basic 
nature.663 Thus while resistance might deploy violent means, it is itself not limited to 
violent or physical means. Of course, this is partly because Foucault does not conceive 
of the exercise of power in purely physical terms. Through the idea of government, he 
characterises the exercise of power as referring to the myriad of ways, tacit and 
explicit, overt and subtle, through our actions, speech and behaviour that we influence 
the actions of others. A relation of power, moreover, is also a relation of freedom that 
contributes to the intelligibility of those actions and inscribes them with meaning.  
But how is resistance actualised? In what does it consist? The problem is not 
that Foucault fails to answer these questions; it is that he provides so many answers. 
We have seen that the inscription of resistance in power relations is founded in the 
idea that the originary constitutive relations of rapport à soi give way to an un-
determined, spontaneous subjective dimension. This dimension can be cultivated by 
techniques of the self, which can themselves be characterised as modes of resistance. 
He also links resistance to freedom, although neither are defined in opposition to 
power. The care for the self, too, can cultivate the capacity for resistance, and can 
itself constitute a mode of resistance. Indeed the aesthetic activities of self-sylisation 
and self-constitution can enable resistance to both exercises of power and broader 
structures of normalisation. Finally, parrēsia is a mode of resistance to both political 
and other forms of power. It seems as if everything for Foucault can enable, if not 
constitute, resistance to power. (This would not be far off the mark, since power is 
everywhere.) 
But it is in the common function of these activities that the key to understanding 
Foucault’s idea of resistance lies. We can understand this function not by looking to 
what ‘resistance’ is, but by looking to what is being resisted. It is less specific 
exercises of power than the overarching discourses, power structures and epistemic 
frames in reference to which these exercises of power occur. In Chapter Two I made 
the initial suggestion that resistance should be thought in terms of the ‘agonism’ that 
Foucault identifies between power relations and the “intransitivity of freedom.”664 
From this perspective, resistance would be founded in the “analysis, elaboration, and 
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bringing into question of power relations” which is “a permanent political task 
inherent in all social existence.”665 Resistance is constituted in those practices, 
activities, speeches and modes of being that not only place relations of power in 
question, but put into play the broader discourses and epistemic frames to which these 
relations refer. This is precisely why directing our political activities at ‘the state’ 
itself is pointless. Foucault thinks that we must attack the roots of political 
rationalities, and not the effects of these rationalities.666 In this way, Foucault’s 
concept of resistance is exemplified in the critical attitude. The critical attitude, as we 
have seen, establishes a critical relation to power—it resists power by refusing it. 
Placing in question the relation of authority to truth by refusing to be governed like 
that is the underlying model of operation of the various manifestations of resistance 
that Foucault describes. 
But it is here that we return to a seemingly intractable problem with Foucault’s 
account more broadly. Does ‘refusal’ give real critical and political impetus to 
Foucault’s account of resistance? Does it save him from the critiques outlined in 
Chapter One? That is, the failure of Foucault’s account of resistance to defer to a 
strong normative framework, and the apparent contradiction that subsequent claims to 
the freedom of subjects and their capacity to resist power appears to entail. The 
explanation of resistance in terms of refusal would appear particularly vulnerable to 
the charges levelled at critical theory noted above. That is, resistance (like critical 
theory) fails to offer either a coherent political project, a program for change, or even 
picture of how a different world might look. The mistake in such interpretations, I 
argue, is to simply read resistance as counter-power.  
In this element of refusal, inherent in Foucault’s idea of resistance, we can hear 
an echo of Albert Camus’ idea of ‘revolt’ from The Rebel. This is, broadly speaking, 
the attitude that the rebel takes in the face of oppression and social injustice. To revolt 
is to say ‘no’: “his [the rebel’s] ‘no’ affirms the existence of a borderline. You find the 
same conception in the rebel’s opinion that the other person is ‘exaggerating,’ that he 
is exerting his authority beyond a limit where he infringes on the rights of others.”667 
Revolt adds to rebellion – the individual’s resistance to their own mortality and the 
meaninglessness of the universe, exemplified in the desire to transform the world into 
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something else – a social element; a movement beyond the individual’s concern with 
their own condition to a more general concern with the immediate experience of other 
people.  
For Camus of course revolt has recourse to civic and natural rights, which does 
set him at some distance from Foucault. Yet they share a suspicion of politics or 
discourses that seek to legitimise real, immediate injustice on the basis of a 
guaranteed, future justice. For Foucault this is expressed primarily as a critique of 
governmental technologies of liberalism. For Camus, it is a suspicion of the 
revolutionary that “contrives, by the promise of absolute justice, the acceptance of 
perpetual injustice, of unlimited compromise, and of indignity.”668 As such, they share 
the idea of a ‘limit.’ For Foucault, as we have seen, this is expressed as the revelation 
of discursive and epistemic limits and the subsequent project of subverting those limits 
through the introduction of new discourses and subsequent possibilities for self-
constitution. In this critical attitude this takes the form of a qualified refusal: to not be 
governed like that, not by them.669 It is any action, deliberate inaction, non-doing, 
which in the very least says ‘no’ to an exercise of power or to an arrangement of 
power-knowledge. For Camus, the rebel not only says ‘no’ in order to establish a 
limit; she places limits on her own rebellion. The latter must “respect the limits that it 
discovers in itself.”670 He argues further that if “rebellion could found a philosophy it 
would be a philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, of risk.”671 But what is 
especially striking is the way in which this ‘limit’ is expressed in terms of the limits of 
one’s own life. The rebel “refuses his own condition, and his condition to a large 
extent is historical.”672 In Foucaultian terms these conditions are expressed as the 
limits of the subject’s life and being imposed by her relation to the present. 
Thus they both see this refusal, this ‘no,’ as a way of responding to and living in 
the world. In this sense it is a practice, a way of being. As Camus suggests in his 
introduction to The Rebel, “What matters here is not to follow things back to their 
origins, but, the world being what it is, to know how to live in it.”673 For Camus the 
response lies in rebellion: in the refusal of the transgression of a limit. But this 
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response is also an affirmation. The affirmation of a limit is simultaneously the 
affirmation and desire to preserve what lies beyond that limit.674 In this way, Camus 
suggests, rebellion “lures the individual from his solitude.”675 Foucault’s invocation of 
refusal might similarly rescue him from certain criticisms that read his work – 
especially his enthusiasm for an ethic of the self conceived in aesthetic terms – as 
ultimately individualistic and egoistic. As we saw earlier in the chapter, it is by 
conceiving of human beings as subjects of power that Foucault can articulate a 
meaningful concept of resistance, and indeed a meaningful concept of the right to 
resistance. It is the fact of being ruled, of being subjects of power, which founds the 
solidarity that for Foucault is the basis of a ‘citizenry’ of recalcitrant subjects. Indeed, 
this resonates with Camus’ idea that it is revolt that places individuals in community 
with one another: “We see that the affirmation implicit in each act of revolt is 
extended to something which transcends the individual in so far as it removes him 
from his supposed solitude and supplies him with reason to act.”676 As we saw earlier, 
Foucault shares this idea that resistance can place individuals in community with one 
another, and indeed forms the basis of a certain solidarity. 
Finally, it should be noted that their respective accounts are also responses to 
the waning of certain moral and religious forms. For Camus, the world of the rebel 
exists in mutual exclusion to the sacrosanct: “Is it possible to find a rule of conduct 
outside the realm of religion and of absolute values? That is the question raised by 
revolt.”677 As I noted in Chapter Five, Foucault’s turn to an ethic of the self is partly in 
response to the waning of traditional moral foundations. Although not posed explicitly 
in the same terms, Camus’ point is certainly evocative in the context of Foucault’s 
work: “The rebel is a man who is on the point of accepting or rejecting the sacrosanct 
and determined on creating a human situation where all the answers are human or, 
rather, formulated in terms of reason. From this moment every question, every word, 
is an act of rebellion.”678 I conclude with an excerpt from a late interview, where 
Foucault (discussing the situation in Poland in the early 1980s) sounds very much like 
Camus, stating that a recognition that nothing can be done in practice does not equate 
to a tacit acceptance. That non-acceptance – like Camus’ ‘no’ – is a concrete form of 
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resistance. In Foucault’s words: “I think this attitude [of non-acceptance] is an ethical 
one, but it is also political; it does not consist in saying merely, ‘I protest,’ but in 
making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as substantial as possible, and 
one which those who govern, here or there, will sooner or later be obliged to take into 
account.”679 This again evokes the imperative that is bound within critique: the 
disruption of one’s thought, beliefs and behaviours through a critical stance gives way 
to the necessity, the imperative for some form of change. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, then, we have seen how the various facets of Foucault’s project 
culminate in the beginnings of critical framework whereby we can re-think the 
relations between power, politics and ethics. I described a relational account of the 
political field, whereby the potential for politics and political activity arises wherever 
relations of power extend. This enables a meaningful account of politics that is 
consistent with Foucault’s rejection of the state and civil society as organising 
concepts in how we understand political action. The idea of a relational politics 
enables a richer account of human relationships, and how these relationships can be 
the foundation for an alternative conception of ‘relational right.’ Consistent too with 
his rejection of the juridico-discursive model of power and liberal technologies of 
government, this preliminary concept of ‘right’ opens up new critical and political 
pathways. In disrupting the alignment between politics and the public sphere, 
moreover, a relational account of the political field enables us to understand the 
political nature of aesthetic practices without resulting in the negative consequences 
that Rorty et. al. suppose. 
As we have seen, for Foucault the subject emerges as a constitutive element of 
the political field. In this way aesthetic practices are posited as part of this politics. By 
understanding the subject as a discursive phenomenon that emerges 
contemporaneously with the relational fields of power and freedom, we can link the 
self-constitutive and self-transformative practices of the subject with the critical work 
involved in challenging the given discourses and epistemological frames that govern 
subjects’ self-understanding. As I suggested in the final section, this challenge can be 
described as a ‘refusal.’ Read in conjunction with Camus, we can see how Foucault’s 
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idea of resistance is linked to an idea of human solidarity founded in the fact that we 
are all subjects of, and subject to, power. This sense of solidarity builds on the 
‘recognition’ of other human beings as subjects of power, which together found an 
ethic of power. 
But there is more to say about the political stakes of ‘resistance.’ The 
foundation of Foucault’s idea of resistance lies in refusal: refusal of forms of 
government, of given arrangements of power relations, of forms of subjectivity; but is 
this enough to provide a groundwork for individuals to establish new forms of 
subjectivity? While he does have an idea of a praxis of the self – founded in the 
ancient precept of the care for the self and renewed by a more recent Nietzschean 
aestheticism – is there enough work conducted at the level of the modern individual to 
ensure the political objectives he desires? Perhaps not: but we should see this more as 
a critical tension than as a failure. Not only does Foucault deliberately avoid being 
prescriptive, he hesitates at even assuming too much of a responsibility for the 
analyses and critical investigations that he thinks individuals should carry out for 
themselves.680 
                                                                                                                                            
679 Foucault, “Politics and Ethics,” 377. 
680 As James Bernauer puts it, “Foucault’s treatise, as it is encountered in his writings, 
constitutes a practice which educates his readers into an ethical responsibility for intellectual 
inquiry. It provides not an obligatory conduct but a possible escape from an intellectual milieu 
unnourished by ethical interrogation. Foucault’s practice of his ethic marks paths for a 
collaborative assumption of new responsibilities.” (Bernauer, “Foucault’s Ecstatic Thinking,” 
in The Final Foucault, 73-74.) 
  229 
Conclusion: an ethic of power? 
 
The view that Foucault fails to offer a politically meaningful account of resistance 
denies the theoretical and political possibilities of his broader project. Reading the 
concept of resistance merely as ‘counter-power’ not only points to broader 
misunderstandings of ‘relations of power,’ it leads to confusion about Foucault’s 
political objectives. The confrontation of power is clearly a central political, ethical 
and philosophical problem in Foucault’s work. Yet he approaches this problem with 
recourse neither to natural rights, nor to humanist conceptions of human nature. 
Similarly, he rejects corollary conceptions of power as a repressive, negative force and 
of liberty as that which is free from power. Instead, he begins by dispelling these 
conceptions – through his archaeo-genealogical investigations – in order to arrive at a 
conception of the subject of power: the body-subject that emerges within networks of 
power relations, yet which is capable of self-constitution. 
From this point, Foucault is able to re-formulate resistance in a way that is not 
limited to counter-power. The problem with ‘counter-power,’ as we have seen, is that 
it tends to characterise resistance either as the opposite force of power, or as just 
another exercise of power. For Foucault, the former recalls the liberal tradition, 
implying that power can only be opposed from something other and outside itself. For 
Foucault’s critics, however, the latter appears particularly problematic because it 
undermines the normative sense which resistance might otherwise be thought to entail. 
Yet while the possibility of resistance is inscribed within relations of power, the latter 
does not delimit the force, direction or expression that resistance may take. This is 
where the subject’s capacity for self-constitution comes into play. Self-constitution 
employs the subjective dimension that emerges with rapport à soi. For Foucault, it is 
the cultivation of this dimension – through the practices, techniques and activities of 
self – that enables the subject to develop a certain critical stance in relation to herself. 
This is similar to Foucault’s characterisation of the operation of thought. Conversely, 
it is thought that enables the critical practice of these techniques and activities. What 
emerges from this analysis is that the relationship between critique and self-
constitution gives way to a certain circularity. Foucault thinks that critique is the 
movement by which the subject gives herself the right to question the relationship 
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between authority and truth. As we have seen, this simultaneously de-subjugates the 
subject and opens up the interstices within which self-constitution can be carried out. 
As such, critique and self-constitution appear to be mutually enabling and mutually 
dependent. Through the critical attitude, we arrive at the idea that resistance is 
founded in refusal: in the qualified refusal of given technologies and forms of 
government. But does this address one of the central problems posed in Chapter Two: 
namely, the problem of identifying what the foundation or source of the critical 
attitude should be today? As we have seen, Foucault rejects the humanist and liberal 
ideals upon which this refusal has been founded in the past. 
Furthermore, as I pointed out at the end of the last chapter, the question remains 
as to whether the grounding of resistance in refusal is enough to inform and give 
impetus to modern projects of self-creation and self-transformation. Particularly, 
whether Foucault does enough to explain how such projects might avoid the 
normalising and disciplining forces that are still at play in today’s societies. Can 
Foucault avoid all the problems he identifies, and yet still offer a groundwork for 
modern individuals which is both compelling and meaningful? Answering these 
questions requires the careful avoidance of assumptions about power and freedom that 
fall back upon either the juridico-discursive model or the liberal idea of the 
relationship between power and freedom. I thus sought in part to provide a coherent 
defence of Foucault’s project in a way that avoids the well-known problems that arise 
from his often inconsistent and problematic presentation of his views. This thesis 
proposed approaching the question of resistance (and Foucault’s project more broadly) 
through the idea of an ‘ethic of power.’ The goal of this approach was to enable a 
different way of thinking-through what, given Foucault’s philosophical commitments, 
resistance might entail.  
To this end, I pointed out the ways in which certain criticisms of Foucault’s 
work in this area have tended to assume philosophical positions and commitments that 
from the outset are contrary to Foucault’s own. Such criticisms are limited in the 
contribution that they can make to an evaluation of Foucault’s project according to its 
internal commitments and objectives. In Chapter One I presented these criticisms in 
order to provide a critical framework within which the thesis as a whole rests. I noted 
the way in which they tend to read the lack of a strong normative foundation in 
Foucault’s account of power as inevitably precluding the evaluation of exercises of 
power as acceptable or unacceptable, legitimate or illegitimate. From this perspective, 
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Foucault’s claims to the possibility of resistance appear unfounded, if not 
inconsistent with other conceptual facets of his account. Similarly, his use of 
‘freedom’ appears at odds with his broader project, since it implies a certain normative 
sense that Foucault is normally at pains to avoid. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, 
however, these interpretations turn on the assumption of a particular relationship 
between power and freedom that remains bound in the liberal tradition. Namely, the 
idea that power and freedom are mutually exclusive, whereby freedom is reduced 
everywhere that power is exercised. According to this view, a meaningful notion of 
resistance would therefore need to refer to the limitation of power and subsequent 
preservation of freedom. Yet, as I argued in Chapter Two, Foucault rejects these 
characterisations. This is particularly because he considers such ideas of freedom to be 
both the effects and instruments of liberal technologies of government, which deploy 
these concepts in order to rationalise and legitimise the very imposition of government 
upon these freedoms. 
It is the case, however, that Foucault’s descriptions of freedom – especially as a 
‘field of possibilities’ – are liable to lead to such misunderstandings. Freedom for 
Foucault is not radically different from the concepts put forward by the traditions that 
precede him; it does in its most basic form refer to the opportunities and possibilities 
for a range of actions and behaviour. The point of departure is the definition of these 
opportunities and possibilities as lying within a network of power relations—not as 
external to, or defined by their exclusion from, this network. Accordingly, power does 
not refer to a repressive state or mechanism. Foucault thinks of power merely as a 
function of social interaction, and therefore an unavoidable part of everyday life. It is 
neither an absolute state, nor a physical capacity that can be measured and possessed. 
Similarly, ‘government’ refers to the myriad of ways – both inadvertent and deliberate 
– by which individuals affect each other’s actions.  
Neither therefore does freedom mean to be free from power. Nor, despite being 
in a sense conditions of one another, do they amount to the same thing. Thus, while he 
certainly rejects the notion of an absolute liberation, it is not always clear that he 
rejects the idea of freedom as a field of action which is increased or reduced according 
to the exercise of power. I argued, however, that we should understand this as a ‘field’ 
or ‘domain’ defined relationally between individuals (rather than as a space of action 
bound to the individual). As such, Foucault’s idea of freedom is not a state or area 
inalienable from the individual. It is defined in and through relations between people. 
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This is what it means to say that power is the condition of freedom: freedom is only 
coherent if conceived as the possibility for a range of actions which are defined by and 
meaningful in the context of relations of power.  
In re-conceptualizing ‘power’ and ‘freedom’ in this way, Foucault wants to 
move beyond more traditional political and philosophical theories. These tend to rely 
on certain conceptions of the subject and human being that place individual freedom, 
autonomy and self-determination as the key measures of what constitutes acceptable 
and unacceptable forms of power. Critics such as Habermas, Fraser and Taylor fall 
within these traditions. While they are right to point out his inconsistent use of 
‘freedom’ and ‘resistance’ – particularly when it comes to the implication of a 
normative underpinning to these concepts – these evaluations are made from positions 
external to Foucault’s philosophical and political framework. Accordingly, a different 
evaluative framework is required to render his alternative ideas about power 
politically and philosophically meaningful. The key to this problem for Foucault 
scholars – and the challenge – is to avoid framing the idea of resistance exclusively in 
terms of power or freedom.  
In the first part of Chapter Two I laid the groundwork for this approach by 
drawing out the theoretical and philosophical commitments underlying Foucault’s 
archaeo-genealogical approach and his analyses of critique. On one hand, in 
displacing the central, ordering ‘Subject’ of Western epistemologies Foucault sought 
to create a space in which to ‘think differently.’ In doing so he subsequently opened 
the possibility of inserting the subject as part of the epistemological field itself. On the 
other hand, in moving to a genealogy of modern Western subjects, Foucault wants to 
show how our modern conceptions of the self and subject are historical and cultural 
realities that are open to challenge. I have argued that it is in this idea that the central 
ethical and political objectives of Foucault’s work lie. These are, first, to reveal the 
epistemic and discursive conditions by which we understand ourselves and each other 
in particular ways; and second, to thereby open the possibility of understanding and 
constituting ourselves in different ways. It is from this perspective that Foucault’s 
project should be evaluated. His concept of resistance, in particular, should be 
appraised in terms of its contribution to achieving the success of these political aims. 
Archaeology, as we saw in Chapter Two, seeks to bring to light the way that 
knowledge and history have been structured by specific, historical discursive 
conditions. Foucault’s genealogy represents a continuation of this approach, bringing 
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to light the discursive conditions of past and present ways of talking about, 
interpreting and understanding ourselves as particular kinds of subjects. What Chapter 
Two achieved was to illustrate the role of the analytics of power in continuing to 
pursue the same philosophical and political commitments underpinning the archaeo-
genealogical approach. Moreover, I pointed out that Foucault’s resistance to liberal 
and humanist conceptions of human nature and to a priori theories of the subject does 
not result in the ethical and political failure that Foucault’s critics would have us 
believe. Just because Foucault fails to orient his work according to a founding idea of 
human nature, it does not follow that all is permitted, or that there are no means by 
which to distinguish between forms of life, or exercises of power. The rejection of 
these concepts is a key political and philosophical manoeuvre.  
In Chapter Three I argued that Foucault’s later emphasis on a self-constituting 
ethical subject is consistent with his earlier dismissal of ‘the Subject.’ The ethical 
subject he adopts later is not the rational, Cartesian subject separated from the world. 
Furthermore, his genealogy of the modern subject can be read as cementing Foucault’s 
rejection of the sovereign, founding subject precisely because it enables the 
circumvention of traditional philosophies of the subject. I argued that we should also 
understand this movement within the context of Foucault’s problems with humanism. 
In doing so, the later work also appears as an attempt to restore to the subject the 
power it has been denied by both liberalism and humanism. As such, this chapter 
supported a more synthesised reading of Foucault’s work more broadly, whereby the 
ethical aspects of the subject provide critical and theoretical depth to Foucault’s earlier 
thought. However, a significant problem emerged from this analysis, and one which 
emerged again later in the thesis, albeit in a slightly different form. That is, that the 
political stakes of Foucault’s project are sometimes undermined by a lack of political 
pragmatism. In the case of humanism, Foucault’s concerns fall too far on the side of 
the merely theoretical, appearing to place philosophical stakes before social and 
political realities. 
In addition, in Chapter Three I addressed the criticisms outlined in the first and 
second parts of Chapter One. I argued that the conclusion that Foucault cannot speak 
about resistance in a meaningful way – because his account does not admit the body as 
either a bearer of a priori values or as endowed with a minimum strength or agency – 
turns on the view that to posit the body as inextricably located within networks of 
power is to posit the body as necessarily determined by power. I argued that to seek a 
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concept of the body ‘in itself’ as a foundation of a transcendent critique of power 
assumes an interpretation of the latter as a negative, repressive force, and as such falls 
back upon the juridico-discursive model of power. My response was to posit the idea 
of a body-subject that has capacities and skills that arise internal to networks of power 
relations, but which are not determined by them. In doing so, I adopted Deleuze’s idea 
of the subjective dimension, which arises out of rapport à soi. I complemented this 
idea with Butler’s analysis, which demonstrates how rapport à soi is established in 
relation to social norms. This established an initial framework within which to 
examine the role of social norms in Foucault’s ethics more broadly. In articulating 
how individuals are produced by disciplinary power, rapport à soi enables us to strike 
a balance between the individual’s subjectivation (assujettissement) through 
heteronomous exercises of power, and the capacity for self-constitution.  
In Chapter Four I evaluated certain implications of rapport à soi for Foucault’s 
account of ethics more broadly. In doing so, I argued that the inter-relational structure 
of rapport à soi does not imply that human beings are ontologically indistinct. We 
could say both that we are distinct beings and that our rapport à soi is bound in 
relations with others. Subsequently I argued that care for oneself takes precedence 
over care for others precisely because of our distinctness as beings: it cultivates the 
capacity to care for others. In light of this, I argued that Foucault’s insistence on the 
imperative of care for oneself indicates a structural primacy of self over others. Yet 
this did not address the problem that such an account fails to show any necessary link 
between care for oneself and care for others. 
By pointing out that ‘care’ is an attitude toward oneself, a manner of being, and 
an activity, I demonstrated how it presupposes a reflexive relationship with oneself. 
Care is a social practice that takes place within the socio-political domain and within 
concrete relationships with others. What emerged from this discussion is that we 
should not judge Foucault’s accounts of rapport à soi and care for the self by seeking 
evidence of a primordial ethical bearing toward other human beings (like Levinas-
inspired criticisms suggest). This is not to say that there is no genuine ethical spirit to 
Foucault’s ethics, but that this spirit is derived neither from a conception of care as 
recognition of the absolute authority of other human beings, nor from a sense of 
primordial responsibility. Rather, we should instead view Foucault’s accounts of 
rapport à soi and the care for the self as founding an account of situated subjects 
whose responsibilities arise out of their social embeddedness. It is in terms of the 
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subject’s relationship with herself that Foucault analyses relations to other people and 
conceives of our responsibilities toward them. 
I argued, furthermore, that this enables a minimalist form of universalism – 
what Cordner calls a ‘universalism of outlook’ – founded in the recognition of other 
human beings as subjects of power. In contrast to Cordner’s account, however, I argue 
that (following my argument that rapport à soi founds a culturally and historically 
situated form of subjectivity) this universalism of outlook should be based on the 
recognition of others as subjects of power. This enables a similarly situated operation 
of universalism that can respond to social and cultural particularity. This is compatible 
with Foucault’s account because it does not require that individuals submit to 
universal moral codes, and neither does it result in the limitation of human difference. 
I argued, moreover, that the recognition of other human beings as subjects of power is 
central to his very understanding of human interaction and freedom, although 
Foucault’s objections to humanism would preclude us from describing this 
acknowledgement in terms of an essential human nature. 
In the final section of Chapter Four, I took the idea of a situated subjectivity 
founded on rapport à soi further, arguing that it also allows us to understand how a 
certain idea of situational norm is compatible with Foucault’s ethics, and indeed is 
necessary to the overall coherence of this account. In doing so, I pointed out that 
Foucault does not entirely reject the influence of moral codes on individuals. Rather, 
these codes constitute the overarching framework within which individuals develop 
their ethics and rapport à soi. This point is significant for two reasons. First, because 
criticisms focusing on the apparently individualistic and egoistic nature of Foucault’s 
ethics ignore the fact that all the elements of this ethics – including rapport à soi, the 
care for oneself, and aesthetic practices of self-stylisation – take place in reference to 
the broader values and moral codes of an individual’s given society. They are, as I 
have argued, social practices. Second, because it is only by understanding this point 
that the significance of these practices for transforming individuals’ relations to these 
values and codes becomes clear. Rapport à soi thus conceived is compatible with a 
certain kind of situational norm. That is, a norm or principle for behaviour that is 
associated with a specific, if not unique, situations. 
From this analysis emerged the question of the extent to which Foucault thinks 
that such norms and principles are binding. To answer this question, I turned to the 
idea of ‘ethical distance.’ This is effectively a ‘space of contemplation’ enabled by 
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rapport à soi. I argued that the latter enables us to articulate how individuals can 
recognise and respond to social norms and obligations tied to social roles, while 
avoiding the problematic consequences of a stronger command-obedience model of 
ethics. Particularly, it enables the distinction between an unthinking exercise of pre-
determined social roles and a reasoned and reflective execution of these roles as part 
of one’s rapport à soi. Finally, I pointed out that an individual’s rapport à soi 
becomes the foundation of an ethos that enables her to respond to the problem of the 
exercise of power. This ethos involves activities and practices that both form the 
foundation of the subject’s self-mastery in the power she exercises over others, and 
represent a mode of response to heteronomous exercises of power. 
In the first part of Chapter Five, I argued that the practices of the self that 
Foucault adopts from Antiquity represent the starting point for re-conceiving political 
activity and the relationship of self-constitution to politics. In doing so, I pointed out 
that rather than signifying the re-institution of ancient values into the modern world, 
Foucault’s adoption of practices of the self represents a point of departure for a new 
‘politics of ourselves.’ As I pointed out, Foucault views his analyses of ancient 
philosophy as a preparatory work, both reflecting upon and (to an extent) adapting 
ancient ethics for a modern audience. In doing so, I suggested that Foucault’s work 
should be partly evaluated according to its contribution to assisting modern 
individuals to develop an ethic of the self.  
To this end, I argued that the key point of similarity that Foucault identifies 
between Antiquity and the modern world lies in the problem of the practice of liberty. 
In this way, I suggested, the idea of liberty is re-instituted as a core idea in the analysis 
of power, although as I pointed out, it is still far from traditional liberal conceptions. 
The significance of this point, I argued, is that this re-emphasises the extent to which 
Foucault does think that the exercise of power is a significant problem. This is because 
liberty can give rise to new relations and exercises of power, and because practices of 
liberty represent one avenue for mediating the exercise of power. In this way the 
practice of liberty refers to the manifestation of the relationally defined field of action 
(established in Chapter Two), which is politically important because it affects the very 
relation from which it arises. Thus by positing rapport à soi as the foundation of the 
practice of liberty, the relation of politics to ethics becomes clear.  
In the second section I took up the point that Foucault’s work should be partly 
evaluated in terms of its contribution to the possibility of a modern ethic of the self. 
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As I have pointed out, one of the central functions of Foucault’s work, particularly in 
its genealogical aspects, is precisely to enable us to see that the ways in which we 
understand ourselves and each other are not necessary. Rather, they are products of 
specific historical epistemological frames, and the discourses that support them. This 
is not only a theoretical contribution; it is precisely part of the groundwork required 
for elaborating an ethic of the self. Indeed, I argued that the heart of Foucault’s 
conception of the role of the public intellectual is bound with the political enterprise of 
the critical attitude. The public responsibility of the intellectual and philosopher is 
precisely to question authority on its relation to truth: that is, to disrupt established 
orders of knowledge, epistemological frameworks, and their corollary structures of 
power. As such, I pointed out that Foucault’s work demonstrates a strong sense of 
public responsibility. 
Yet in this analysis emerged again the question of how valuable such an 
approach actually is. In examining how Foucault conceives of the relation of 
philosophy to politics this became particularly clear; the role of philosophy is not to 
tell governments how to exercise power, nor what qualifies as a legitimate exercise of 
power. Rather, the task of philosophy is to tell the truth in relation to power. 
Similarly, I pointed out how the task of constituting new forms of subjectivity while 
politically indispensable are nevertheless founded in refusal. I pointed out that while 
this again emphasises the extent to which Foucault aligns the role of philosophy and 
intellectuals with the critical attitude, there are real questions about the meaning and 
political efficacy of this approach. While it goes some way in explaining the absence 
of strong normative claims in his work, it does little to address the failure to offer an 
account of how things should actually be. 
Conversely, however, this analysis also revealed a more pragmatic approach to 
the role that the intellectual or philosopher can play with regard to politics and 
governments. I argued that in this case their role is to disrupt congealed arrangements 
of power in order to give rise to the potential for political and institutional change. In 
doing so, I demonstrated the stronger, imperative sense of critique. The latter forces 
transformation by removing the certainty of the assumptions, beliefs and unconsidered 
modes of thought in which our political practices are founded. In this way, the 
significance of Foucault’s analyses of ‘critique’ are not limited to their theoretical 
contribution to the philosophical tradition. They play both a theoretically and 
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practically indispensable role in how he conceives of politics, the relation of 
philosophy to politics, and the relationship between ethics and politics. 
In the third and fourth sections of Chapter Five I then examined the ethical and 
political implications of Foucault’s emphasis on aesthetic practices. In doing so I 
argued that over-emphasising the artistic analogy unfairly limits aesthetic practices to 
the pursuit of a beautiful life, which is misleading in terms of Foucault’s ethical and 
political objectives. Particularly, it over-emphasises the superficial and sensuous 
aspect of such practices, and as Bennett points out, undermines the sense in which 
such practices can be conceived as properly ‘ethical.’681 Furthermore, I argued that 
such criticisms over-emphasise the Nietzschean elements of Foucault’s account and 
thus misconstrue his political objectives.  
Unlike Nietzsche, Foucault does not turn to aesthetics in order to create a new 
‘table of good.’ Rather, the subject’s aesthetic practices take place in relation to 
existing tables of good. Furthermore, Foucault’s use of aesthetic practices neither 
signifies a turning away from worldly problems, nor indicates a disregard for the 
concerns of the polis. Overly Nietzschean interpretations of this idea downplay the 
extent to which rapport à soi embeds aesthetic practices within socio-political reality, 
and that these practices are only an element of Foucault’s ethics. The latter retains a 
strong dependence on the overarching moral codes and social practices in which 
aesthetic activities are carried out. Finally, I argued that aesthetic practices should be 
conceived as political activities. (In this way, Foucault does not necessarily suspend 
the distinction between the public and private spheres, but disrupts the correlation of 
the political with the public.) In contrast to Rorty, who thinks that such practices 
should remain relegated to the private sphere, I pointed out that Foucault thinks we 
should disassociate the political relevance of such activities from their interplay or 
dependence upon the state or other liberal institutions.  
Finally, in the last section of Chapter Five I examined Foucault’s analyses of 
ancient dietetic practices, in order to evaluate the critical contribution that Foucault’s 
emphasis on techniques and practices of the self make to achieving his political 
objectives. In doing so, I pointed out that these analyses support my view that 
Foucault’s work in this area requires a re-thinking of the alignment between the public 
sphere and political activities. By positing dietetic practices more broadly in terms of 
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practices of the self, and by linking them with the individual’s participation in 
politics and community life, Foucault questions the relegation of such activities to the 
realm of the ‘private’ and ‘feminine’ in order to deny them political significance. As 
such, I argued that the real political value of these analyses for a modern ethic of the 
self is that they illustrate how modern individuals can use such practices to challenge 
given discourses about the self and subjectivity. Moreover, they enable modern 
subjects to challenge given epistemic categorisations that govern how we understand, 
recognise and make sense of ourselves and others.  
What emerged in this analysis, however, is that techniques of the self can be 
deployed to contradictory ends, especially where practices conducted under the 
heading of self-care or self-development can be re-deployed to subjectivising 
[assujettisement] and disciplining ends. As such, the extent to which they constitute a 
mode of resistance will always be in question. My response to this problem was to 
point out that while this remains a real possibility, what is both theoretically and 
politically significant is that subjects can nevertheless participate in such practices in a 
critical way. Yet, as I observed, this does point to a certain weakness in Foucault’s 
account, and one which also emerged in the final chapter of this thesis. That is, that 
the unwillingness to prescribe certain actions or behaviour, or to make normatively 
founded judgements about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ exercises of power, limits Foucault to 
showing the ways in which our assumptions, practices and ways of understanding 
ourselves are determined by historically and culturally specific discourses and 
épistémès.  
Finally, in Chapter Six, I took up these political issues and returned to the idea 
of the critical attitude and its implications for ‘resistance.’ I argued that relations of 
power, read in conjunction with the disassociation of political power from the state, 
requires an alternative political model organised around ‘relations of power.’ In 
developing this alternative approach, I pointed to the discursive field as the primary 
site of political contestation. Discourse, I suggested, marks the site of interplay 
between the epistemological frameworks and structures of power of a given society. 
As such, discourse is a ‘strategic field,’ where subjects can use discourse as both an 
instrument of control and as a countervailing force. This is essential to understanding 
the operation and significance of the critical attitude, since it is irruptions in the 
discursive field that open the interstices within which individuals can promote new 
forms of subjectivity. This is because discourses are not merely the surface of 
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historical arrangements of power, but feed into and support those arrangements, 
which set the limits of experience and the terms of intelligibility. 
In addition, I pointed out that a relational politics enables the articulation of a 
notion of ‘relational right’ that is compatible with Foucault’s broader philosophical 
commitments. It promotes a richer account of human relationships and seeks to 
disassociate the regulation of these relationships from statist institutions. Indeed, it is 
in this context that Foucault moves toward the idea of a relational right, and further 
away from rights as defined and guaranteed by the state. Such rights are de-identified 
from individuals and emerge instead from relations between individuals. Moreover, I 
argued that these culminate in the idea of a common right to resistance, based on a 
solidarity that emerges from the recognition that we are all subjects of, and subject to, 
power.  
In the second section I returned to the idea of the critical attitude in order to 
evaluate its success in contributing to a conception of political activity as work carried 
out upon oneself through a critically practiced challenge to given frameworks of 
interpretation. I argued that in line with the idea that discourse constitutes the primary 
site of political contestation, critique should be understood as the foundation of, if not 
the primary form, of political activity. In doing so, I turned to the concept of parrēsia, 
which introduces a break – a caesura – into the discursive field, and exposes the limits 
of a given epistemology. It is within this space that alternative discourses and ways of 
ordering the world can emerge. Similarly, I argued that it is in adopting a critical 
stance that subjects can open up the interstices within which they can understand and 
form themselves in innumerable and unforseen ways. 
In the final section of Chapter Six, I returned to the concept of resistance. I 
pointed out that the inscription of the possibility of resistance within power relations 
does not lead to the formulation of resistance merely as ‘counter-power.’ While 
resistance does, in part, refer to recalcitrance against given exercises of power, this is 
not the whole story. I pointed out that this recalcitrance should be thought instead as 
the ‘agonism’ of placing power relations in question, a task which is bound within the 
embeddedness of our situated subjectivity. In doing so, I argued that the primary 
targets of resistance are the overarching discourses, structures of power and epistemic 
frames which govern that subjectivity. The critical attitude resists power by refusing it. 
In drawing out the similarities of this refusal with Camus’ idea of rebellion, I argued 
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that while we should understand this refusal as a ‘no,’ it is nevertheless a concrete 
way of living in and responding to the world.  
A politics of refusal 
Foucault’s genealogical analyses reveal the historical specificity of the 
epistemological and discursive frameworks through which we understand ourselves as 
subjects. While these analyses are a groundwork for the possibility of a modern ethic 
of the self, it is nonetheless clear that this is a mere prelude to the work that 
individuals would need to undertake in order to establish and develop their own ethic. 
Foucault merely begins this task by introducing a caesura into philosophical and 
political discourses. This caesura begins to open the interstices between the given 
discursive fields, structures of power, and epistemic frames of modern Western 
societies within which we can begin the work of constituting an ethic of the self.  
Foucault effectively synthesises the problem of governmentality – which can 
also be thought of as the question of ‘power’ – with the question and problem of 
critique. Foucault links the possibility of new forms of subjectivity with the 
‘liberation’ of the individual from the state and its individualising mechanisms.682 This 
liberation is not framed in terms of the problem of how to ‘release’ individuals from 
the grip of power or governmental institutions. Rather, the problem of how to refuse 
given arts of government is fundamentally linked to question of the present—of who 
we understand ourselves to be and of the conditions of that understanding.683  In this 
way, we should understand the question of resistance in terms of its challenge to the 
discursive, epistemic and power structures that frame our being and living in the 
world. In light of this, I have argued that we should look to the critical attitude – the 
right to qualified refusal of given forms of government – as the foundation of a 
meaningful concept of resistance.  
The subject is a discursive phenomenon that emerges contemporaneously with 
relations of power and freedom. The discursive field marks the site of interplay 
between the epistemic frames and structures of power of a given society. It is by 
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calling into question the relation of authority to truth that the subject can open up 
interstices between given discourses, structures of power and epistemological frames. 
These interstices enable alternative ways of understanding and ordering the world and 
therefore the possibility of understanding ourselves in innumerable and unforseen 
ways.  
The task of questioning relations of power is founded in the critical practices of 
self-constitution. As such, rapport à soi can be thought of as the ‘permanent limit’ to 
relations of power and arts of government.684 To adopt an attitude of critique is to 
‘problematize’ one’s relation to the present, to the world. It is a way of understanding 
ourselves in relation to the given discourses, epistemological frameworks and 
corollary structures of power in which we live. Continuous work upon the self – 
conceived through the concepts of the care of the self and aesthetic self-stylization – 
cultivates the capacity to ‘step back,’ as it were, from a given way of thinking, 
behaving, or being in relation to others. Evoking Foucault’s definition of ‘thought,’ 
the latter is itself posed as an object of analysis and contemplation in order to question 
its underlying conditions, assumptions, prejudices. Indeed, philosophical activity is 
precisely the critical work of calling into question what is ‘known’ in order to 
establish the possibility of thinking differently. It is an exercise of oneself in the 
activity of thought—a practice of self that shapes one’s rapport à soi.  
Recognising how our understanding of ourselves is influenced and determined 
by these can inform our self-constitution in such a way to resist these forms of being 
and give rise to new forms of subjectivity. In this way, the activity of critique is a form 
of ‘ascesis’—of ethical work upon oneself. It is a lived activity. Through the practices 
of self that refine our rapport à soi, the possibility of critique is inscribed in our very 
being and embodiment as historical and cultural realities, which renders it part of the 
work of freedom. Most significantly, however, the critical attitude is a stance that one 
takes in relation to oneself and to the world which enables the perpetual posing of the 
question ‘how not to be governed?’ 
Like Camus, the foundation of Foucault’s concept of resistance lies in refusal, 
in a ‘no.’ Indeed, I have argued that Foucault’s work presents the possibility of a 
                                                                                                                                            
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations.” (Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27.) 
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continual ‘no,’ founded in critical practices of the self. Similarly, this resonates with 
Camus’ idea that it is revolt that places individuals in community with one another; 
that gives the individual reason to act by removing her from her solitude.685 There is a 
positivity in this refusal: “Rebellion, though apparently negative since it creates 
nothing, is profoundly positive in that it reveals the part of man which must always be 
defended.”686 It is in recognition of the commonality of being subjects of, and subject 
to, power from which the ‘solidarity’ bound within resistance emerges. It is by 
conceiving of human beings as subjects of power that Foucault is able to articulate a 
meaningful concept of resistance, and indeed a meaningful concept of the right to 
resistance. It is the fact of being ruled, of being subjects of power, which forms the 
commonality that for Foucault is the basis of an ‘international citizenry.’  
The adoption of the critical attitude as resistance recognises that critique is a 
lived activity that follows from our social embeddedness as concrete, historical 
realities. The subjective dimension that emerges as an undetermined and undefined 
result of the practices of rapport à soi enables the challenge, if not the subversion, of 
the limits of intelligibility. To be a self-constituting subject of power means that one’s 
reflexive dimension – that which constitutes oneself as subject – emerges through 
relations of power with others. The recognition that we are each subjects of, and 
subject to, power forms the basis of a solidarity in refusal. The fact of our being 
subjects of power is the basis of a minimalist form of human being.687 That ‘we are all 
ruled’ – that we are all subjects of power – is the basis of a common ethic of power 
and right to resistance.  
                                                                                                                                            
684 As Deleuze puts it, “There will always be a relation to oneself which resist codes and 
power; the relation to oneself is even one of the origins of these points of resistance.” (Deleuze, 
Foucault, 103.) 
685 Camus, The Rebel, 21-22. 
686 Ibid., 25. 
687 Indeed, Foucault does not necessarily reject all tenets of humanism; his project is far more 
concerned with restoring the power to the subject that liberal humanism has denied it. As 
Veyne points out, Foucault “was not the enemy of man and humanity that he was believed to 
be. He simply reckoned that humanity could not get any absolute truth to descend from heaven 
or to operate, in sovereign manner, in a heaven of truths. He believed that all he could do was 
react to the truths and realities of his time and perhaps respond to them in an innovative 
fashion.” (Veyne, Foucault, 2.) Cf. Patton, “Foucault’s Subject of Power.” 
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